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ABSTRACT
DESIRING REASON:
REASON AS AN UNAVOIDABLE DISCOURSE OF DESIRE
FEBRUARY 1991
CYNTHIA C. KAUFMAN, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
M.A.
,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
In this dissertation I argue that reason is nothing
more than the term we give to thinking taken to be
legitimate. It has no a priori content. Because of this,
there is no objective thing called reason which could be
accepted or rejected. I argue that Nietzsche's most
important contribution to the critique of the
Enlightenment is his exposing of reason as a socially
constructed discourse of desire. This puts him above the
fray of the debates over the acceptance or rejection of
reason, and onto what I claim is the more productive
terrain of looking at reason as problematic but
unavoidable. Irigaray develops this Nietzschian approach
to reason in a way that exposes the tendencies of
philosophical notions of reason to prevent women from
V
being able to articulate their interests in discourses
taken to be legitimate. Through this example of the
marginalization of the interests of women, she is also
able to help us see just how it is that reason can operate
hegemonically
. This epistemological perspective lends a
certain plausability to Habermas' claim that
in the absence of a transcendental ground for a notion of
rationality, what we should call rational is a judgment
that all participants in a discussion agree is correct.
Where Habermas' position becomes problematic is in his
insistence that a rational consensus can be distinguished
philosophically from a non rational one. It is here that
Habermas' position operates to reinforce dominant
exclusionary mechanisms. I draw out the implicatons of
this position for looking at feminist in am international
context, and argue that we do not need universal notions
of what counts as women's liberation to be able to make
cross-cultural critical judgments. Rather, what we need to
be able to do this is an open ear to the self articulation
of the concerns of real women. I argue that critique can
be rational if we do not suppose that we can ever have a
fixed notion of what counts as rational, but rather if we
accept that rationality is a place holder concept for the
discourses which we take to be legitimate. From this it
follows that the rational is the site of inevitable
struggles over legitimation.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Reason, Irrationality and Legitimation
And how are you going to
search for this, Socrates,
when you don ' t have the
faintest idea what it is?
Which of the things that you
don't know will you suppose
that it is, when you are
searching for it? And even if
you do come across it, how
are you going to know that
this is the thing you didn't
know?^
When we say that a person should do their best to solve
a problem we tell them to use their reason to come up with
a solution. When we are having an argument and we feel
that the other person is being difficult, we ask them to
be reasonable. When someone holds a view that we find
incomprehensible, we think of them as irrational. But what
is this thing reason that we take to be the arbiter of
differences and disagreements? Throughout the history of
philosophy, reason has been appealed to as the faculty for
properly solving disputes, regulating the will and
mediating the impulses. And, though this history is full
of discussions of the nature and content of this court of
’ Plato, Menp, trans. R.W. Sharpies (Chicago:
Bolchazy-Carducci
,
1985) p. 63, 81d5.
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appeals, its existence is more often assumed than argued
for.
In this thesis I want to explore the dilemma of
contemporary Western philosophy with respect to the
grounding of critical judgments. I will focus on the
notion of reason as the term of last resort used to
legitimize a strategy for judgment. In contemporary
Western philosophy, most approaches to the question of
reason fall into two broad categories. One view is that
there must be some sort of a universal standard we can use
as the basis for our judgments in the world. With this
approach the attempt is made to find a grounding for a
particular view of reason and to overcome the failings of
previous attempts. The other view is that there is no way
to establish such a standard without circularity. On this
view, use of any notion of reason is seen as a bad faith
effort to control and manipulate others. Appeals to
reason, including critiques of existing standards of
reason, are always exercises of power over others and have
no further foundation.
What I want to show in this thesis is that although
this dilemma is not philosophically solvable, a clear
understanding of its status can help us to work more
productively with it. Against the first approach, I shall
use the arguments of the second: any notion of
rationality, and therefore any legitimation of judgments,
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rests on an unavoidable circularity. Justifications for
our judgments are always related to discourses of desire
and interest. The second approach focuses on the necessary
non-universality of discourses of reason. By showing that
reason is always related to desire, thinkers in this
tradition undermine the pretensions to universality of
traditional discourses of legitimation.
Against the second approach, however, I shall argue
that discourses of legitimation are unavoidable, and
therefore so to is reason unavoidable. Where followers of
the second approach get into trouble is in legitimizing
their own forms of practice. While many of them do not see
this as a problem because they do not see themselves as
engaging in praxis, I shall argue that all being in the
world involves praxis, even when what that means is going
along with the status quo. What I shall conclude from this
is that reason can neither be grounded without circularity
nor avoided.
Where I think both schools go wrong is in assuming that
reason is something stable that can be accepted or
rejected. I shall argue that reason is the term we give to
thinking taken to be legitimate. It has no a priori
content. Because of this, there is no objective thing
called reason to be accepted or rejected. Once we
challenge the reification of whatever occupies the
privileged position of the rational, we open up a space
3
discussion. The two sltematives outlined
above yield political strategies that I take to be
problematic: dogmatism in the first case and guietism in
the second. A clear understanding of the dilemma can yield
an open ended politics of critique. Once we begin to
look at rationality as a dynamic concept we can begin to
move beyond the paralysis of universalism versus
relativism.
Nietzsche occupies a very special position in this
whole discussion. His work has been taken to be pivotal in
many discussions of universalism versus relativism and
more recently in the discussions of modernism versus post-
modernism.^
In these discussions Nietzsche has been both championed
and vilified as the great irrationalist . He has also been
shown to be the most consistent thinker in the tradition
of the Enlightenment. Thus, while Nietzsche is central to
many of the discussions of modernism and post-modernism,
the ways that he is read are so diverse that it would be a
mistake to think that there is one Nietzschian legacy or
Nietzschian tradition.
In Chapter Two, I argue that Nietzsche's most important
contribution to the critique of the Enlightenment is his
^ For a good discussion of the variety of readings of
Nietzsche's position in these debates see: Robert Gooding-
Williams "Nietzsche's Pursuit of Modernism" in New German
Critique #41, Spring-Summer 1987, pp. 95-108.
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analysis of reason as a socially constructed discourse of
desire. This puts him above the fray of the debates over
the acceptance or rejection of reason, and onto what I am
claiming is the more productive terrain of looking at
reason as problematic but unavoidable. Irigaray develops
this Nietzschian approach to reason in a way that exposes
the tendencies of philosophical notions of reason to
prevent women from being able to articulate their
interests in discourses taken to be legitimate. Through
this example of the marginalization of the interests of
women, she is also able to help us to see how reason can
operate hegemonically
.
The epistemological perspective which I develop in
Chapters Two and Three, through readings of Nietzsche and
Irigaray, leaves us in the position of acknowledging the
unavoidability of discourses of legitimation, but of also
acknowledging the fact that our discourses of legitimation
are always limited. It challenges us to constantly look
into the space of the privileged discourse of reason to
find operations of hegemony.^
One of the disturbing things about this approach to
reason and legitimation is that it tells us what not to do
^ Another tradition that offers the possibility of a
third way between acceptance and rejection of reason is
the work of Frankfurt School. It is not surprising that
Nietzsche also played a pivotal role in much of their
thinking.
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and what to watch out for, but it does not offer a solid
ground for making the judgments that I am arguing are
unavoidable. The philosophically incomplete nature of this
position, combined with the tendency of critics of
universal approaches of reason to go along with the status
quo by focusing on the impossibility of making judgments,
in part accounts for the enormous popularity of the work
of Habermas.
There is a certain intuitive plausibility to Habermas'
claim that in the absence of a transcendental ground for a
notion of rationality, what we should call rational is a
judgment that all participants in a discussion agree is
correct. And Habermas seems right to claim that this
consensus should always be judged with an eye to the power
relations of participants of the discussion. Habermas
claims to hold these views while still positing a
universal source of legitimation. He seduces with the
promise of universal legitimation in the ideal speech
situation. Because I believe that universalism is as
politically dangerous as it is appealing, I devote Chapter
Four to a critique of Habermas' slippery position on the
status of universalism in reason and legitimation. The
hope is that this will not just serve as a critique of one
regressive Enlightenment thinker but rather, will
sensitize us to some of the ways that universalism has of
insidiously reasserting itself.
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In this thesis I want to argue that reason is a place
holder term for discourses of legitimation and that this
place is always occupied by some content, but that this
content is never wholly justifiable. Because of this the
best we can do in critical discussions is to be self
conscious about the positions that we hold, and to not let
charges of irrationality stop us from moving our
investigations into areas where we are interested in
going. Because of the enormous weight that commonly
accepted beliefs have in prejudicing notions of
rationality, we need to be continually aware of the
hegemonic operation of all discourses of legitimation.
Section 1:
One of the most peculiar things about reason is that
though many philosophers have spoken of it as if it were a
thing, found in the world, every aspect of the nature of
this thing has been the subject of dispute in the Western
philosophical tradition.'^ Why then do we persist in
^ Kant argues that reason is the faculty through
which we control our appetites. Hobbes argues that reason
is "nothing but Reckoning (that is. Adding and
Subtracting) of the consequences of general names agreed
upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts..."
For Locke, if we use our reason, we will know the laws of
nature and live according to them. God has given us reason
in order for us to be able to know the good and act
according to its dictates. For contemporary rational
choice theorists, such as Rawls, reason is the capacity to
act to satisfy more rather than less of our desires. [See:
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaohvsic of Morals ,
trans. H.J. Patton (New York: Harper, 1964) pp. 64-65, par
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talking about iraason as if it had som© sort of
metaphysical existence?
One thing that the various philosophical approaches to
reason seem to have in common is that when they call
something rational they mean that it is in some sense
correct, right or good. But if reason is the faculty
through which we judge the validity of a proposition, then
how do we know when we are using the correct faculty, or
using it correctly? There is an infinite regress of
standards of legitimation that no theory of reason, truth
or justice can escape. Because of this regress, I will
argue that reason can only be used as a ground which is
temporary and open to further challenge. That is, if what
we mean by reason is thinking taken to be legitimate, and
we admit that no discourse of legitimation can find
absolutely stable ground, then the best we can do with a
concept of reason is to use it as a place holder for
/
thinking taken to be legitimate at the moment.
This does not leave us with no concept of
rationality nor does it leave us with a valorization of
irrationality. The reason it does not leave us with no
concept of rationality, is that whenever we are engaged in
linguistic practices, we unavoidably raise legitimation
#397-8; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Middlesex: Penguin,
1968) p. Ill; John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New
York: New American Library, 1963) p. 311; John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971) p. 143.]
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claims. In speaking we act to organize the world according
to the categories we adopt. Even if we do not want to
attribute to these organizational schemes any metaphysical
validity, our use of them constitutes a certain
intervention in the world. It is impossible to jump out of
the language game of legitimation. Even if we accept the
Derridean deconstruction of the distinction between
serious and playful uses of language, or Sara Kofman's
deconstruction of the distinction between metaphoric and
literal uses of language, language still implies
legitimating practices.^
In, On Deconstruction
. Jonathan Culler has argued
against the reading of Derrida that takes his undermining
of the distinction between serious and playful uses of
language to mean that he has found a way to use language
such that determinations are avoided. Culler argues that
the notion that all meaning is derivative does not get us
out of the view that language creates meaning.^
With Derrida we give up on the notion of absolute
meaning, but not of meaning altogether. And as meaning
creating practice, language, even ' deconstructive
'
^ See: Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans.
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)
;
Sara Kofman Nietzsche et la Metaphore (Paris: Payot,
1972) .
^ Jonathan Culler On Deconstruction: Theory and
Criticism after Deconstruction (Ithica: Cornell University
Press, 1982), p. 132.
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language, works as an intervention in the world. As a
meaning creating practice, language is only not a
legitimating practice if we refuse to accept
responsibility for our actions.^
Since our linguistic interventions in the world always
throw up legitimation claims, we are always caught in the
game of rationality. This is not to say that we always
need to use the term rationality to name the discourse of
legitimation. But if rationality has no a priori content,
and is seen as nothing but a place holder for a discourse
of legitimation, then there is no a priori reason not to
call any discourse of legitimation that we accept
'rational.' Of course the discourse of rationality is
strongly historically bound to admit some contents and not
others. In currently accepted discourses of reason,
thoughts associated with desire or any notion of interest
other than 'rational self-interest' are taken to be
antithetical to reason. These exclusions are part of the
strength reason has as an operative force. Reason acts to
mark its other, and the weight of the accepted exclusions
sets up a powerful political force.
Once we have accepted the view that reason opens up
onto an abyss of legitimation, however, the a priori
exclusion of desire or interest cannot be held up on
philosophical grounds. This does not mean that it is not
^ Admittedly a philosophical possibility.
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held up in reality. Reason is accepted as having a certain
content by most people and because the space occupied by
discourses of rationality is an almost sacred one, it is
very difficult to challenge what ever it is that occupies
this space. Thus not everything can be called rational by
a given group at a given time, but the reasons for what is
accepted and what is not grow out of political struggles
over legitimation rather than from any disinterested set
of a priori laws.
Habermas argues from the position that all language
involves discourses of legitimation to the view that in
all speaking we raise universal validity claims. As I
shall argue in Chapter 4, Habermas' reasons for claiming
this universality are highly problematic. We can reject
this universalism and still claim that some form of
legitimating practice is always involved in the use of
language. If what we mean by rationality is something
taken to be legitimate, then we cannot avoid making claims
to rationality, as long as we use language.
See: Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the
Evolution of Society trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1979. Habermas bases this claim in the
speech act theories of Searle and Austin. See: John
Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of
Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)
;
J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962) . For an interesting
reading of Austin as himself undermining the distinction
between playful and serious uses of language see Shoshona
Felman The Literary Speech act: Don Juan with J.L. Austin,
or Seduction in Two Languages trans. Catherine Porter
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1983).
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since discourses of legitimation are unavoidable, our
defetishization of the concept of rationality need not
lead to a rejection of rationality. Neither must it lead
to a valorization of the irrational. Irrationality is the
other of what is taken at any one moment to be rational.
If we understand the extent to which the rational is
unstable, then nothing can be given stability as reason's
other. The content of the irrational, like the content of
the rational is open to dispute.
The problem with taking rationality to be a
metaphysical given is not just a philosophical one. Since
the designation 'rational' gives a particular content the
mark of legitimacy, the assumption that we can divide up
the contents of discursive space into the rational and the
irrational allows for the political operation of inclusion
and marginalization. Throughout its long and varied
history, the concept rationality has worked to mark a
barrier between the dominant and the dominated. This
occurs in the relations between the sexes and in the
designation of colonized others.
One implication of the position that we cannot avoid
discourses of legitimation is that we are always
unavoidably involved in discourses of inclusion and
marginalization. Speaking always involves discourses of
legitimation, and discourses of legitimation always imply
the evaluative marking of positions. What happens when
12
rationality is fetishized and taken to be an invariable
given, however, is that the political process of
marginalization becomes unaccountable. The commonly
accepted structures of what counts as correct reinforce
of marginalization, and the designation
rational puts them above the field of discursive struggle.
If being dispassionate is the mark of a rational
person, then it is difficult for the person who advocates
a position because of a passionate interest in the subject
to get a fair hearing. In advocating for her position, the
passionate person could adopt a dispassionate demeanor and
use some argumentative strategies accepted as rational,
she could reject the discourse of rationality as
oppressive and stick to an emotional appeal, or she could
challenge the notion that what it means to be rational is
to be dispassionate. While use of all three strategies can
be effective, the third strategy is one that is often
overlooked. This is the case because the concept
rationality has achieved such a high level of
fetishization that we often forget that its content is a
matter of social determination. When the content of the
concept rationality is allowed to remain above the fray of
ideological struggles, a key form of hegemony is allowed
to remain unchallenged.
This is not to say that the content of the concept
rationality has remained stable over time. In fact there
13
have been enormous changes in it over the course of the
Western philosophical tradition. What has remained stable
is the way that reason has been able to designate its
other without having its own constitution openly
challenged. The discursive space occupied by rationality
embodies an enormous amount of power. What counts at a
particular moment as rational is what is unquestionably
taken to be correct, what has achieved the highest level
of legitimation possible. But the way that this concept
receives its content is from the power of commonly
accepted beliefs.
This operation has been especially clear in the
discursive construction of woman as the other of reason.
While the nature of the relationship between reason and
its other has changed dramatically over time, the fact
that reason constructs its other has not. For Aristotle,
the fundamental distinction between reason and its other
was the distinction between form and matter. Each thing
has a formal principle or essence, and its reason consists
in fulfilling the function dictated by its essence. For
Aristotle, form is a fundamentally male principle, matter
is associated with the female. Men exercise reason in
thinking and deliberating. Women are the material
substrate from which life grows, they do not add a formal
element, in reproduction or in social life. Reason's other
14
is unthinking matter, and women's essence is to be
matter.’
The notion that reason is opposed to passion is a
fairly modern innovation. While Aristotle's reason could
include passionate convictions, the desires of the body
and moral principles, concepts of reason growing out of
the Enlightenment excluded these elements. For Kant reason
elevates us above bodily desires and interests. Reason's
other becomes the emotional desiring body. Whereas for
Aristotle women were not rational because they were
material giving and not form giving beings, for Kant their
lack of rationality lay in the over dominance of their
emotions
.
Since the Enlightenment, the notion of a strict
mind/body dualism has been one of the more stable and
politically powerful elements of the concept of reason. On
this view, reason is seen as deriving from the mind as
opposed to the body. As reason and the mind are elevated
so are the body and its brute desires denigrated. The
assumption of mind/body dualism has worked to mask the
source of reason. If the mind were based on a
fundamentally different principle from the body, it would
not be absurd to suppose that this principle had a law to
govern it. Once we reject the ontological assumption of
’ Ann Ferguson "Does Reason have a Gender?"
unpublished manuscript.
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mind/body dualism, we bring up for question the status of
the source of reason.
While Descartes built his whole system around the
notion of mind/body dualism, he was never able to clearly
articulate the relationship between these two elements, if
mind and body are truly distinct, how can they effect one
another? Of course Descartes had an answer to this
question, but his theory of the pituitary gland as working
like a lever to operate the machine of the body begs the
question. The point of contact in a dualistic ontology
always invites an infinite regress. Once we reject a
dualistic ontology, we are forced to rethink the
relationship between reason and desire. If reason is not a
faculty found somewhere in our heads, as distinct from our
bodies, where does it come from?
As reason changes, so the nature of its other changes,
and along with it, nature of woman. Woman's status as the
other of reason has remained stable as the character of
this otherness has changed dramatically . While the
history of Western philosophy contains a variety of
notions of rationality, each with its own way of
construing its other, what these notions have in common is
A similar operation takes place in the
construction of the racialized other of colonialist
ideology. See: Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967);
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books,
1979)
.
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the ability to designate a boundary of acceptability. Only
when the construction of this boundary is theinatized and
included in discussions of legitimation, rather than
accepted as a given, will it be possible to break the
hegemonic function of operations of reason.
In this thesis I want to make a specific point about
the hegemonic function of the way that the relation
between reason and passion is traditionally construed and
a more general point about the need for a continual
questioning of any views which get elevated to the status
of the rational. This is meant in part as a caution
against using notions of reason to limit the kinds of
critical issues that can be raised and to encourage the
taking seriously of the specific critical claims that
people raise, even if on first sight they do not appear
rational
.
Section 2:
If we take seriously the notion that rationality is a
place holder term for discourses of legitimation then it
no longer makes sense to carry on a debate over the
virtues or disadvantages of its acceptance. While we may
not necessarily continue to use the word 'rationality' to
connote legitimate discourse, the very instability of the
term prohibits its simple rejection. If what we mean by
the rationality we reject is a certain content it is taken
17
at present to contain, its rejection always falls onto the
terrain of the rational, since the rejection itself must
appeal to what it takes to be a more legitimate position
than the one rejected as 'rational.' if we accept this
view, then it does not make sense in discussions of the
critique of rationality to argue for and against, as if
the object under discussion were a metaphysical given. A
more fruitful discussion would center around the
constitution of the discourse of legitimation, whether pro
or anti 'rational.'
If we begin to investigate the constitution of the
concept rationality, we can begin to move beyond what has
become a standoff in recent literature in social theory
between adherents of rationality and its opponents. The
potential fruitfulness of a discussion over what can be
used to ground political judgments in the contemporary
world has been all but thwarted by a sniping back and
forth around positive and negative evaluations of
rationality. This uncritical acceptance of the givenness
of rationality is nowhere more extreme than in discussions
about Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard.
The position that Lyotard takes up in The Postmodern
Condition: a Report on Knowledge is that the rationalism
of Western modernism is an unnecessary attempt at
legitimation which limits our freedom. In his analysis, he
distinguishes between metanarratives, through which we
18
establish discourses of legitimation, and narratives
through which legitimation is established "by the simple
fact that they do what they do."^^ He argues that society
is made up of a plurality of language games and that each
language game grounds itself in rules and practices
immanent to its own functioning. The problem with meta-
narratives- such as Marxist discourses of liberation,
philosophical discourses around truth or the Hegelian
doctrine of Absolute Spirit is that they attempt to
establish a narrative frame to hold all narratives.
Whereas narrative knowledge "does not give priority to its
own legitimation and. . . certifies itself in the pragmatics
of its own transmission without having recourse to
argumentation and proof metanarratives such as the
Western discourse of truth establish a form of cultural
imperialism through the demand for legitimation.’^ Lyotard
then calls for an abandonment of all metanarratives. We
should allow the narratives that we have to hold our
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on Knowledge trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984)
p. 23 .
Curiously excepted from this is the Western
ideology of science which Lyotard takes to be a open and
experimental practice, free from metanarrative
constraints. See The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge
.
p. 64.
Ibid. P- 27.
Ibid. P- 27.
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societies together without recourse to discourses of
legitimation
.
One of Lyotard's targets in this discussion is
Habermas. Habermas' project of grounding critical
judgments in the 'uncoerced coercion' of the ideal speech
situation strikes Lyotard as an imperialistic attempt at a
meta-narrative. He argues that Habermas makes two faulty
assumptions: that all speakers could come to some
agreement as to what rules to accept as legitimate for all
arguments and that the goal of a dialogue should be
agreement. Lyotard claims that different language games
should have different rules, and that dissensus- or a
space for disagreement- should be the goal of discourse.
In The Philosophical Discourse of the Modern Habermas
makes a counter attack on the French postmodernists who he
characterizes as neoconservatives (this is because their
refusal to get behind any emancipatory program leaves them
valorizing the given) . While not addressing Lyotard
directly in this book, Habermas takes up the problematic
dealt with by Lyotard. The problem with the
postmodernists, for Habermas, is that by denying the
universality of knowledge they undermine any position from
which they could make judgments. This leaves them either
contradicting themselves when they make judgments or not
making judgments at all. To combat this relativism, what
Ibid. p. 65.
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is needed is a universal form of reason, which Habermas
argues can be found in the notion of the force of the
better argument as the foundation for settling disputes in
a counter-factual ideal speech situation.
Habermas takes the position that a universal form of
reason is required for critical judgment. He takes up the
banner of reason- albeit reason in a non-instrumental,
non-transcendental form- and shows the postmodernists to
be irrational ists
. Lyotard replies with the charge that
Habermas engages in a repressive practice by using
rationality to enforce conformity and discipline. Missing
from the debate is the issue, that both Habermas and
Lyotard implicitly raise, as to what counts as rationality
and why.
For all of his talk of wanting to escape from
discourses of legitimation, Lyotard himself is engaged in
one in his argument with Habermas. His claim- that
paralogy gives a better measure of justice than consensus-
is nothing but a metanarrative of legitimation. Even the
notion that narratives ground themselves in the pragmatics
of their functioning implies a pragmatist meta-narrative.
For all of his posturing as someone willing to take the
leap into the undefined world beyond discourses of
legitimation, Lyotard's insistence that we must go there
necessarily implies such a discourse.
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If we see the ways in which Lyotard himself is engaged
in discourses of legitimation it becomes clear that the
ground for a debate between Habermas and Lyotard is not
over the desirability of engaging in discourses of
legitimation- and therefore of reason- but rather how
these discourses should function. All of the charges of
rationalism and irrationalism keep us from getting to this
point.
If we accept the notion that reason is what we call a
discourse when we find it to be legitimate, then the
difference between the positions of Habermas and Lyotard
is not one of reason versus unreason, which given the
fluidity of these terms is impossible. But rather the
contest is between different strategies for legitimation.
While Habermas argues that there are universal and
necessary requirements for any legitimate discourse,
Lyotard argues that different discourses carry with them
different rules. For Lyotard, the questions as to what
legitimizes these rules or even why plurality is better
than universality are never adequately dealt with. This is
because Lyotard's refusal to engage in anything that looks
like a discourse of legitimation makes him back off and
avoid discussions when these sorts of questions are
raised
.
One of Habermas' objections to the postmodernists is
that by denying the universality of reason they undermine
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any position from which they could make critical
judgments. If I am right in arguing here that thinkers
such as Lyotard and Foucault are always engaged in
discourses of legitimation even if they themselves deny
this, then how could it be possible for them to ground
their legitimating practices, given their denial of the
universal validity of any discourse of truth?
Foucault's work has been especially interesting in
showing domination implications of discourses of reason.
Habermas would argue that interesting as these views might
be, the moment they reject universal discourses of reason,
they undermine the ground from which their position gains
its force or purchase on reality. But does the view that
we are always speaking from a standpoint necessarily imply
the position that we must take our own standpoint as
universally valid? Habermas argues yes. For him, thinkers
who reject all universal approaches to rationality involve
themselves in a pragmatic self-contradiction. Their
practice of making critical judgments is contradicted by
their position that these judgments can never achieve
universal validity.
What is unclear in Habermas' position is why making
judgments implies our taking them to be universally valid.
See for example: Michel Foucault The Archaeology
of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language , trans. A.M.
Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972 and The
History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction , trans.
Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980.
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If we accept the position that we are always speaking from
a standpoint we do not thereby completely invalidate our
ability to make claims from where we are standing. We can
accept the view that our positions are our own and use
them to engage in discursive interactions. The important
implication of realizing that our position is perspectival
is not that our view is wrong, but rather, that it is open
to challenge. Although there is always an infinite regress
in any discourse of legitimation, we are constantly
engaged in these discourses, and the regress often stops
where participants in a discussion find themselves to be
in agreement.’^
Section 3;
In holding the view that there is an infinite regress
in grounding any notion of reason, we find ourselves on
the terrain of Habermas' charge of self-refutation. If I
have rejected all grounding as unstable, then where can I
An interesting example of this fallacy is
contained in the argument that once we have accepted a
pluralistic epistemology we are committed to the view that
modern Western epistemologists are epistemologically
superior to members of traditional cultures who take their
worldviews to be 'true. ' A truly pluralist epistemology
does not have to accept this implication. Theories of
truth grow out of the answering of questions that arise in
real lived experience. One of the experiences of those of
us who have grown up in the Western ideological tradition
has been the imperialistic implications of notions of
truth as a universal. Thus I can reject the universalism
of my own tradition without having to say that this
pluralism is the new universal truth about epistemology.
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stand as I make this claim? In his essay, "Die Krise des
Wahrheitsbegriffs als Krise der Metaphysik", Josef Simon
argues that the concept of truth is necessarily
paradoxical. It is paradoxical in that any concept of
truth requires a grounding, but any grounding must make
reference back to some already legitimatized principles of
truth if it is to count as grounding. According to the
charge that this view is self-undermining, the rejection
of the validity of truth claims must itself raise truth
claims. Thus, on this view, the skeptic necessarily falls
into a pragmatic self-contradiction in which the claims of
the skeptic are undermined by her practice of making
assertions which necessarily raise validity claims. Simon
claims, however, that the paradox of grounding a concept
of reason is unavoidable: for either the metaphysician or
his critic.
Nothing seems to irritate metaphysical
thought as much as this sort of utterance
[that discourses of truth are inherently
circular]
,
which immediately, when one
takes it seriously, provokes the objection
that it itself wants to raise claims to
truth. Certainly it does do this. The
problem however remains that it is
difficult not just to redeem truth claims
from this sort of paradoxical utterance,
but to redeem them from any sort of
utterance
.
Josef Simon, Nietzsche Studien #18, 1989 p. 242.
Here redeem is a translation of einlosen. This word, which
shows up often in Habermas, means something like cash in
or make good on. We should think of redeeming in the sense
of green stamp redemption rather than the redemption of
our souls. There are no theological implications in the
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Any speaking implies the validity of the terms used, hence
any speaking raises truth claims. But no speaking can
thoroughly ground the claims it raises.
Simon wants to limit discussions of truth to the
clarification of names. A name clarification is sufficient
when it distinguishes the things we need to distinguish
for a specific goal. This means that discourses of truth
take place within a horizon of commonly accepted beliefs.
Simon sees questions of knowledge as fundamentally
pragmatic. That is, we are justified in holding something
as true when our understanding is clear enough for
action.^’ Rejecting the claim that this lands one in a
pragmatic self-contradiction, Simon argues.
Those who make the objection of the
pragmatic contradiction do not realize
that no concepts can have the validity of
a definitive interpretation, including the
concept truth, and that one can only speak
of a contradiction under the
presupposition of definite interpretations
of concepts, for example, that in making a
claim to 'truth' one would be making a
claim about the 'correspondence between
concept and object. ' This can only be done
under the presupposition that the concepts
' correspondence
' ,
' concept ' and ' obj ect
'
are not at the same time in need of
interpretation, that means, that it
depends inseparably upon the situation of
which the meeting of the different
horizons of the speaker and the hearer is
a part.^°
German.
Ibid. p. 247.
Ibid. p. 255.
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And this, he claims, means that discourses of truth are
necessarily provisional and related to the horizon of
inquiry of the participants of a discourse of knowledge.
In all speaking there takes place, in a
way which can never come to a conclusion,
not only a discussion about objects but at
the same time over concepts to clarify
their respective uses. Since this process
of self-clarification can never come to a
conclusion, there is no basis for the
charge of self-contradiction. There is a
basis for this charge when used against
the person who speaks out of an uncritical
consciousness, which sees its concepts as
final and by that token as referring to
ultimate being. The charge of self-
contradiction is a typical metaphysical
charge in a high sounding tone which
refuses to perceive the bodily origin of
its own voice.
In other words, there is no pragmatic self-contradiction
for the critical thinker who knows that her concepts are
temporary, and related to specific contexts. Only when one
attempts to claim a wider scope of validity for one's
truths do the problems of the paradoxes inherent in a
theory of truth come to bear. The self-critical critical
thinker is prepared to enter into a discussion of the
validity of concepts being used when a participant in the
discussion finds something being assumed to be
problematic. The discussion can proceed until the conflict
or misunderstanding is resolved or at least clarified.
Ibid. p. 255.
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this point there can be a moment of acceptance of a
truth, until the next problem arrives on the scene.
Section 4;
Simon shows the impossibility of self grounding for any
notion of truth, or Reason. In The Dialectic of
Enlightenment
. Horkheimer and Adorno show the implications
this circularity has for relations of domination.
Underlying their critique of Enlightenment notions of
rationality is an acceptance of the positive challenge the
Enlightenment raised to traditional forms of authority in
medieval Europe.
The aporia that faced us in our work
proved to be the first phenomenon for
investigation: the self-destruction of the
Enlightenment. We are wholly convinced-
and therein lies our petitio principii-
that social freedom is inseparable from
enlightened thought.
As sons of the Enlightenment, embittered by German
fascism, Horkheimer and Adorno found themselves in the
position of asking how things could have gone so wrong in
Europe and pointed the finger at the inherent
contradictoriness of Enlightenment rationality.
Works such as Kant's "What is Enlightenment" offer the
promise of human liberation by positing a faculty of
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of
Enlightenment trans. John Gumming (New York: Continuum,
1972) p. xiii, translation modified. Dialektik der
Aufklarung (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 1969) p. 3.
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reason that can be used to undermine illegitimate
structures of authority and to prepare the way for a
society in which all people are treated with the dignity
they deserve as human beings,
This free thought gradually acts upon the
mind of the people and they gradually
become more capable of acting in freedom.
Eventually the government is also
influenced by this free thought and
thereby treats man, who is now more than a
machine, according to his dignity.
But while undermining traditional forms of authority, the
principle of autonomous reason sets up a new form of
legitimation.
For enlightenment is as totalitarian as
any system. Its untruth does not consist
in what its romantic enemies have always
reproached it for: analytic method, return
to elements, dissolution through
reflective thought; but instead in the
fact that for enlightenment the process is
always decided from the start.... Nature,
before and after quantum theory, is that
which is to be comprehended
mathematically; even what cannot be made
to agree, indissolubility and
irrationality, is converted by means of
mathematical theorems.
Although we are told that we each have faculty of judgment
within ourselves and that we can use this faculty as the
ultimate court of appeals for any judgment, only certain
Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment" in The
Philosophy of Kant trans. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: The
Modern Library, 1949) p. 138.
Horkheimer and Adorno p. 24.
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kinds of judgments are recognized as having been made by
this faculty.
As the transcendental, supraindividual
self, reason comprises the idea of a free,
human social life in which men organize
themselves as the universal subject and
overcome the conflict between pure and
empirical reason in the conscious
solidarity of the whole. This represents
the idea of true universality: utopia. At
the same time, however, reason constitutes
the court of judgment of calculation,
which adjusts the world for the ends of
self-preservation and recognized no
function other than the preparation of the
object from mere sensory material in order
to make it the material of subjugation.^^
Adorno and Horkheimer criticize Enlightenment
rationality for its prescriptive aspect according to which
only systematizable knowledge counts as knowledge. Reason
posits man as an autonomous agent who relates to nature as
a passive other. This way of positing nature sets up a
relation of domination within man over what he
conceptualizes as his natural side, and a relation of
domination of women and colonized others on the basis of
their being associated with nature.
Woman as an alleged natural being is a
product of history, which denaturized her.
But the desperate will to exterminate
everything that embodies the allurement of
nature- the physiological, biological,
national and social inferiors- shows the
extent to which the experiment of
Christianity has failed. .. .Women and Jews
can be seen not to have ruled for
thousands of years. They live, although
they could be brushed aside; and their
Ibid. pp. 83-4.
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fear and weakness, the greater affinity to
nature which perennial oppression produces
in them, is the very element which gives
them life. This enrages the strong, who
must pay for their strength with intense
alienation from nature, and must always
suppress their fear.^^
For Adorno and Horkheimer, discourses of rationality
can function critically to unmask operations of power
while functioning to hide their own operations of power.
In its critical aspect, rationality challenges operations
of power by raising questions that undermine traditional
forms of authority and domination. At the same time,
discourses of rationality raise their own standards of
legitimation that valorize certain ways of thinking and
proscribe others. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the
'dialectic of enlightenment' is inescapable for attempts
at emancipatory social theory.
Since the term 'critique' is often used to denote the
unmasking side of this dialectic, it may seem that we can
avoid the traps of the 'dialectic of enlightenment' by
engaging in critique rather than rational discourse.
But, since any notion of critique requires its own
legitimation, calling our discourses critical rather than
Ibid. pp. 111-112, translation modified, German
pp. 119-120.
For a reading of Nietzsche as an enlightenment
thinker along these lines see: Heinz Rottiges Nietzsche
und die Dialektik der Aufklarung . (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1972) .
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rational still makes us vulnerable to the hegemony implied
by any rational discourse.
Critiques of rationality are thus in a certain sense
circular. Since we always begin our critiques with a set
of views which will remain unquestioned for a certain
time, we rely on a form of rationality (defined here as
thinking taken to be legitimate) while rejecting another.
Section 5:
Pointing out the way that discourses of reason set up
systems of validity that exclude the interests and desires
of women, feminists have often been driven to the position
of rejecting reason as necessarily expressing only male
interests. Some radical feminists have used this insight
to argue that reason is an inherently masculine domain. In
the radical feminist classic, Gvn-Ecology
. Mary Daly
posits a female harmony which exists beyond the
patriarchal discursive structures of philosophical reason.
This book has to do with the mysteries of
good and evil. To name it a 'feminist
ethics' might be a clue, but it would also
be misleading, pointing only to foreground
problems. It would be something like
arguing for 'equal rights' in a society
whose very existence depends upon
inequality, that is, upon the possession
of female energy by men. The spring into
free space which is woman identified
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consciousness, involves a veritable
mental/behavioral mutation.^®
The ' free space ' that Daly encourages us to spring into is
the realm of a natural female solidarity that requires no
discursive articulation, except in so far as articulation
is required to free us from the hold of the current
patriarchal discursive system.
An unfortunate consequence of this approach to the
question of reason is that it keeps women on the outside
of discourses taken to be legitimate. As Joan Cocks points
out in "Wordless Emotions: Some Critical Reflections on
Radical Feminism," there is a tendency in much of the work
of radical feminists to accept the position of alterity
within the conceptual framework set up by its enemy.
Thus it is that the dominant culture and
the counterculture engage in a curious
collusion, in which the established
conceptual apparatus dictates what counts
as the opposite of what, and a rebellious
feminism takes up its assigned position at
the negative pole.^’
Accepting the split between reason and passion as a
natural given, radical feminists have achieved some
positive ends by valorizing the emotional side of life
with which women are often identified. But this positive
aspect is offset by their accepting this split as
Mary Daly, Gvn-Ecologv (Boston; Beacon Press,
1978) p. 12.
Joan Cocks in Politics and Society . 13, #1 (1984)
pp. 27-57.
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ing natural diffsirsncss bstWGen m©n and woniBn
and not challenging the discursive structures which encode
women's capacities as irrational. Cocks points to the
notion of 'women's intuition' as an example of this
ideological coding,
By accepting the validity of a female
'sixth sense,' women help obscure the fact
that their insights stem from careful
attention to the nuances of personal
relationships, from an intelligence
trained on the minutely perceptible
exterior signs in people around them of
loneliness, pride, disappointment, and
changes of heart. Knowledge about life in
close emotional quarters is a mystery only
for those who have not had to sharpen
their powers of psychological observation
and analysis in order to fathom, day in
and day out, the unexplained moods, mute
thoughts, and sudden desires of others.
Thus, there has been a tendency to call the kinds of
knowledge most commonly associated with women irrational,
mystical or at least, not rational. In accepting this
view, however, as Cocks points out.
radical feminism forfeits a key ideo-
logical weapon in its war against
patriarchy. Recognition of that aspect of
the life of the mind that is focused on
the life of the heart, and recognition of
the knowledge women exhibit in the
narrowest of social spaces, is a far more
astute demand to make of the larger
culture than the cognizance of a female
identity with natural or mystical
forces. ^
Ibid. P- 47
Ibid. P- 48
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to combat the position of marginalization to
which women are relegated by the dominant ideological
systems, it is necessary to move beyond valorizing the
of alterity to reason. While such a valorization
is often an important part of the struggle for a
redefinition of our gendered identities, more than this is
needed.
In dealing with the gender system according to which
women are debased as non-thinking nurturers, we need to
re-valorize the role of nurturer, but we should also
question the necessity of the gender allocations
associated with nurturing. Given what I have been arguing
about the openness of the notion of rationality, the
situation here is a bit more complicated. We can valorize
the associative and non-rigid thinking sometimes
associated with women and we can reject rationality as
meaning thinking which is rigidly lawlike. But if we do
not accept the fetishization of accepted concepts of
rationality and instead see rationality as being a place
holder term for discourses of legitimation, then it might
be a better tactical move to argue that rigid thinking is
irrational, rather than conceding the terrain of
legitimized discourse to what has traditionally been
construed as rational.^^
Here I am not arguing that we must hold on to the
term 'rational.' Rather, I am arguing that rationality has
no existential status except as a discourse of
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Any rigid construal of the choice between reason and
passion should be seen as false. Once we have clearly
understood the radical openness of discourses of reason,
we can begin to see how it is that the hegemonic
operations implied by women's exclusion from dominant
conceptions of Reason could be challenged. If we accept
the view that Reason is up for grabs, we can see how it is
possible to take over the terms of the debate and
reformulate reason in a more congenial way.
Section 6;
A critique of rationality can reject specific notions
which are found to be problematic on the basis of
principles not under question at the moment. A view of
critique as an unending process, motivated by the concerns
of real people, allows us to admit that notions of
critique or rationality are always partial, and
potentially hegemonic, but that choosing not to engage in
them is not possible either.
I would like to follow Marx in looking at critique as
the self clarification of the struggles and desires of an
age. If we look at critique this way we are lead to see
legitimation. If we reject reason we are rejecting a
specific concept of what it is right to think or how it is
right to think. I am choosing to hold onto the term as a
tactical move, because I believe that the power invested
in the space that this term occupies warrants its being
displaced rather than its being ignored.
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notions of reason as growing out of the situated concerns
of life. From this approach to reason, it will be shown
that the traditional split between reason and passion in
the modern Western philosophical tradition is one of the
most fundamental hegemonic operations of reason. By
rejecting ways of thinking that ground themselves in the
body or that take the situated concerns of the body as
central, the interests of those groups associated by this
tradition with the body are ruled as irrational by
definition. Far from separating the higher, universal
concerns of the mind from the base ones of the body,
reason should be seen as a specific species of passion and
one that operates to reinforce social hegemony by
legitimizing certain forms of passion while excluding
others
.
Section 7:
In Chapter Two I argue for Nietzsche's view that reason
is a species of passion. Since discourses of rationality
raise only the passions of some people to a level at which
they achieve legitimation, they will be shown to have a
hegemonic function. Nietzsche has two very different
doctrines of the will operating in his work. I will argue
that there is a different epistemology corresponding to
each of these doctrines of the will. One of these can be
used as the basis for a counterhegemonic epistemology.
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th© other reinforces dominating discourses of
reason. According to the first view, the will has a
natural liveliness to it, and the most valid notion of
reason is one that allows the expression of the wills of
those operating with it. On the other view, the will is in
constant danger of atrophy, a doctrine of truth as non-
perspectival, as something heroic and unattainable leads
to a strengthening of the will. Truth is a woman who must
be appreciated at a distance in order for man's drives to
be heightened and sublimated. Nietzsche shows how
discourses of reason and truth operate as social practices
allowing certain concerns to be expressed while
suppressing others. Nietzsche himself is ambivalent in his
preference between dominating and non-dominating
epistemologies
.
In Chapter Three I show how Luce Irigaray uses a
Nietzschean epistemology to point out some of the ways in
which traditional philosophical notions of rationality
have functioned to suppress the articulation of the
interests of women. She shows how traditional
philosophical notions of rationality are built upon a
denial of the rational potential of women, thus making it
difficult for the interests of women to enter into
discourse as legitimate. Against much of the literature on
her work, I argue that Irigaray is not an irrationalist
who believes that language is a necessarily patriarchal
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r©alm, but rather that she displaces the opposition
between reason and passion such that we can see the
hegemonic function of its operation.
In Chapter Four I use the epistemological views
developed in the previous chapters to reveal a masculine
and eurocentric bias in the work of Jurgen Habermas.
Habermas claims to accept the view that reason has no
universal content. On first glance his work seems helpful
for the present project of discussing how it is possible
to talk about reason as a place holder term for discourses
of legitimation. His view that the rational decision is
one that is reached through the uncoerced consensus of all
participants in a discussion is helpful up to a point. If
we accept no a priori content for the concept of reason,
yet we also claim that reason is unavoidable, it makes
sense to then begin to look at the agreement of
participants in a discussion as the mark of rationality.
Where Habermas' position becomes problematic is in his
insistence that a rational consensus can be distinguished
philosophically from a non rational one. It is just at the
point where he claims to be able to make this distinction
that Habermas' position operates to reinforce dominant
exclusionary mechanisms.
In Chapter Five I draw out the implications of this
critique of discourses of rationality to show that
critique can be rational if we do not suppose that we can
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ever have a fixed notion of what counts as rational, but
rather if we accept that rationality is a place holder
concept for the discourses which we take to be legitimate.
From this it follows that the rational is the site of
inevitable struggles over legitimation.
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CHAPTER 2
Reason as a Discourse of Desire:
Nietzsche's Social Epistemology
Thoughts are the shadows of our
feelings- always darker, emptier,
and simpler.
In this chapter I will argue for the value of using
Nietzsche's work in developing a feminist epistemology.
This task is fraught with dangers since Nietzsche's
misogyny is both extreme and pervasive. Before
appropriating ideas in Nietzsche's work which seem
attractive and rejecting those which seem problematic, we
should first see how these ideas hang together, we need to
look into the question of the relationship between
Nietzsche's misogynist views and his philosophical
positions. What I shall argue in this chapter is that
there are two distinct doctrines of the will operating in
Nietzsche, one misogynist the other not, and that these
doctrines of the will are related to different
epistemological strategies in Nietzsche's work. Before
using Nietzsche for feminist epistemological projects we
need to be clear in our rejection of the hegemonic
’ Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science , trans. Walter
Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 203, section
# 179. In many of the quotations from Nietzsche the
translations have been modified slightly.
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Nietzsche just as we appropriate Nietzsche the
epistemological pluralist.
For many commentators, what is significant about
Nietzsche's discussion of truth and reason is his
rejection of their validity. There is a tendency in the
literature for Nietzsche to be read as a skeptic or an
irrationalist
. And Nietzsche of course wrote much that can
be used to support a skeptical view. His is one of the
more powerful critiques of the concepts of reason that can
be found in the Western tradition. And yet, to read
Nietzsche this way is to miss the real power of his
discussion of reason. Nietzsche had much more to say about
reason than simply that it does not hold up to critical
scrutiny. Once we begin to look at reason the way that
Nietzsche did, the terms of the discussion shift so
radically that we end up speaking about something
fundamentally different than what we began with.
Nietzsche shows us that rationality cannot be an
autonomous faculty through which we know the truth of the
world. After having made this point, he then goes on to
ask what reason could be. For Nietzsche it is certain that
reason is something that is very powerful in our lives.
Even if it does not have the kind of existence its
metaphysical supporters have claimed, it has some sort of
existence. Nietzsche sees reason as a kind of social
practice and he wants to know how it works, and how it can
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be made to better serve life. Knowing that reason is not
what we have seen it as does not make it disappear. In
Nietzsche does not see its elimination as desirable.
Living in the world we need to make sense of it, and
Niotzsche sees reason as the name we give for our making
sense of the world. He wants to investigate the effects
different ways of making sense have on our culture and our
individual experiences.
In this chapter, I will argue that Nietzsche had an
epistemology, but that it was a social epistemology.
Approaching the problem of truth from the perspective of
social construction, Nietzsche shows how reason functions
as a social practice which mediates our consciousness of
our experience in the world through socially constructed
discourses of reason, and how these discourses of reason
profoundly effect our lived experience of our own being in
the world. From a Nietzschean perspective it still makes
sense to speak of the validity of truth and reason, but
the basis for validity has been shifted. Having rejected
the notion that reason has a transcendent nature it no
longer makes sense to search for timeless and universal
principles as the ground of reason's validity. For
Nietzsche the validity of a discourse of truth is based in
its healthiness for the will.
Because he has two contradictory theories of the will,
he has two different theories of the kinds of
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epistemological practices that are healthy for the will.
On one view, discourses of reason grow out of the willing
practices of individuals. Each individual has a will which
grows out of a lively engagement with life. This will has
a natural liveliness to it that only becomes nihilistic
when it is not allowed expression. These willing practices
are mediated through the social practice of language.
While this mediation through language brings a necessary
social element into the articulation of the will, there is
no reason that a range of truths cannot be articulated
within a linguistic system. Thus, on this view we can
imagine a multiplicity of epistemological practices
growing out of the linguistic articulation of the varied
experiences of individuals.
On the other view, the will has an inherent tendency to
atrophy. The will gains its vitality through sublimation
and negation. It must constantly create a dominated other.
The will gains the stability it needs to ward of nihilism
through the creation and negation of the other.
Epistemological differences are threatening as alterity
undermines the stability needed for keeping the will
coherent. The tendency toward diffusion and hence nihilism
can only be overcome by stimulating the will through the
creation of unattainable goals and the sublimation of
desire through games of seduction.
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power remainsNietzsche's doctrine of the will to
ambiguous between these two concepts of will. He often
writes as if the will to power means the will to the
expression of the will. In other places it seems clear
that the will to power means the will to dominate. Given
the history of Nietzsche interpretation, it is not
surprising the will to power as mostly been read as the
will to dominate.^ Nietzsche has been conveniently used by
conservative and fascist thinkers beginning with the
edition of The Will to Power prepared by his sister,
Elizabeth Foerster Nietzsche, who herself was a fascist.^
While Nietzsche himself clearly held elitist views, only
one of his doctrines of the will supports these views.
^
Looking at reason as Nietzsche did allows us to see how
discourses of reason have operated to reinforce social
hegemony, by legitimizing interpretive frameworks which
2 ...For an interesting history of Nietzsche reception
in Germany see: R. Hinton Thomas, Nietzsche in German
Politics and Society. 1890- 1914 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1983)
.
^ At the onslaught of his madness, and the end of his
writing career, Nietzsche left volumes of unpublished
notes and had intended to publish a book called The Will
to Power . For a history of the politics surrounding the
editing of these notes by his sister, and of her political
interests, see the introduction to the English translation
of The Will to Power , translated and edited by Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968)
.
^ In Nietzsche and Political Thought . Mark Warren
makes a strong case for the view that Nietzsche's elitism
is accidental to his most significant philosophical
positions. Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988)
.
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the interests of some members of society and
suppress those of others. It also encourages us to look at
reason as growing out of a dynamic relationship with the
body. From this we conclude that reason is a specific way
^^terpreting certain passions. It is not a separate
faculty through which we control the passions.^
While Nietzsche lays the groundwork for a social
epistemology that is useful for questioning hegemonic
operations of power, Nietzsche himself was not interested
in challenging certain forms of hegemony. In order to use
his epistemology for a radical project, we must be careful
to notice Nietzsche's own hegemonic operations. I shall
argue that Nietzsche's belief that the will must be made
heroic through a form of asceticism idealizes a masculine
relation to autonomy and hence serves the hegemonic
function of preventing women's interests from being able
to be articulated in legitimate discourse.
^ In Thinker on Stage; Nietzsche's Materialism
.
Peter
Sloterdijk claims that Nietzsche's most significant
innovation is his "uncovering of the physicality of
thought ." [p. 67 ] Curiously, though, Sloterdijk goes on to
distinguish thought in which physis is illuminated from
the operation of logos' descent into the body. One of our
central theses here is that there is no logos in itself
that could descend into the body. If we reject the idea
that ideas ever could exist autonomously and go "in search
of a body"[p. 83], then we cannot use the model of
internally versus externally derived ideas to distinguish
between positive and negative epistemological practices.
Peter Sloterdijk, Thinker on Stage; Nietzsche's
Materialism , trans. Jamie Owen Daniel (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1989)
.
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In Section 1 of this chapter, I argue that Nietzsche
has a coherent critique of reason and that this critique
does not lead him to a position from which no critique is
possible. Rather, he offers a pragmatic epistemology
according to which knowledge is a social practice that
grows out of situated human concerns. In Section 2, I give
an interpretation of how Nietzsche sees reason operating
as a hegemonic social practice. In Section 3, I discuss
Nietzsche's distinction between these two forms of
knowledge and ask what the value of Universal reason is
for Nietzsche. Then, in Section 4, I discuss the problem
of abstinence and distance with respect to women and argue
that Nietzsche's call for a heroic form of willing is
based on a masculine fear of contact with the other. In
Section 5 I draw out the conclusions from this discussion
and argue that if we reject Nietzsche's heroism of the
will we can reinterpret his epistemology as the foundation
for epistemological practices which are healthy for the
body and useful for challenging domination.
Section 1
"Truth is the kind of error without which a certain
species could not live."^ What could Nietzsche mean by
such an obviously self-contradictory statement? If
Nietzsche is really denying the possibility of truth, how
^ Nietzsche, The Will to Power
, p. 272, section #493.
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can he call anything an error? One finds this paradoxical
way of approaching the question of truth throughout
Nietzsche's work. Two obvious and typical reactions to
this paradox are to either accept Nietzsche's view and use
it to reject out of hand any epistemology, or to reject
Nietzsche's view by arguing that Nietzsche's position is
incoherent. A third way of reading the aphorism may prove
more fruitful. Nietzsche is showing that discourses of
truth are not what they have traditionally been thought of
as, that they do not have the metaphysical validity they
have traditionally been granted. Discourses of truth are,
however, necessary to life and therefore not to be totally
rejected.® For Nietzsche, the question of truth becomes a
question about the social function of truth and how can we
change the way we use discourses of truth to better serve
human needs.
The debate between Habermas and Lyotard, referred
to in Chapter one, can be seen in terms of the author's
different views on Nietzsche. Lyotard reads Nietzsche as
an anti-epistemologist and takes him as an ally. Habermas
argues that this anti-epistemological position of
Nietzsche's is incoherent. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge , trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1985) and Jurgen Habermas, Per
PhilosoDhische Diskurs der Moderne
.
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1986)
.
® Werner Stegmaier argues that Nietzsche does not
have a theory of truth, but rather, he tries to re-define
the latitude of such theories. Werner Stegmaier,
"Nietzsche's Neubestimmung der Wahrheit," Nietzsche
Studien , Band 14, 1985, pp. 69-95.
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For Nietzsche, the concept of truth is an inherently
paradoxical one. It is paradoxical in that any concept of
truth requires a grounding, but any grounding must make
reference back to some already legitimatized principles of
truth if it is to count as grounding.
The view that any concept of truth or reason implies a
necessary circularity has often provoked the charge that
this view is self-undermining. The rejection of the
validity of truth claims must itself raise truth claims.
As I have argued in Chapter 1, Joseph Simon credits
Nietzsche with being aware of this paradox of reason and
with responding to it by developing an open ended,
perspectival epistemological strategy.
Nietzsche was not interested in coming up with a
general truth criterion.’ He saw such a criterion as both
In Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge , Rudiger Hermann
Grimm argues that the paradox of self-referentiality does
not arise for Nietzsche. When making the claim that there
is no truth, Nietzsche means that there are no eternally
valid standards of truth. Grimm's central thesis is that
the will to power is the founding notion in Nietzsche's
philosophy. On his view, the criterion of truth for
Nietzsche becomes: that which increases the will to power.
This is not self-contradictory, says Grimm, because
Nietzsche is claiming that this is an interpretation of
the world which Nietzsche finds appealing, and its appeal
is its own ground. It is therefore self-referentially
consistent
.
While this reading succeeds in getting Nietzsche out
of the paradox of self-referentiality, it misses much of
the power of Nietzsche's critique of epistemology. If we
are not convinced, as I am not, that the will to power is
an appealing idea, the dialogue with Nietzsche must come
to a grinding halt. The grounds for a discussion are
undermined by an individualistic and voluntarist
aesthetics. Rudiger Hermann Grimm, Nietzsche's Theory of
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impossible and undesirable. In section #344 of The Gay
Science he argues that science rests on faith in the value
of truth, on a resolve to avoid illusion, to not deceive.
The value of this resolve needs to be questioned.
Charitably interpreted, such a resolve
might be a quixotism, a minor slightly mad
enthusiasm; but it might also be something
more serious, namely, a principle that is
hostile to life and destructive. 'Will to
truth'- that might be a concealed will to
death.
The will to truth rests on a nihilistic impulse to deny
the perspectival nature of knowing existence in the world.
Discourses of truth are valuable to life when they express
our existential concerns and allow for the expression of
the multiplicity and fluidity of our perspectives.^’
For Nietzsche, there is no pragmatic self-contradiction
for the critical thinker who knows that her/his concepts
are temporary, and related to specific contexts. Only when
one attempts to claim a wider scope of validity for one's
truths do the problems of the paradoxes inherent in a
theory of truth come to bear. The self-critical critical
Knowledge (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977)
.
Nietzsche, The Gav Science , p. 282, section #344.
” For discussions of perspectivism in Nietzsche see:
Volker Gerhardt, "Die Perspective des Perspectivismus ,
"
Nietzsche Studien . Band 18, 1989, pp. 260-281 and Daniel
W. Conway, "Perspectivism and Persuasion," Nietzsche
Studien . Band 17, 1988, pp. 555-562.
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is pir©pairGd to ©ntGir into a discussion of th©
validity of conc©pts b©ing us©d wh©n a participant in th©
discussion finds something being assumed to be
problematic. The discussion can proceed until the conflict
or misunderstanding is resolved or at least clarified.
After this point there can be moment of acceptance of a
truth, until the next problem arrives on the scene.
Nietzsche sees the nihilism of Western civilization as
intimately related to the attempt to come up with a final
truth. If we believe that truth is something to be
reached, we negate the validity of our own thinking being
in the world. We posit a possible end to our intellectual
living and we fundamentally misperceive what it is we are
doing when we are engaged in discourses of truth. Our
acting in the world requires that we hold things as true.
For this reason discourses of truth are necessary. But
since they can never be given a solid grounding, that is,
one that does not make some presuppositions and
assumptions, discourses of truth are never 'true' in the
sense of the word usually meant by metaphysical thinkers.
Prior to any epistemological question for Nietzsche is
the question of our goals in searching for truth. As Tracy
Strong points out in his Friedrich Nietzsche and the
Josef Simon, "Die Krise des Wahrheitsbegrif fs als
Krise der Metaphysik," Nietzsche Studien . Band 18, 1989,
p. 257.
51
Politics of Transfiguration , rather than assuming that the
search for truth is an end in itself, Nietzsche raises
many interesting questions simply by asking why we feel
compelled to engage in this search.’^ Nietzsche argues
that science, with its underlying assumption of the
desirability of knowledge, is not as antithetical to
religion as it has traditionally seen itself:
This pair, science and the ascetic ideal,
both rest on the same foundation- I have
already indicated it: on the same
overestimation of truth (more exactly: on
the same belief that truth is inestimable
and cannot be criticized)
Or, from The Gay Science
.
But you will have gathered what I am
driving at, namely, that it is still a
metaphysical faith upon which our faith in
science rests- that even we seekers after
knowledge today, we godless anti-
metaphysicians still take our fire, too,
from the flame lit by a faith that is
thousands of years old, that Christian
faith which is also the faith of Plato,
that God is the truth, that truth is
divine.
By questioning the value of truth, Nietzsche invites us
to ask what sort of social role it plays. If the search
for truth is not an end in itself, why do we engage in it.
Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics
of Transfiguration (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1975)
.
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals , trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 153,
essay #3, section #25.
Nietzsche, The Gav Science , p. 283, section #344.
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what interests does it serve and how might these interests
better be served? Nietzsche's views on the interests
served by different discourses of truth is both complex
and contradictory. While Nietzsche argues for the value of
viewing truth as perspectival
,
as growing out of the
situated concerns of the individual, he also sees some
value in the traditional philosophical view of reason as
absolute, unitary and hostile to the body. The search for
an absolute, perspective free truth has nihilistic
implications, (he sees perspective free truth as a
castration of the intellect^*^) but he also thought that it
can serve a useful function. The creation of a great and
unattainable goal leads to a heroism of the will which he
claims will lead to cultural greatness, if we can aim for
this goal without at the same time having the hostility to
lived experience inherent in it lead to an atrophy of our
wills. As I shall argue later, this connection between
heroism and perspective free truth is at the heart of
Nietzsche's misogynist and hegemonic epistemological
strategies.
Section 2
While truth is the sort of lie without which the human
species cannot survive, different lies about truth
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals , p. 119,
essay #3, section #12.
53
structure human life in different ways. Nietzsche's
criticism of Christianity is not simply that it is not
but that it is a way of structuring our
understanding of the world such that an unhealthy
relationship to the body is encouraged. The point for
Nietzsche of claiming that god is dead is not that the
doctrines of religion have been proven to be false or self
contradictory. For Nietzsche this would be a weak and
almost irrelevant criticism. The point for him is that
religion still has negative effects on people. By bringing
attention to them, he hopes to rid human society of these
effects.
An example of this is his critique in The Genealogy of
Morals of the ascetic ideal of Christianity. Here he
claims that asceticism is an unhealthy response to the
nihilism of Western culture.
. .
.
the ascetic ideal springs from the
protective instinct of a degenerating life
which tries by all means to sustain itself
and to fight for its existence; it
indicates a partial physiological
obstruction and exhaustion against which
the deepest instincts of life, which have
remained intact, continually struggle with
new expedients and devices. The ascetic
ideal is such an expedient; the case is
therefore the opposite of what those who
revere this ideal believe: life wrestles
in it and through it with death against
death; the ascetic ideal is a trick
[Kunstgriff] for the preservation of
life.^^
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals , p. 120,
essay #3, section #13.
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Here, Nietzsche argues that Christianity is an unhealthy
response to unhealth. It is a way of organizing the
specific combination of dying and vital impulses found in
European society. This organizational structure allows the
vital aspects of this culture to survive the death it
cannot throw off. It is a holding pattern against total
collapse. Having said this, however, Nietzsche also
believes that the negative aspects of this holding pattern
are beginning to outweigh the positive and that it is time
to overthrow this ideological structure and replace it
with one that would cast off some of the deadly impulses
that Christianity has attempted to deal with. An
interpretive structure that grows out of unhealth must be
replaced by one that integrates only healthy impulses.
For Nietzsche it is not possible to move beyond the use
of interpretive structures to a 'true' understanding of
reality. What leads us to accept one interpretation and
reject another is not based on the truth of the
interpretation, since all interpretation is a making of
errors. That is, no interpretation bears an essential or
• *18
necessary relation to the reality being interpreted. In
Michel Foucault sees interpretation as the key
category for understanding Nietzsche's theory of truth,
see: Michel Foucault "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx",
Philosophie
.
NV 1, Nietzsche . (Paris: Les Editions de
Minuit, 1964). Sarah Kofman argues that Nietzsche
undermines the distinction between concepts and metaphors.
Once this has been done we can no longer distinguish a
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molding our perceptions into perceptions of things we
reify the flux of experience according to categories that
make the world make sense to us. Some reifications are
more helpful than others for our projects, but none can be
given an absolute justification."”
This process of reification is not an individual one,
based on our each making sense of our own world.
Conceptualization takes place through the medium of
language. Through using language, we engage in a process
of social fetishism. We experience the world as mediated
'proper 'and non-metaphorical use of language from a poetic
use. The result of this is that epistemological questions
cannot be sharply distinguished from questions of meaning
and interpretation. See: Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche et la
Metaphore
.
(Paris; Payot, 1972)
.
” John Wilcox makes a helpful point that
Nietzsche's critiques of traditional epistemological
theories should not be seen as a blanket rejection of 'the
correspondence theory of truth'. Danto's position that the
main thrust of Nietzsche's epistemology is a rejection of
the correspondence theory of truth is misleading on two
grounds. It assumes that there is a correspondence theory
of truth. Wilcox argues that what is meant when we say
that the truth of something lies in its correspondence to
its object is open enough to dispute that we cannot simply
claim that Nietzsche rejected this doctrine without first
clarifying what it is that we see Nietzsche as rejecting.
Secondly, Wilcox argues that correspondence is not a truth
bearing relation, denotation is. Nietzsche's critique of
the epistemological theories he encountered was that they
assumed that there could be a legitimate denotative
relationship. This is false since all denotation implies
the existence of something denoted. From the point of view
of the doctrine of dionysian flux, however, all denotation
is false. John T. Wilcox, "Nietzsche Scholarship and 'The
Correspondence Theory of Truth': The Danto Case,"
Nietzsche Studien . Band 15, 1986. Arthur Danto, Nietzsche
as Philosopher . (New York: Macmillan, 1965)
.
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the categories created through joint processes of
^®ification. This means that language is the site of the
production of ideology. It is the place where individual
experience and social understanding are the most
intimately mediated.
Nietzsche sees discourses of reason as a necessary
consequence of our using language.
Today, on the contrary, we see ourselves
entangled in error, necessitated to error,
to precisely the extent that our prejudice
in favor of reason compels us to posit
unity, identity, duration, substance,
cause, materiality, being...
Out of the positing of things as things and of positing
relations between things, we must also posit stability and
order. This positing of stability leads us to experience
reality as composed of elements of categories. By fixing
things linguistically we are driven to posit them
metaphysically. That is, we are driven to believe that the
categories expressed in language have some sort of
metaphysical existence. From this metaphysical view of the
world it is a short step to the Platonic view that things
exist by virtue of their participation in the categories
See Mark Warren p. 58. For a general discussion of
Nietzsche's work in terms of ideology critique see: Monika
Funke, Ideolooiekritik und Ihre Ideology bei Nietzsche ,
(Stuttgart: Fromann, 1974).
Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols , trans. R. J.
Hollingdale (Harmondsworth England: Penguin Books, 1968)
,
p. 38, 'Reason in Philosophy', section #5.
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that we believe are foundational, and that reason derives
from somewhere other than experience.
Very much later, in a world a thousand
times more enlightened, the security
^
the
subjective certainty with which the
categories of reason could be employed
came all of a sudden into philosophers'
heads: they concluded that these could not
have originated in the empirical world-
indeed, the entire empirical world was
incompatible with them.^^
Reason is then posited as the structural principle behind
this system of categorization. Nietzsche argues that this
prejudice in favor of reason is not one we can possibly
overcome as long as we use language. "[W]e find ourselves
in the midst of a rude fetishism when we call to mind the
basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language-
which is to say, of reason .
While here Nietzsche is arguing that we cannot avoid a
sort of Platonic metaphysics if we engage in linguistic
practices, in other places his position is not so strong.
Language necessarily fetishizes, but the specific sorts of
fetishism which become accepted are contingent on the
categories accepted by a given linguistic group. In the
first book of Human, all too Human . Nietzsche explores the
view that empirical science can be used as a corrective to
our metaphysical view of the world. By relying more on
sense experience as the foundation of our understanding of
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the world, we can come up with categorization schemes that
do not posit a supersensible world and hence devalue the
lived experience of the body. While scientific
explanations distance one from a feeling of responsibility
for the external world as much as metaphysical ones do,
since both types of explanation posit the external world
as fundamentally distinct from the subject, scientific
explanations are more attractive since through them an
"interest in life and its problems is kindled. This
example shows that we have some control over the specific
nature of the reified world of our understanding.
This control is more social than individual, though,
since the discourses of reason, or operations of truth, we
engage in are inextricably bound up with the necessarily
social practice of language. Consciousness resides in the
individual, and always bears the marks of the unique
experience of the individual, but it also always is
articulated through the conceptual frameworks of the
larger linguistic group.
Words are acoustical signs for concepts;
concepts, however, are more or less
definite image signs for often recurring
and associated sensations, for groups of
sensations. To understand one another, it
is not enough that one use the same words;
one also has to use the same words for the
Nietzsche, Human all too Human , trans. Walter
Kaufmann (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984) p.
25.
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same inner experiences; in the end one has
to have one's experience in common .
Nietzsche sees this as problematic, since there is a
tendency for the group understanding to be simplified such
that "The human beings who are more similar, more ordinary
have had, and always have, an advantage
. Thus, the way
we experience our world as mediated through language is
continually dragged toward "the similar, ordinary,
average, herdlike- common! While we should question the
elitism in Nietzsche's conception of 'the herd', he is
making a valuable point about the way that language offers
a framework of interpretation of our experience such that
our individual experience is seen through the eyes of a
larger social group. Even though all language reifies
experience, we should look at how linguistic practices
function to reify it in ways which serve different social
groups
.
In The Gav Science #354 Nietzsche argues that
consciousness, as the mirror of experience, grows out of
the social need for communication. "The whole of life
would be possible without at the same time seeing itself
in a mirror: even now for that matter, by far the greatest
Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil , trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966) , p. 216, section
#269.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil , p. 217, section
# 268 .
Ibid.
60
portion of our life actually takes place without this
mirror effect...."^® "Where need and distress have forced
men for a long time to communicate and to understand each
other at the same time quickly and subtly, the ultimate
result is an excess of this strength and art of
communication...."^’ "It was only as a social animal that
man acquired self-consciousness
.
My idea is, as you see, that consciousness
does not really belong to man's individual
existence [Menschen] but rather to his
social or herd nature; that, as follows
from this, it has developed subtlety only
insofar as this is required by social or
herd utility. Consequently, given the best
will in the world to understand ourselves
as individually as possible, "to know
ourselves," each of us will always succeed
in becoming conscious only of what is not
individual but 'average.' Our thoughts
themselves are continually governed by the
character of consciousness- by the 'genius
of the species' that commands it- at the
same time outvoted [ma j orisiert ] and
translated back into the perspective of
the herd.... This is the true phenomenalism
and perspectivism. . . .^’
Thus, for Nietzsche, perspectivism is not simply the
thesis that each of us has a unique perspective that grows
out of our making sense of our own experiences. Rather, he
argues that our conscious understanding of our own
experiences is mediated through social processes. Our
Nietzsche, The Gav Science , p. 297, section #354.
Ibid. p. 298, section #354.
Ibid.
Ibid. p. 299, section #354.
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perspective is related to these. Through the process of
social reflection, our knowledge comes to us as already
necessarily bearing the mark of the social. We cannot know
ourselves apart from the 'genius of the species.
'
Although the social is an undertheorized category in
Nietzsche, an understanding of its operations is clearly
an important part of Nietzsche's project. In analyzing the
operations of truth and systems of values, Nietzsche shows
a keen understanding of the importance of social
determination. We find ourselves in a discursive space in
which our instincts and interests are structured in
certain ways and not in others. Knowledge is a social and
not an individual construct.
In the case of Christianity, it is clear that Nietzsche
believes that ideologies are perpetuated to serve social
interests. The Christian denial of the body serves the
interests of the priestly class.
We must count the ascetic priest as the
predestined savior, shepherd, and
advocate of the sick herd: only thus can
we understand his tremendous historical
mission. Dominion over the suffering is
his kingdom, that is where his instinct
directs him, here he possesses his
distinctive art, his mastery, his kind
• 32
of happiness.
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals , pp. 125-
126, essay 3, section #15.
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Christian priests have a group interest in dominion over
the suffering, in maintaining a group of slavish
followers
.
Nietzsche argues that those in positions of
power have been able to define terms in ways beneficial to
themselves
,
The lordly right of giving names extends so far
that one should allow oneself to conceive the
origin of language itself as an expression of
power on the part of the rulers: they say 'this is
this and this, ' they seal every thing and event
with a sound and, as it were, take possession of
it. ^
The power to give names to things is the power to
construct the categories through which an entire
linguistic group understands its experiences. In the case
of the terms 'good' and 'evil' Nietzsche claims that
...the judgement 'good' did not originate
with those to whom 'goodness' was shown
1
Rather, it was 'the good' themselves, that
is to say, the noble, powerful, high-
stationed and high-minded, who felt and
established themselves and their actions
as good, that is, of the first rank, in
contradistinction to all the low, low-
minded, common and plebeian.
The concept of goodness did not arise out of
utilitarianism or a dispassionate investigation of the
nature of goodness, rather, it serves to enshrine the
values that the powerful saw as distinguishing themselves
from those they wanted to be distinguished from.
Ibid. p. 26, essay #1, section #2.
Ibid. p. 26.
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Here, Nietzsche shows linguistic practices to have
profound hegemonic implications. Once a term like 'good'
is defined by a group it serves that group's interests,
^ritil this hegemony is broken by having the term
appropriated for another use. This is what Nietzsche
argues happened with the slave revolt in morality. The
terms good and evil which served the interests of the
aristocrats were appropriated by the Christians to
enshrine another hegemonic interpretation on reality, the
rule of the ascetic priest.
For Nietzsche, then, knowledge is a social practice.
Discourses of truth mediate both human interaction and the
consciousness an individual has of her/his experience. But
how can we know the value of a discourse of truth if we
reject any correspondence theory of truth? For Nietzsche
the answer lies in his physiological pragmatism. We should
accept a discourse of truth if acceptance of it leads to a
healthy willing, if it puts us in a relationship to the
world such that healthy impulses are able to be expressed
and generated.
Nietzsche's views of what leads to a healthy willing
are, however, highly problematic. In the following section
I will discuss one example in which Nietzsche attempts to
distinguish two discourses of reason and to argue for a
more healthy relationship between them. While Nietzsche
gives us some hints as to where to look for hegemonic
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operations of truth, I will argue that his discussion of
the value of heroism in truth is based on his own defense
of a hegemonic operation which benefits men over women.
Section 3
In section 110 of The Gay Science
. Nietzsche makes a
distinction between two kinds of knowledge, that which is
based on direct interpretations of experience and that
which is based on more abstract relations to experience.
In this section he refers to these as 'life preserving
errors' and 'truth.' The kind of truth he sees as
fundamental errors are those judgments by which we make
sense out of our sensuous experience.
Over immense periods of time the intellect
produced nothing but errors. A few of
these proved to be useful and helped to
preserve the species: those who hit upon
or inherited these had better luck in
their struggle for themselves and their
progeny.
The other fom of truth aims at a higher level of
universality, it sees knowledge as fundamentally
dissociated from sense experience and sees rationality as
autonomous. Nietzsche argues that this form of knowledge
which posits itself as universal is the weakest form of
knowledge. It is a practice of truth which takes doubt and
consistency as its highest goals, its usefulness for life
is therefore more difficult to see.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science , p. 169, section #110.
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Nietzsche argues that in earlier phases of human
history
,
the truths which oriented human action were
always those based on false generalizations from
experience. Since the time of the Eleatics, however, truth
has become alienated from sense experience. The Eleatics
developed a skepticism toward experience based knowledge.
By denying the perspectival nature of their own knowledge
they could present their way of looking at the world as
valid for all.
[T]hey had to misapprehend the nature of
the knower; they had to deny the role of
the impulses in knowledge; and quite
generally they had to conceive of reason
as a completely free and spontaneous
activity. They shut their eyes to the fact
that they, too, had arrived at their
propositions through opposition to the
commonly accepted, or owing to a desire
for tranquility, for sole possession, or
for domination.
This so called knowledge of the Eleatics is as much based
on error as the experience based knowledge which preceded
it. The difference is that it presents itself as
universally valid, and thus has a heroic quality not
available to its predecessor.
This heroism, though, requires a problematic
relationship to the body. Like all forms of knowledge, it
originates in the body, as an interpretation which gives
expression to a kind of desire, in this case a "desire for
tranquility, for sole possession or for domination." It is
Ibid.
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a relationship to the body which posits itself as non-
bodily, as transcendent. Thus, an internally contradictory
and hostile relation to the body is initiated.
Nietzsche argues that universalistic knowledge, with
its requirements to consistency, has a natural tendency to
rule out as illegitimate other forms of knowing.
Skepticism is an unhealthy atmosphere for 'basic errors.
'
With the victory of universalistic knowledge in our
culture.
The intellectual fight became an
occupation, an attraction, a profession, a
duty, something dignified- and eventually
knowledge and the striving for the true
found their place as a need among other
needs
As a result of the struggle between experience based and
universalistic reason, a human interest in philosophical
knowledge has developed.
Thus knowledge became a piece of life
itself, and hence a continually growing
power- until eventually knowledge
[universal knowledge] collided with those
primeval basic errors [experience based
knowledge] : both as life, both as ^ower
and both in the same human being.
Now in human beings there is a fight between basic errors
and the impulse for 'truth.' Nietzsche writes that these
two forms of knowledge are locked in a struggle, the
outcome of which will have profound consequences. He
Ibid. P- 170, section #110.
Ibid. P- 171, section #110.
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writes that the most important question raised by this
struggle is "To what extent can truth endure
incorporation"^’ That is, Nietzsche asks if our universal
discourses of knowledge can be brought into a vital
relationship to the body, as primordial errors are.
This is one of the great imperatives of Nietzsche's
epistemology— to incorporate knowledge, to bring universal
discourses of knowledge into a healthy relationship with
the will, rather than having them castrate the will by
denying the bodily origin of knowledge. The power of this
imperative is muted, practically lost, in translation.
Nietzsche says we need to ask to what extent truth can
bear einverleibuna
. At the center of the word
einverleibunq is leib
. body. While the Latin corpus is to
be found in the word incorporate, the implication of
physicality is not as strong in the English as it is in
the German. In the German, Nietzsche's question is harder
to misunderstand: can truth bear to be made bodily?^°
The relationship between truth and physicality is a
central theme for Nietzsche, and his criterion for what
counts as useful truth- and hence true truth- is bound up
with the question of what sorts of epistemological
practices are healthy for the body.
Since there is no object for the einverleibuna .
there is an implication of reflexivity, the incorporation
is into itself or into the body.
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For Nietzsche, knowledge does not originate in a
faculty separate from the body. In Beyond Good and Evil
^
Nietzsche points out the futility of answering guestions
about the source of knowledge by referring to a faculty
for knowledge. Kant asks "How are synthetic a priori
judgments possible?" He answers his own question "By
virtue of a faculty". But, Nietzsche says,
...is that an answer? An explanation? Or
is it merely a repetition of the question?
How does opium induce sleep? "By virtue of
a faculty," namely the virtus dormativa
.
replies the doctor in Moliere, "Because it
contains a sleepy faculty whose nature it
is to put the senses to sleep.
Rejecting the possibility of autonomous reason, Nietzsche
sees knowledge as growing out of bodily concerns.
Nietzsche claims that knowledge is the form that the
relations between our instincts take in consciousness.
Before knowledge is possible, each of
these instincts must first have presented
its one sided view of the thing or event;
after this comes the fight of these one
sided views, and occasionally this results
in a mean, one grows calm, one finds all
three sides right, and there is a kind of
justice and a contract; for by virtue of
justice and a contract all these instincts
can maintain their existence and assert
their rights against each other. Since
only the last scenes of reconciliation and
the final accounting at the end of this
long process rise to our consciousness, we
suppose that intelliqere must be something
conciliatory, just, and good- something
that stands essentially opposed to the
instincts, while it is actually nothing
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil , pp. 18-19, part
#1, section #11.
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a bshavior of ths instincts
toward one another .
’
Consciousness grows out of our integration of our
experiences into complex systems.
Philosophers have made the naive mistake of believing
that their views come from somewhere other than their
interests and instincts.
They all pose as if they had discovered
and reached their real opinions through
the self-development of a cold, pure
divinely unconcerned dialectic (as opposed
to the mystics of every rank, who are more
honest and doltish- and talk of
'inspiration'); while at bottom it is an
assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of
'inspiration' - most often a desire of the
heart that has been filtered and made
abstract- that they defend with reasons
they have sought after the fact.^^
The so called basic errors are much closer to the
bodily needs of the individual than the great philosophic
systems since they grow out of the generalizations
required to solve existential problems. One encounters a
dangerous animal. One is successful in survival if one
generalizes from this experience and identifies as the
same another animal which poses the same danger, and if
one is able to communicate this generalization with other
people. This generalization is false in the sense that
there are differences between the two animals that are
missed by the generalization, but right pragmatically.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science
,
p. 261,
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
, p.
#5.
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section #333.
12, section
This form of knowledge answers questions that grow out of
everyday experience. By offering a network of meaning by
which we can make sense out of the world of experience,
of knowledge not only offers us a pragmatic
orientation for our actions, it also makes possible a
practice which is expressive of our wills.
Universalistic, or philosophical knowledge on the other
hand bears a more complex relation to the body and
experience than does the knowledge founded on basic
errors. Even though both forms grow out of experience, the
distinguishing feature of universalistic knowledge is that
it denies this derivation. By positing itself as
perspective free, universalistic knowledge makes claims to
a validity beyond its ability to make sense out of our
experiences. This error is of a different order than the
errors inherent in basic knowledge. Most significant for
Nietzsche is that universalism must deny the relationship
between the body and knowledge. By denying that the source
of consciousness resides in the senses, a hostile relation
between mind and body is set up in which the growth of
knowledge leads to an increased desecration of the body.
Given Nietzsche's view that in the modern West we live
with two fundamentally different sources of knowledge, one
which expresses a positive relation to the body and
another which expresses a hostile one, why does Nietzsche
claim that we need to incorporate universalistic
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knowledge? What does the knowledge founded on "basic
errors" lack that the more philosophic form has?
Given everything that has been said here about the way
Nietzsche uses the concept of truth, the answer cannot be
that philosophic knowledge is more true than experience
based knowledge. In fact, one often gets the impression
that Nietzsche thinks quite the opposite: that the
greatest errors have been perpetrated by the great
philosophical systems. The answer lies in their call to
heroism.
In the preface to Beyond Good and Evil . Nietzsche
discusses the complex role that philosophical systems,
such as Platonism have played in history.
The dogmatist's philosophy was, let us
hope, only a promise across millennia- as
astrology was in still earlier times when
perhaps more work, money, acuteness, and
patience were lavished in its service than
for any real science so far: to astrology
and its 'super-terrestrial" claims we owe
the grand style of architecture in Asia
and Egypt. It seems that all great things
first have to bestride the earth in
monstrous and frightening masks in order
to inscribe themselves in the hearts of
humanity with eternal demands: dogmatic
philosophy was such a mask; for example,
the Vedanta doctrine in Asia and Platonism
in Europe.
Platonism, through its rejection of the perspectival
nature of truth, has created a great tension in the human
soul. The fight against Platonism, and its popular form-
Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil , pp. 2-3, preface.
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Christianity-, "has created in Europe a magnificent
tension of the spirit the like of which had never yet
©xisted on earth j with so tense a bow we can now shoot for
more distant goals. By creating an unattainable goal to
strive for, namely a perspective free truth. Platonism
created a striving spirit, one which identifies with
something heroic. At the same time, by denying perspective
"the basic condition of all life"^^, it alienated human
beings from the source of their wills, the embodied
experience of life.
The answer to our question as to the value of the
dogmatic philosophical systems, then, is that they add the
heroism lacking in other forms of knowledge. But what is
the value of heroism? One might think, on the basis of
much of Nietzsche's writing, that when we are able to live
in a system of understanding which allows us to express
the desires generated in that system, that is, when our
wills find expression, that we have found a healthy form
of truth. Why does Nietzsche add the requirement that our
perspectives be made heroic, that our passions be
spiritualized?^^
Ibid. p. 3, preface.
46 Ibid.
Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols , p. 42,
'Morality as Anti-Nature', section #1.
73
Here it is important to recognize that Nietzsche's
doctrine of the will is not the same as the traditional
Freudian doctrine of drives. The will is not something
that we are born with, that has a fixed intensity that we
need to find a way to discharge. There is a dynamic
relationship between lived experience and willing.
Nietzsche asks how our passions can be integrated into a
consciousness that maintains their vitality. It is not a
matter of imposing a consciousness on the will that does
not suppress the will. Consciousness is an expression of
the will. The problem of knowledge is the problem of how
to have a consciousness which is the expression of the
healthy aspects of our wills. To the question as to what
counts as a healthy form of willing, which arises out of
looking at the willing this way, I do not believe
Nietzsche has a satisfactory answer.
He seems to have two contradictory views of the will.
According to one, there is a natural liveliness to the
will which is maintained when our discourses of knowledge
are able to express and integrate our experiences. Desires
grow out of lived existence. What we desire and how we
desire it develop out of the context of the meaning the
world has for us. As our worlds change, so do our wills.
The sign of a healthy will is that it continually responds
in a lively way to experience. Epistemological questions
raised by unsatisfied desires and interests. When
there is a healthy willing, epistemological questions are
the result of questions which require answers,
as questions are answered, interest in the question
disappears
.
On this view of the will, the 'will to knowledge' could
be seen as an unfortunate result of a social structure in
which certain desires never achieve satisfaction, the
result of this lack of satisfaction is that this desire
comes to look like a natural and universal form of the
will. The skepticism of the Eleatics is, on this view, a
reaction to a lack of power, or ability to have the will
achieve satisfaction, this lack achieves the status of a
doctrine according to which a certain complex of desire
then becomes reified.
Skepticism, for Nietzsche's other doctrine of the will,
is anything but unfortunate. On this view, the will
requires cultivation and mastery. Healthy willing requires
asceticism and sublimation to fight off the nihilism
constantly grabbing at its heels and dragging it down.
Skepticism is a healthy articulation of the will because
it posits an impossible goal: the attainment of
perspective free knowledge. By setting itself on the quest
for this impossible goal, the skeptical will is heightened
and becomes powerful enough to fight nihilism. One aspect
of this doctrine of the will is that the sublimation
required for reaching for higher goals requires repression
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as a mechanism for gaining strength. For this reason,
there is a strong tendency when resorting to this doctrine
of the will for Nietzsche to be anti-sensualist. By
denying the interests and desires of the body, the willing
agent is able to raise his desires to a higher and more
heroic plane. One of the ways that this can be done is
through the playing of a game of seduction and denial in
the sexual arena. This doctrine is especially close to
Nietzsche's valorization of the domination of women, who
are seen as seducers; contact with them leads to a
degeneration of the will, whereas a seductive game with
them, played from a strategic distance, ennobles the will.
One of the things I will argue in the next section is
that this doctrine which sees the will as requiring
sublimation through asceticism grows out of Nietzsche's
fear of contact with the other. We can see the doctrine
of nihilism, which this view requires, as dependent on a
fear of the loss of self that is only a problem for a
In Nietzsche and Philosophy
.
Deleuze presents a
very different interpretation of the doctrine of the will.
According to Deleuze, there are two different wills in
Nietzsche, one active and one reactive. The active form of
the will is the one that dominates; the forces that are
dominated are called reactive. It is hard to make sense
out of this doctrine, since the distinguishing
characteristic between the two forms of will is their
relative successes. What this amounts to is a might makes
right doctrine- those forces which win are called healthy
because they have won. This interpretation seems to me to
be both unhelpful philosophically and dangerous
politically. [Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy ,
trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983), p. 39.]
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certain sort of masculine subject. I will argue that the
aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy which valorize
domination grow out of this doctrine of the will, if we
clearly distinguish these two doctrines of the will in
Nietzsche's philosophy, we are able to see two different
epistemological strategies operating in his work: one that
is critical of hegemonic operations as destroying the
liveliness of the will of individuals operating within a
discursive system and the other which valorizes hegemony
as leading to the heroism of the will of those few able to
have the discursive system valorize the goals and
interests, the pursuit of which lead to their own
ennoblement
.
Section 4
Nietzsche's call for a heroic form of knowledge shows
all of the telltale signs of a sexual phobia, a fear of
contact with the other- especially if that other is
female. There are many passages in which Nietzsche
It is an interesting fact that Nietzsche never
married and that his close relationships with women were
in general quite difficult. His relationships with his
mother and sister are reported to have been tortuous. He
seems to have been in love with Cosima Wagner, the wife of
his friend and mentor Richard Wagner. This relationship is
an example of sublimated 'love at a distance'. His
relationship with Lou Salome was extremely complicated. In
her study of Lou Salome, Angela Livingstone writes that
Salome shared Nietzsche's view that physical love should
be avoided, "...she put the view that it was a great
mistake to do away with the traditional prizing of
virginity in middle class girls: virginity could lead them
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^iT^UGS thst both woiTiGn Grid truth should b© sxpsrisncsd
from a distance. The kind of truth that Nietzsche
associates with woman and distance is the universalistic
truth of the philosophical systems. His view that
^^stinence, both sexual and epistemological, are reguired
for the development of the will grow out of his fear of
association. This valorization of abstinence is not to be
found in his alternative view of truth as growing out of
the integration of experience. On the contrary, this truth
is fundamentally sensualist. When developing this view,
Nietzsche calls for a valorization of sense experience as
the source of knowledge and expression of the pleasures of
the body as required for a healthy willing.
In Twilight of the Idols
.
Nietzsche criticizes the
denial of the desires of the body in Greek philosophy.
The moralism of the Greek philosophers
from Plato downwards is pathologically
conditioned: likewise their estimation of
dialectics. Reason= virtue= happiness
means merely: one must imitate Socrates
and counter the dark desires by producing
a permanent daylight - the daylight of
reason. One must be prudent, clear, bright
at any cost: every yielding to the
to productivity, even to heroism. Nietzsche seems to have
thought similarly. " [Livingstone p. 46] Thus, although
Nietzsche and Salome had a very close and intense
relationship, the fact that it did not end in a physical
one, or at least not a sustained physical one, follows the
pattern we are suggesting. [Angela Livingstone, Salome: Her
Life and Work (Mt. Kisko, New York: Moyer Bell Ltd.,
1984) . ]
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instincts, to the unconscious, leads
downwards .
The denial of the instincts required by philosophy is
nihilistic since it encourages a denial of the will.
The harshest daylight, rationality at any
cost, life bright, cold circumspect,
conscious, without instinct, in opposition
to the instincts, has itself been no more
than a form of sickness, another form of
sickness- and by no means a way back to
'virtue', to 'health' to happiness.... To
have to combat one's instincts- that is
the formula for decadence ; as long as life
is ascending
, happiness and instinct are
one.
Everyday practices of knowledge imply a unity of reason
and desire, reason becomes the expression of desire. The
overheated, dominating will created by seduction and
denial is required only for universalistic or
philosophical knowledge.
In the preface to The Gay Science
.
Nietzsche deals with
the relationship between philosophical knowledge, heroism
and woman. In section #3 of the preface, he argues that
philosophies are merely interpretations of the states of
the body, and that bodily pain encourages a more profound
philosophy.
Only great pain, the long, slow pain that
takes its time- on which we are burned, as
it were, with green wood- compels us
philosophers to descend to the ultimate
Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols , p. 33, 'The
Problem of Socrates,' section #10.
Ibid. p. 34, 'The Problem of Socrates,' section
# 11 .
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depths and to put aside all trust,
everything good-natured, everything that
would interpose a veil, that is mild, that
is medium- things in which formerly we may
have found our humanity. I doubt that such
pain makes us 'better' ; but I know that it
makes us much more profound.
This pain "is the ultimate liberator of the spirit" since
it creates a suspicion in us that moves us beyond the
surface to great philosophical depths. And, it develops
the strength and heroism of the will. It also, however,
leads to nihilism.
The trust in life is gone: life itself has
become a problem. Yet one should not jump
to the conclusion that this necessarily
makes one gloomy! Even love of life is
still possible,- only one loves
differently. It is love for a woman who
casts doubt in us... The attraction of all
that is problematic, the delight in an x,
however, is too great in such spiritual
and excited men, for this delight cannot
continue as a bright glow to engulf all
need of the problematic, all danger of
uncertainty, even the jealousy of a lover.
We know a new happiness...
This love of the woman who casts doubts represents a
sickness, a falling into an abyss from which the
philosopher must find a way of extricating himself. The
love of the unknown is not heroic, but rather morbidly
self-indulgent when it leads to such an excitement with
negation that all of that which excites him is constantly
being annihilated by his penetrating gaze.
Nietzsche, The Gav Science , p. 36, preface,
section #3.
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In Section #4 of the preface, Nietzsche finds the new
happiness referred to at the end of section #3 by
renouncing the rape implied by too deep a searching after
truth.
No, this is bad taste, this will to truth,
to 'truth at any price,' this youthful
madness in the love of truth is spoiled
for us: for that we are too experienced,
too serious, too merry, too burned, too
profound. We no longer believe that truth
remains truth when her veils have been
stripped away; we have lived too much to
believe this.^^
Nietzsche has been through a sickness that has
strengthened his will, but using this strength to rip the
veils off all earthly phenomena will only lead to
annihilation. What is needed, rather is a will to remain
at the surface, to not penetrate truth, but to keep her at
arms length and admire her. The philosopher is
strengthened by imposing his interpretation on reality
from a distance. When one is aroused but abstinent, sexual
desire leads to a heightened sense of the significance of
our experiences, to an illusion of profundity.
Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons
for not letting us see her reasons?
Perhaps her name is- to speak Greek-
Baubo? ...O these Greeks! They know how to
live. What is required for that is to stop
courageously at the surface, the fold, the
skin, to adore appearance, to believe in
forms, tones, words, in the whole Olympus
Ibid. p. 38, preface, section #4.
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of appearance. These Greeks were
superficial- out of profundity
With reference to both truth and woman, the philosopher
must stop at the surface and construct the other which
pleases him the most. Too close a contact with her will
open the great thinker to the possibility of a decentering
by the other. Nietzsche conceptualizes this fear of
contact as a disgust with the natural functions of a
woman's body.
When we love a woman, we easily conceive a
hatred for nature on account of all the
repulsive natural functions to which every
woman is subject. We prefer not to think
of all this; but when our soul touches on
these matters for once, it shrugs as it
were and looks contemptuously at nature:
we feel insulted; nature seems to encroach
on our possessions, and with the profanest
hand at that. Then we refuse to pay any
heed to physiology and decree secretly: "I
want to hear nothing about the fact that a
human being is more than soul and form ."
"The human being under the skin" is for
all lovers a horror and unthinkable, a
blasphemy against God and love.^^
The aletheia-truth in the sense of unveiling- of woman
gives sight to a grotesque and obscene physical body. What
does the unveiling of truth show? Remember that for
Nietzsche truth unveiled is no longer truth. If truth is a
discourse through which we make sense out of the world, a
naked truth would be impossible. What happens when one
looks too deeply into the question of truth, though, is
54 Ibid.
Ibid. 122, section #59.
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similar to what Nietzsche, the phobic philosopher, gets
when he looks at a naked woman: the vertigo of looking
into an abyss, the fragmentation of the self that comes
from the realization of the lack of solidity and stability
of that which lies beneath the veils.
The true otherness of woman, realization of which
destroys the autonomy of the thinker, must be guarded
against by maintaining one's distance from her, just as
the flux of reality must be guarded against by reifying it
into an organized, predictable and controllable
interpretive framework for understanding experience.
When a man stands in the midst of his own
noise, in the midst of his own surf of
plans and projects, then he is apt also to
see quiet, magical beings gliding past him
and to long for their happiness and
seclusion: women . He almost thinks that
his better self dwells there among the
women, and that in these quiet regions
even the loudest surf turns into deathly
quiet, and life itself into a dream about
life. Yet! Yet! Noble enthusiast, even on
the most beautiful sailboat there is a lot
of noise, and unfortunately such small and
petty noise. The magic and the most
powerful effect of women is, in
philosophical language, action at a
distance, actio in distans ; but this
requires first of all and above all,
distance.
The problem of the relationship between women, truth
and distance is one of the central themes of Derrida's
Sours . David Ferrel Krell's book. Postponements , is
Ibid. 124, section #60.
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partially a reading of Spurs
, and partially an original
exploration of the problematic of woman and truth in
Nietzsche. Both of these thinkers argue that there is a
feminine side to Nietzsche that one sees in his discussion
of woman and distance. I agree with Kelly Oliver that
there is a strong cooptive tendency in this literature
which ought to be challenged.
What Derrida and Krell see as feminine in Nietzsche is
his view that truth does not really exist. According to
Derrida, "that which will not be pinned down by truth is,
in truth- feminine . Here Derrida accepts the Lacanian
schema according to which that which exceeds and cannot be
incorporated into a symbolic network of meaning in
language is the feminine. For Lacan, there is no such
thing as woman. What it means to be woman is to be the
other of language, and since the other of language cannot
be described, it cannot be captured under any category-
which would be required for us to know it as a thing.
In Spurs
.
Derrida wants to claim that in writing a
truth that cannot be written, that is in showing truth to
be something that exists only as a myth, as an other to be
Oliver "Nietzsche's Woman: The Poststructuralist
Attempt to do Away with Women," Radical Phi losophy #48,
Spring 1988, pp. 25-29. See also Robert Scholes "Eperon
Strings" Differences . V.l, #2, pp. 93-104.
Jacques Derrida, Spurs . trans. Barbara Harlow
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 55.
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pointed to but not explicated, Nietzsche's writing of
truth is a feminine operation.
Nietzsche's writing is compelled to
suspend truth between the tender-hooks of
quotation marks- and suspended there with
truth is- all the rest. Nietzsche's
writing is an inscription of the truth.
And such an inscription, even if we do not
venture so far as to call it the feminine
itself, is indeed the feminine
'operation.
'
Here Derrida is careful to distinguish writing the
feminine, which is impossible, from writing which is a
feminine operation. The first is impossible, since the
feminine is precisely that which escapes discursive
articulation. The latter is possible, for men or for
women, as an undermining of the pretensions to truth of
the masculine systems of truth. Derrida wants to claim
that the feminine operation that Nietzsche effects in his
writing on truth, is in a profound sense feminist.^’
Derrida understands the difficulty of calling Nietzsche a
feminist
:
Must not these apparently feminist
propositions be reconciled with the
overwhelming corpus of Nietzsche's
venomous anti-feminism?'^°
What Derrida goes on to argue is that Nietzsche's critique
of feminism must be understood as a critique of women
trying to become like men, and giving up the special
Ibid. p. 57.
Ibid.
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relationship women have to truth through their 'powers of
simulation, ' their not playing the game of truth.
And in truth, they too are men, those
women feminists so derided by Nietzsche.
Feminism is nothing but the operation of a
woman who aspires to be like a man. And in
order to resemble the masculine dogmatic
philosopher this woman lays claim- just as
much claim as he- to truth, science and
objectivity in all their castrated
delusions of virility. Feminism too seeks
to castrate. It wants a castrated woman.
Gone the style.^^
Still, Derrida claims that there is a positive
valorization of woman in Nietzsche, and presumably this is
the apparent feminism he refers to.
Since she is a model for truth she is able
to display the gifts of her seductive
power, which rules over dogmatism, and
disorients and routs those credulous men,
the philosophers. And because she does not
believe in the truth (still, she does find
that uninteresting truth in her interest)
woman remains a model, only this time a
good model. But because she is a good
model, she is in fact a bad model. She
plays at dissimulation, at ornamentation,
deceit, artifice, at an artists
philosophy. Hers is an affirmative power.
And if she continues to be condemned, it
is only from the man's point of view where
she repudiates that affirmative power and,
in her specular reflection of that foolish
dogmatism that she has provoked, belies
her belief in truth.
Only from the perspective of the valorization of truth is
the dissimulation of woman to be seen as negative. For
61 Ibid. P- 61.
62 Ibid
.
P- 65.
63 Ibid P- 67-69
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Derrida, Nietzsche's feminism lies in his insight into the
superiority of being the other of reason.
Krell's reading of this view of Nietzsche as a feminist
takes the point even further:
Writing now with the other hand, as it
were, both Nietzsche and Derrida record
the plaint of women against "The
foolishness of the dogmatic philosopher,
the impotent artist, or the inexperienced
seducer.
Nietzsche is a feminist because he feels for women's
suffering at not having an adept seducer. Woman is the
other of discourse and her one legitimate demand is that
the man who engages her in a seductive relationship-
though not one that ends in consummation-be potent and
experienced.
Derrida believes that women, and philosophers engaged
in a feminine operation, can see the untruth of discourses
of truth. But this whole schema implies that we do not
need to question the content of discourses of truth. The
sophisticated can choose not to believe in them, women can
mock them. The effects of women's being conceptualized as
the other of reason, or of men's living under a specific
regime of truth are left unexplored in the play in the
untruth of truth. And yet, for there to be a realm of
untruth, there must be one of truth, even if it is
mythological. In order to operate in the symbolic realm,
David Farrell Krell, Postponements (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1986) , pp. 10-11.
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man needs to keep a distance from the other, the negation
of which is constitutive for the same. On this reading of
Nietzsche, truth and woman must be kept at a distance in
order for the symbolic realm to have the illusion of
solidity required for language. Thus, although he claims
to be valorizing Woman's position, this has little effect
on the lives of real women: the symbolic structure remains
unchallenged
.
Nietzsche himself at least had the honesty to not claim
that he valorized actio in distans for the sake of women.
Nietzsche was not interested in asking what operations of
truth are the most beneficial for women. His problem was
how to create a relationship to truth which increases his
own power and the power of the male free spirits he hoped
would revive European culture. Because of his fear of the
sexual relation, his answer to this problem was to engage
in a seductive/ascetic game which strengthens the will by
generating both desire and a will to resist.
Nietzsche's demand for heroism through abstinence needs
to be questioned in light of its negative implications for
women and also in light of Nietzsche's own critique of
asceticism. As I will argue in the following section,
Nietzsche has a critique of asceticism that can be applied
to his own view of the will as requiring negation in order
to achieve heroism. One explanation for this contradiction
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is that this view of the will was developed as a
philosophical defense of male power.
In section #285 of The Gay Science
. Nietzsche asks how
modern people will be able to renounce our faith in god
when it means giving up on belief in a perpetual guardian
and friend, when it means "there is no longer any reason
in what happens. The renunciation of god will
require an enormous loss which we must find a way to give
ourselves the power to accept. Nietzsche offers a solution
to this problem with a metaphor:
There is lake that one day ceased to
permit itself to flow off; it formed a dam
where it had hitherto flown off; and ever
since this lake is rising higher and
higher. Perhaps this very renunciation
will also lend us the strength needed to
bear this renunciation; perhaps man will
rise higher as soon as he ceases to flow
out into a god.^^
Giving up on the old forms of knowledge which have given
our culture security and meaning requires above all else,
the power to say no, and to say no to something very
appealing.
In The Genealogy of Morals . Nietzsche rails against the
anti-life tendencies of the ascetic priest. One might be
tempted to read his diatribe against Christianity as a
call for a return to sensuality, for using our sensuous
experience as the basis for our discourses of knowledge.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science , p. 230, section #285.
Ibid.
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But what Nietzsche calls for in his discussion of
asceticism and philosophy is a new sublimation of
sensualism.
He begins his discussion of asceticism and philosophy
with a section on the aesthetic theories of Kant and
Schopenhauer. He argues that their equation of beauty with
disinterestedness comes from a fear of their own sexual
desire.
Of few things does Schopenhauer speak with
greater assurance than he does of the
effect of aesthetic contemplation: he says
of it that it counteracts sexual
'interestedness,' like lupulin and
camphor; he never wearied of glorifying
this liberation from the 'will' as the
great merit and utility of the aesthetic
condition.^'
Nietzsche contrasts this view of aesthetic beauty as
protection from sexuality with Stendahl ' s view that "the
beautiful promises happiness."^® He claims that for
Stendahl "the beautiful arouses the will
('interestedness')." Turning this into a critique of
Schopenhauer, he claims that the theory of
disinterestedness masks the philosopher's real interest:
"that of a tortured man who gains release from his
torture." Nietzsche reminds us that Schopenhauer wrote The
World as Will and Representation when he was a young man.
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals , pp. 104-
105, essay #3, section #6.
Ibid. p. 105.
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presumably tortured by unfulfilled sexual desire/’ The
philosopher should not however, run in fear of contact
with the other, but should play with his desire, gain
mastery over it and use it to generate a more powerful,
controlling self.
Nietzsche argues that the asceticism of the philosopher
is currently anti-life and must be transformed into a more
sublimated form of asceticism. The current philosophical
asceticism does serve a certain life interest, however.
Just as Nietzsche claims that the asceticism of the priest
serves the interest of decaying humanity, the asceticism
of the philosopher serves his interest in a liberation
from desire.
They think of what they can least do
without: freedom from compulsion,
disturbance, noise, from tasks, duties,
worries; clear heads; the dance, leap, and
flight of ideas; good air, thin, clear,
open, dry, like the air of the heights
through which all animal being becomes
more spiritual and acquires wings; repose
in all cellar regions; all dogs nicely
chained up; no barking of hostility and
shaggy-haired rancor; no gnawing worm of
injured ambition; undemanding and obedient
intestines, busy as windmills but distant;
the heart remote, beyond, heavy with
future posthumous- all in all, they think
of the ascetic ideal as the cheerful
asceticism of an animal become fledged and
divine, floating above life rather than in
repose
.
69 Ibid.
Ibid. p. 108, essay #3, section #7.
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The traditional philosopher is someone who has an interest
in autonomy from other people and from the various needs
of the body. Nietzsche claims that the life denying
attitude of the philosopher is a version of the asceticism
of the priest. Even in the case of anti-religious
philosophers, the impulse to "intellectual cleanliness"
comes from the tradition of the ascetic priest.
To put it vividly: the ascetic priest
provided until the most modern times the
repulsive and gloomy caterpillar form in
which alone the philosopher could live and
creep about.
We should not, however, think that Nietzsche's disgust
for this life denying type leads to a complete rejection
of him. Nietzsche claims that philosophy could not have
developed without the asceticism of the priest. He does
not argue for an end to philosophy. He wants for there to
be a new revived philosophy which takes the strength
gained through asceticism and turns it to more life
affirming ends.
Nietzsche praises Stendahl as one who wants to relish
in an increased desire. But Nietzsche sees the value in
this not in terms of sexual expression, but rather, in
terms of sublimation.
Every artist knows what harmful effect
sexual intercourse has in states of great
spiritual tension and preparation; those
Ibid. p. 148, essay #3, section #24.
Ibid. p. 116, essay #3, section #10.
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with the greatest power and the surest
instincts do not need to learn this by
experience, by unfortunate experience-
their •maternal' instinct ruthlessly
disposes of all other stores and
accumulations of energy, of animal vigor,
for the benefit of the evolving work: the
greater energy uses up the lesser.^
The ascetic philosopher is tied to a nihilistic practice
to the extent that he attempts to suppress the will which
arises out of the desires and interests of the body. What
Nietzsche wants him to try to do is to cultivate and
channel this desire to a heroism that is constructive for
culture
.
But why is heroism necessary for culture? In the
preface to Beyond Good and Evil
. Nietzsche writes "It
seems that all great things first have to bestride the
earth in monstrous and frightening masks in order to
inscribe themselves in the hearts of humanity with eternal
demands. The greatest things of humanity have grown out
of monstrous errors such as Platonism and Vedantism. But
by virtue of what are these things great? Nietzsche
himself, in many places criticizes the weak sort of spirit
who would need to believe in a greatness which is other,
such as god or truth in order to position himself in
reality. In aphorism #283 from The Gay Science ,
Nietzsche is jubilant at the prospect of a masculine and
^ Ibid. p. Ill, essay #3, section #8.
Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil , pp. 2-3, preface.
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which knowlcdg© will become heroic. Men
will "wage war for the sake of ideas and their
consequences Be robbers and conquerors as long as you
cannot be rulers and possessors, you seekers of
knowledge."^ So long as the philosopher cannot posses
knowledge, or woman for that matter, he should at least
not allow himself to be emasculated by giving up the quest
"Soon the age will be past when you could be content to
live hidden in the forest like shy deer." If he maintains
a warlike stance, if he poses as a fighter, as one who
knows what he is looking for, woman will find him
attractive and give him the illusion of conquest.
"Finally, knowledge will reach out her hand to him who
deserves her...."^*^ Similarly, in the preface to Beyond
Good and Evil
.
Nietzsche writes of the failures of the
traditional philosopher at the game of seduction.
Assuming truth is a woman- what then? Are
there not grounds for the suspicion that
all philosophers, insofar as they were
dogmatists, have been very inexpert about
women? That the gruesome seriousness, the
clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have
usually approached truth so far have been
very awkward and indecent attempts to win
themselves a wench.
Nietzsche's rhetoric of the need for a masculine and
warlike knowledge that will lead us to greatness in
Nietzsche, The Gav Science , p. 228, section #283.
Ibid. p. 229, section #283.
^ Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil , p. 2, preface.
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culture and attract truth toward him grows out of his own
need for an other to dominate. By creating a discourse of
knowledge that keeps women as the other, and as the object
of desire, Nietzsche guarantees for himself a solid other,
3 reflection from which a stability is given to the self
that prevents the madness of falling into the abyss. If
Nietzsche gets so close to woman that she begins to speak
and show herself to also be a fluid subject, the tain is
removed from the mirror and the self is in danger of
dispersing into the dionysian flux.
Nietzsche views the self as a fiction which grows out
of a reification of the actions of one body, as coherent
and generated by one source- consciousness. This myth of
the originary self allows the individual to see him/her
self as the author of her/his actions. On his view of the
will as self generating, we could see the self as
generated out of the situated practices of the concrete
individual. The fluidity of the self that follows from
this could in theory be lived unproblematically . The 'I'
that is the author could be recognized as a myth and yet
still be lived through.
Why then, must the self be seen as heroic? What I am
arguing here is that there is another view of the self
which requires more stability than this- this is the view
of the self associated with the heroic notion of the will.
As I will argue in the following chapter, Irigaray shows
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that this is the notion of the self which makes male
domination possible.
In her book Amante marine: de Friedrich Nietzschf*
^
Irigaray writes that the distance that Nietzsche
associates with women does not originate with them.
Distance does not come from her, even if,
for him, her seduction operates at a
distance. Even if he lends her, at
present, this element of her power. Not
wishing to see the effect of his
operation: the abyss between. Which averts
and fascinates him with the attraction of
a knife blow given to the other. In the
belly/womb of the other. Whom he no longer
simply approaches without risking death
itself: by the dreadful return of his own
action. The seizing for himself, the
definitive incision between the lips which
renders her silent and alluring as a
tomb
.
Through seeing themselves as free from human
interdependencies, men are able to ignore the debt their
selves owe to women and to sensual existence. This enables
them to set up a system of symbolic exchange in which
women are objects of exchange. Using the Marxian theory of
the unequal exchange of commodities as a metaphor,
Irigaray writes:
-just as commodities, despite their
resistance, become more or less autonomous
repositories for the value of human work,
so, as mirrors of and for man, women more
or less unwittingly come to represent the
Luce Irigaray, Amante Marine de Friedrich
Nietzsche (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1980), p. 113.
This passage is included in a section translated by Sara
Speidel as "Veiled Lips," Missipoi Review , 11:3, 1983, p.
106.
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danger of a disappropriation of masculine
power: the phallic mirage. .. .This
transformation of women's bodies into use
values and exchange values inaugurates the
symbolic order, but that order depends
upon a nearly pure added value . Women,
animals endowed with speech like men,
assure the possibility of the use and
circulation of the symbolic without being
recipients of it. Their nonaccess to the
symbolic is what has established the
social order. Putting men in touch with
each other, in relations among themselves,
women only fulfil this role by
relinquishing their right to speech and
even to animality.^’
The problem with perceiving the lack of solidity of the
self
that a man encounters upon contact with the concrete other
is that the symbolic order of meaning is disrupted. This
order must maintain its solidity if male domination is to
be replicated through the system of unequal exchange.
Although Nietzsche is highly critical of the
reifications implicit in the symbolic order, as a man he
receives certain benefits from this system of unequal
exchange. At the end of a long section on women, in The
Gay Science Nietzsche writes.
If the majority of men had not always
considered the discipline of their minds-
their 'rationality'- a matter of pride,
an obligation, and a virtue, feeling
insulted or embarrassed by all fantasies
and debaucheries of thought because they
say themselves as friends of 'healthy
Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One , trans.
Catherine Porter (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1985)
,
p. 190.
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common sense, ' humanity would have
perished long ago.®°
It is necessary for the maintenance of social order that
the majority of individuals believe in rationality and
truth. The free spirit is able to play freely within the
structure of domination and privilege set up by these
beliefs
.
Thus the virtuous intellects are needed-
oh let me use the most unambiguous word-
what is needed is virtuous stupidity ,
solid metronomes for the slow spirit, to
make sure that the faithful of the great
shared faith stay together and continue
their dance. It is a first-rate need that
commands and demands this. We others are
the exception and the danger- and we need
eternally defense. -Well there actually
are things to be said in favor of the
exception
,
provided it never wants to
become the rule .
While Nietzsche does not explicitly argue here that this
stability is required for the maintenance of the current
gender system, this passage is placed at the end of a long
polemic on the need for women to stay in their place.
Thus, Nietzsche can be seen as arguing for the need for
woman to remain the other of the symbolic in order for
there to be enough stability for the present power
relations to be maintained.
Nietzsche, The Gav Science , p. 130, section #76.
Ibid. p. 131, section #76.
The passage is from section #76 of The Gay
Science . The woman question is the main theme from
sections #59-#75.
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The strength of will required for abstinence is
therefore not developed simply in the interest of
sublimation. For Nietzsche the will is self generating as
long as a healthy relationship to life is maintained.
There is no reason to suppose that the will requires
stimulation, life itself is stimulating enough for a
healthy willing. Cultivation of the will is only required
to fight against nihilism. And nihilism only develops when
the will is suppressed. Nietzsche's call for distance from
the other through sexual abstinence as a means of
elevating the will, is therefore a charade to cover his
fear of annihilation or loss into the other.
Section 5
Now we have an epistemological challenge before us: how
will it be possible to have a form of knowledge that is
perspectival
,
meaning that is grows out of the situated
perspectives of human agents, yet common, meaning that
there is a shared interpretive framework for all those in
a discussion which still does not crush the will? In the
following passage from The Gay Science Nietzsche points to
how he sees this unity as coming about:
Appearance for me is life and effectivity
itself. It goes so far in its self-mockery
that it makes me feel that it is nothing
more than appearance, and will-o'-the-
wisp and a dance of spirits- that among
all of these dreamers, also I the 'one who
knows' [that I am dreaming], dance my
dance, the 'one who knows' is a means for
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prolonging the earthly dance and thus
belongs to the masters of ceremony of
existence, and the sublime consistency and
interrelatedness of all knowledge perhaps
is and will be the highest means to
preserve the universality of dreaming and
the mutual comprehension of all dreamers
and thus the continuation of the dream.
Nietzsche knows that truth is an error, that understanding
is based on a dream or illusion through which a group is
able to have consciousness of a common reality. This
common understanding, while based on illusion, is
necessary for language and human interaction. The myth of
truth is necessary to life.
But why does this dream require masters of the
ceremonies? Why is it not possible for the common illusion
to simply grow out of communicative interaction? Nietzsche
does not even begin to answer the question of how we can
do without masters of the ceremonies, since this is in no
way his question. Nietzsche didn't ask this question
because for him it was quite enough that he himself, and a
small community of male comrades were able to find a
discourse of knowledge in which their wills were able to
find expression. His need to suppress his will when it
came to sexual connection with the other led him to make
bizarre claims about the need for heroism and domination
which are not required for at least one possible reading
of his doctrine of the will. Nietzsche himself was not
Ibid. p. 116, section #54.
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aware of the nihilistic implications of positing woman as
an absolute other and the impossibility of an affirmative
culture on the basis of this denial of the will.
If we reject Nietzsche's demand for a heroic,
universalistic form of knowledge, we are left with an
interesting approach to the question of truth. Linguistic
practices always generate interpretive frameworks which
themselves always imply discourses of truth and reason.
But they do not need to imply doctrines of truth that
posit a hostile relationship to the body or to
perspectivism. Since discourses of truth always abstract
from experience and reify it according to the interests of
those with the power to control the discourse, we can see
the sources of the hegemonic nature of reason. If we
accept the reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of the will,
according to which willing is a self generating engagement
with life, then we can use instances of repression as
evidence of nihilistic, unhealthy and hegemonic discourses
of truth. ^ In working to bring the voices of women, and
all those whose interests have been excluded from
articulation in the current dominant discourse of reason,
^ This is not to say that all negation of the will
necessarily implies a hegemonic operation. Given the
flexibility of the will and of desire, the interests of
the will are constantly being formed and cultivated
through social practices. Still, we can look to instances
of sustained resistance as cites of operations of
domination. These issues will be dealt with in more depth
in Chapter 5.
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we can begin to move beyond the nihilism generated by
philosophical reason.
(
L
!
*
1
'
^
CHAPTER 3
Woman as Other than the Other of Reason:
Irigaray and the Rationality of Suppressed Voices
Every operation on and in
philosophical language, by virtue
of the very nature of that
discourse- which is essentially
political- possesses implications
that, no matter how mediate they
may be, are nonetheless
politically determined.’
In her work. Luce Irigaray follows Nietzsche in
claiming that what we call reason is the expression of the
will, or desire, of those subjects who have been able to
impose their will as truth. In The Gay Science
.
Nietzsche
writes that the seeming autonomy of truth derives from a
denial of truth's relation to a desire for control,
[Exceptional thinkers] had to deny the
role of the impulses in knowledge; and
quite generally they had to conceive of
reason as a completely free and
spontaneous activity. They shut their eyes
to the fact that they, too, had arrived at
their propositions through opposition to
the commonly accepted, or owing to a
desire for tranquility, for sole
possession, or for dominion.^
' Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is not One , trans.
Catherine Porter (Ithica; Cornell University Press, 1985)
p. 81
.
^ Friedrich Ni etzsche
.
The Gav Science trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New YorkrVintage Books) p. 170 Section 110
,
(translation modified)
.
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In The Gay Science
. Nietzsche claims that the desire for
truth grows out of a desire for control. He also claims
that the content of a concept of truth grows out of the
needs of those positing the truth.
How did logic come into existence in man's
head? Certainly out of illogic, whose
realm originally must have been immense.
Innumerable beings who made inferences in
a way different from ours perished; for
all that their ways might have been truer.
Those, for example, who did not know how
to find often enough what is 'equal' as
regards both nourishment and hostile
animals-those in other words, who subsumed
things too slowly and cautiously-were
favored with a lesser probability of
survival than those who guessed
immediately upon encountering similar
instances that they must be equal. The
dominant tendency, however, is to treat as
equal what is merely similar-an illogical
tendency, for nothing is really equal-is
what first created any basis for logic.
Irigaray takes this notion that the need for control is
fundamental to discourses of truth and goes a step
further. She argues that the dominant discourses of truth
grow out of specifically male psychic needs. Because the
oedipal complex requires that the boy renounce his
attraction for the mother, he sets up a system of
knowledge which offers him an illusion of autonomy.
Irigaray argues that Freud was caught up in this logic in
his theory of subjectivity.
^ Ibid. p. 171 section 110.
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For, when Freud reaffirms the incest
taboo, he simply reannounces and puts back
in place the conditions that constitute
the speculative matrix of the 'subject.'
He reinforces his positions in a fashion
yet more 'scientific,' more imperious in
their 'objectivity.' A demonstration he
clearly needed himself if he is to
'sublimate' in more universal interests
his own desire for his/the mother. But as
a result of using psychoanalysis (his
psychoanalysis) only to scrutinize the
history of his subject and his subjects,
without interpreting the historical
determinants of the constitution of the
'subject' as same , he was restoring, yet
again, the newly pressed down/repressed
earth, upon which he stands erect, which
for him, following tradition though in
more explicit fashion, will be the
body/sex of the mother/nature. He must
challenge her for power, for productivity.
He must resurface the earth with this
floor of the ideal.
^
Thus, for Irigaray, the whole discourse of truth is
founded on the psychic needs of the male child for
autonomy. This implies that there is an internal
relationship between what is constituted as truth and the
desires of those subjects whose psychic needs have been
able to gain dominance.
Irigaray agrees with Lacan that desire is constructed
through human interaction. For both, interests come to be
experienced in consciousness as unfulfilled desire. This
desire in turn is key for structuring the symbolic system
of meaning that is language. According to Irigaray, the
^ Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman , trans.
Gillian Gill (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1985) pp.
139-140.
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desire that women experience is excluded from language
through women's lack of access to control over the
symbolic. One of the goals of her work is to investigate
what keeps this desire from being able to find expression
in the dominant discourses of Western society.
For Lacan, language is the primary locus of human
alienation. Language acts as a mediating principle between
consciousness and experience. Whenever we use language we
are alienated from direct access to our sensuous
existence. Both men and women are alienated according to
Lacan, but in different ways. Because he sees language as
necessarily instituting a masculine system of meaning, men
are able to adopt a subject position in language that
gives them access to control in social institutions, but
this alienates them from direct access to their sensuous
existence. Women on the other hand, are not even able to
legitimately take up a subject position in language. While
women are able to maintain a more direct relationship to
their sensual existence, their needs and desires are not
able to find expression in language. As a result of this
women are excluded from the sphere of social control.
Most Lacanian feminists see the alienation experienced
in language by men and the exclusion from language
experienced by women as the most important cause of the
social differences between men and women. Since language
damns us to a necessary form of alienation, human
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liberation is made impossible. Thus, in this discourse
there is very little talk of domination or of oppression.
In contrast with this, Irigaray looks at how language
functions ideologically to keep the interests of women
from being coded in the symbolic system, but she never
argues that these interests cannot be linguistically
coded. She follows Lacan in seeing language as an
important locus of domination, but not as the only one. To
the extent that women's interests cannot find expression
it is difficult for women to make demands in
the social arena. Thus, gaining access to the symbolic
system is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
overcoming male domination.
The apparent paradox of writing about the impossibility
of writing is central to Irigaray 's work. In her work she
attempts to represent the feminine desire which she claims
is unrepresentable in our language. Irigaray herself is
often unclear in her discussions of whether or not
language must perpetuate a patriarchal hegemony. Thus in
This Sex Which Is Not One Irigaray claims that any concept
of the feminine is necessarily patriarchal. "To claim that
femininity can be expressed in the form of a concept is to
allow oneself to be caught up again in a system of
•masculine' representations..."^ It is easy to read such
^ Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One , trans.
Catherine Porter (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1985)
p. 123.
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statements as implying that conceptualization in general
is patriarchal. Since concepts are necessary to language,
this would lead us back to the position that feminist
language would be impossible. Yet she often writes of the
need to change our modes of conceptualizing, implying that
the problem is with the conceptual systems operating
within the current system of representation, and not with
the possibility of a non-patriarchal mode of
conceptualizing.
What is complicated is that there can be
no 'woman's discourse' produced by a
woman, and that furthermore, strictly
speaking, political practice, at least
currently, is masculine through and
through. In order for women to be able to
make themselves heard, a 'radical'
evolution in our way of conceptualizing
and managing the political realm is
required.^
There are tendencies among both her critics and her
supporters to underplay the aspect of her work which calls
for a radical evolution in our way of conceptualizing, and
to see her as giving up the linguistic realm entirely. She
is often read as following Lacan in arguing that woman is
the other of language, that female desires and interests
are constitutionally incapable of finding expression in
any language and thus, as advocating a renunciation of
language and critique. Beginning with this view, readers
have tended to either reject her work as a feminist
^ Ibid. p. 127.
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irrationalism ^ or accept it as a valorization of women's
experience over the straight j ackets of language.®
Each of these approaches misses the way in which
criticizes traditional notions of critigue and
reason, while opening the door to new forms. While much of
Irigaray's work does seem to accept the view that there is
a necessary conflict between women's experience and
language, other aspects of what she has to say about the
relationship between women and language however, escape
the dualism which this view implies. Both her critics and
her supporters allow the dualism of reason and passion to
remain intact. One valorizes reason, and thus rejects
Irigaray for being unable to offer a basis for a critical
perspective. The other valorizes non-linguistic passion,
and sees her as an advocate for the value of the
unsayable. Absolutely central to Irigaray's work, however,
is the way in which she explodes this dualism.
See: Margaret Homans "'Her Very Own Howl' The
Ambiguities of Representation in Recent Women's Fiction"
in Signs #2, vol. 9 (1983), pp 186-205; Monique Plaza
"
' Phallomorphic Power' and the Psychology of 'woman'" in
Ideology and Consciousness vol. 4, (1978), pp 5-35; Rachel
Bowlby "The Feminine Female" in Social Text #7 (1983) pp
54-68
.
® See: Robert de Beaugrande "In Search of Feminist
Discourse: The 'Difficult' Case of Luce Irigaray in
College English #3, vol. 50 (March 1988), pp 253-272;
Diana J. Fuss "'Essentially Speaking': Luce Irigaray's
Language of Essence" in Hypatia #3, vol. 3 (Winter 1989),
pp 62-80; Jane Gallop "Quand nos Levres S'ecrivent:
Irigaray's Body Politic" in Romanic Review #1, vol. 74
(1983) pp 77-83.
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Irigaray begins with Lacan's theory of subjectivity and
language, but where Lacan claims that the symbolic is
necessarily a masculine function, Irigaray shows how the
symbolic is only masculine under certain circumstances.
She then theorizes the coming into language of female
desire. An important aspect of her work is how she
analyzes the mechanisms whereby the desires of women come
to be encoded as irrational, suppressed from thematization
in conceptual systems or simply censored from language.
In the following I hope to show, 1- Irigaray 's critique
of the patriarchal bias built in to western notions of
reason, how the enlightenment view of reason as a neutral
measure of the validity of thinking cannot be lived up to
as long as discourses of reason act to exclude the desires
of women; 2- how it is that Irigaray can use a Lacanian
framework for her theory, and yet still argue for the
possibility of women articulating their desires in
language; 3- how given the way that female imaginaries can
come into language, what the mechanisms for its exclusion
are in our current symbolizing systems.
Section 1
In her work, Irigaray criticizes the content which
reason has come to be seen as having without giving up on
the notion of critique. In doing this she reformulates the
notion of critique- and reason itself in a way which opens
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up the critical enterprise in precisely some of the ways
needed if women are to be able to participate in this
enterprise in a fruitful way. She shows how traditional
rioi-ious of reason are systematically based on denials of
the connection to matter and to desire. She rejects the
notion of reason as the faculty that divides the mind from
the body, or that allows for the assertion of universal
truths
Irigaray launches a critique of 'reason' in which she
shows how the currently dominant systems for the
representation of truth require the exclusion of the
desires of women for their functioning. An example of her
critique of the distortions inherent in traditional
notions of reason can be found in her reading of Plato in
the final section of Speculum . Here Irigaray asks what
would motivate someone to leave the cave of 'ignorance,'
and how could we know whether or not what is found on the
outside is preferable to the sensuous depths of the cave.
Once he has left his underground home, the
man will not see the outside- outside and
up on top- what used to happen in- outside
and underneath- the cave. He will see both
more and less. In a way other than he had
from "inside" that confined space. And it
is not fair to say that the scene has
simply been raised up out of the
"nether"/regions
,
which are also the
regions of the soul. Out of the senses
’ If he deigned to deal with feminist theorists, we
could imagine Jurgen Habermas painting Irigaray with the
same broad brush he uses to wipe out Nietzsche, Foucault,
Adorno, Horkheimer Derrida, etc.
Ill
into thG intGllect, out of thG passions
into thG harmonious Iovg of truth, out of
doxa into Gpistomo . ThG prGcautions takGn
to prGVGnt thG nGophytG from roturning to
his formor placG, and to GnsurG that hG
only goGs back down oncG hG has bGGn
confirmGd in his bGliGf in thG nGW
knowlGdgG to convGrt othors in turn, is
Gnough GvidGncG that somGthing is lost in
this accounting
.
ShG goGS on, "Hg has bGGn sGducGd, without roalizing it,
by thG authority of a philosophy toachor who somGtimGs
abusGs his powGr a littlG."” ThG movG from thG cavG into
thG light cannot bG motivatGd by light. PGrhaps thG cavG
dwGllGr is sGducGd by thG sGGming authority of thG
philosophGr. That thG light outsidG thG cavG is supGrior
to thG cozinGss of thG insidG is only obvious from thG
pGrspGctivG of thosG who havG alroady accGptod thG
authority of roason as onG truth.
If pGoplG saw it [thG sourcG of boing and
truth as mothor/thG back of thG cavG/thG
back of thG mirror of truth]
,
thoy might
dGmand somG accountability or, GVGn, take
back some part of the father's goods, of
his Good. Dismember value, capital. Divide
it up between two genders, at least, two
kinds of resources and specularizations
.
The logos would no longer simply be, for
itself, the means of translating his will
alone; of establishing, defining and
collecting his properties into one Whole.
Truth would lose its univocal and
universal character. . . .There would be no
way of knowing which way to look
anymore . . . ^^
10 Irigaray
,
p. 286
11 Ibid. P- 313 .
12 Ibid. P- 308 .
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For Irigaray men's rejection of the cave and their
faith in the superiority of the world of ideas is
motivated by the need to establish their autonomy. The
problem according to Irigaray is that in order for men to
be able to gain a sense of themselves as independent
subjects, a need which Irigaray takes as fundamental to
patriarchal structures, but not necessarily as the cause
of their existence, they must deny their originary
relation to the mother and to materiality.
The head of the family has to re-insure
his potency. Every single day, therefore,
he is enjoined to reappropriate the right
to exploit blood and then, as a result, to
go on to more sublime pursuits. The master
is a vampire who needs to stay in disguise
and do his work at night. Otherwise he is
reminded that he is dependent on death.
And on birth. On the material, uterine
foundations of his mastery. Only if these
be repressed can he enjoy sole
ownership.
Men must set women up as the absolute Other, as an
object over and against which their subjectivity gains
meaning. "Subjectivity denied to woman: indisputably this
provides the financial backing [Mortgage] for every
irreducible constitution as an object: of representation,
of discourse, of desire. For this structure to remain
Ibid. p. 126, see also Ibid. p. 308.
Ibid. p. 133.
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intact, it is critical that the desire of women not be
allowed into the system of representation.
But what if the 'object' started to speak?
Which also means beginning to 'see' etc.
What disaggregation of the subject would
that entail? Not only on the level of the
split between him and his other, his
variously specified alter ego, or between
him and the Other, who is always to some
extent his other even if he does not
recognize himself in it, even if he is so
overwhelmed by it as to bar himself out of
it and into it so as to retain at the very
least the power to promote his own
forms
.
In her reading of Freud's theory of sexuality, Irigaray
shows how this need to exclude the desires of women
functions in his work. For Freud, female sexuality is an
obscure and murky topic, a dark continent which theory
cannot penetrate. By characterizing female sexuality as a
'dark continent', Freud recognizes that it is
untheorizable from within his conceptual system. It is not
staged according to the rules of his discourse. "What she
•suffers', what she 'lusts for, 'even what she 'takes
pleasure in,' all take place upon another stage, in
relation to already codified representations."
In the essay "Femininity" in New Lectures pn
Psychoanalysis , Freud sees the little girl as the same as
the little boy with one important difference: she is
lacking a penis. Irigaray raises the question which
Ibid. P- 135
Ibid. P- 140
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feminists have often focused on in their critiques of
Freud, namely, why should we see the girl as lacking the
penis, rather than as having a different genital
arrangement? The way she poses this critique takes this
point a few steps further than is normally done. In her
discussion of Freud in the first chapter of Speculum , she
writes.
This nothing [i.e., female genitalia],
which actually cannot be well mastered in
the twinkling of an eye, might equally
well have acted as an inducement to
perform castration upon an age-old
oculocentrism. It might have been
interpreted as the intervention of a
difference, of a deferent, as a challenge
to an imaginary whose functions are often
improperly regulated in terms of sight. Or
yet as the 'symptom' of the 'signifier,'
of the possibility of another libidinal
economy
.
Irigaray argues that it is important for the whole
structure of Western thinking that the female not be
theorized as having a different structure, but rather, as
either an inferior male or something radically other which
cannot be spoken about. "Penis envy" is imputed to women
in order to compensate for man's feeling of lack. Her envy
props up the system of value which maintains the entire
symbolic order. "Woman's fetishization of the male organ
must indeed be an indispensible support of its price on
Ibid. p. 48.
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the sexual market"^® Woman acts as the support for the
masculine symbolic system by taking the phallus as the
signifier of desire and value. She also does this through
maintaining the subject-object polarity, by being the
object of his desire, by being his other.
Now if this ego is to be valuable, some
I
mirror
I
is needed to reassure it and re-
insure it of its value. Woman will be the
foundation for this specular duplication,
giving man back 'his' image and repeating
it as the 'same'’’
In the system of representation which valorizes the one,
the true and the good, there is no place for women as
different from men precisely because women support this
system by being the other which simply mirrors the male.
She is the non-reason by virtue of which there is
20
reason.
Since the current systems of representation do not
allow female desire to be linguistically coded, Irigaray
argues that in speaking woman both participates in
patriarchal structures and disrupts them. She participates
in that much of her speaking is a mimicking of the
masculine symbolic. She disrupts them to the extent that
her speaking disrupts the dominant categories and brings
Ibid. p. 53.
” Ibid. p. 54.
See Genevieve Lloyd The Man of Reason: 'Male' and
'Female' in Western Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1985)
.
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what she wants to say, what had previously seemed
incoherent, into language.
Given that, once again, the 'reasonable'
words— to which in any case she has access
only through mimicry- are powerless to
translate all that pulses, clamors, and
hangs hazily in the cryptic passages of
suffering-latency. Then ....Turn
everything upside down, inside out, back
to front. Rack it with radical
convulsions
. carry back, reimport, those
crises that her 'body' suffers in her
impotence to say what disturbs her. Insist
also and deliberately upon those blanks in
discourse which recall the places of her
exclusion and which, by their silent
plasticity
. ensure the cohesion, the
articulation, the coherent expansion of
established forms.
Section 2
The aspect of Irigaray's work which thematizes the
bringing into language of female desire is often
underestimated. One reason for this is that it is
inconsistent with Lacan ' s .theory of the relationship
between gender and language, and most interpreters read
Irigaray's work as being simply an extension of Lacan's.
Both her critics and her supporters tend to miss the
critical significance of her work by seeing her argument
as closer to Lacan's than it actually is. For Lacan the
symbolic is necessarily a masculine function. This means
that whenever a woman speaks, Lacan sees her as mimicking
masculine behavior. Irigaray shows how the symbolic is
Irigaray, p. 142.
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only masculine under certain circumstances. She then
theorizes the coming into language of female desire.
In order to come to terms with how it is that Irigaray
distances herself from Lacan, it is important first to
foray into the murky realm of Lacan's theory of
subjectivity and investigate why he believes that women
are necessarily unable to take up the subject position.
According to Lacan, subjectivity is generated through a
structure of relations entered into when the child enters
into language. When the child is in the primary
narcissistic relationship with the mother, there is a
constant flow of libidinal energy through the relationship
which continues until the circuit of need is broken by the
child's inability to achieve the satisfaction of a need.
The frustrations felt by the child in its inability to
get its needs met motivate the child's entry into the
mirror stage. Here, the child first develops an ego, that
is, an image of itself as an autonomous whole, in order to
compensate for the terror of the loss of the mother which
is experienced when the circuit of libido is broken. There
is some debate in the literature over whether or not the
mirror of the mirror stage should be taken literally.
Whether or not the child must actually look into a mirror
to experience the transition, the point remains the same
that after this stage, the child has a conception of
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itself as whole, like the whole individuated body seen
when looking into the mirror.
This separate entity acts as the locus of the ego, the
sense of the which was not experienced before, when
the child could not distinguish self and other. With this
step, the 'imaginary' order is set up in which perception
of things as things, i.e. as individuated entities, is
made possible. Concrete immediacy of experience is
alienated and replaced by a conceptual order in which
notions of repeatability, predictability and persistence
over time offer a sense of security.
The next major developmental phase is encountered with
the castration complex. Here, the child is further cut off
from the mother through the intervention of the paternal
law. The child sees that the mother's attentions are taken
away by the father and symbolizes the interest that the
mother has in the father as her desire for the phallus.
With this, the phallus becomes the universal symbol for
the object of desire. The reality of the lack of self
sufficiency of the individual is symbolized as castration.
Following on this, Lacan claims that every one, both male
and female, is castrated. The phallus is what promises to
fill the empty space which the lack that we all experience
opens up. But in accepting the phallus as the object of
desire, the child must accept the whole symbolic system in
which the phallus has meaning.
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There is a great deal of ambiguity about the effects of
sexual differences in Lacan's theories of desire and the
castration complex. While he claims that we are all
castrated, since none of us is a self sufficient
individual, what initiates the dialectic of desire is the
child's attempt to posit itself as the desired Other of
the mother, a possibility, according to Lacan, only open
to the boy. Once the boy accepts the law of the father, or
entry into the symbolic, he enters into subjectivity. His
libidinal resources are cut off from their physiological
sources and are co-opted by the symbolic network. Need
is replaced by an economy of desire. According to Anika
Lemaire,
Without access to this order, the child
will not in fact acquire his or her
individuality or the status of a member of
society, but, on the other hand, entry
into the symbolic establishes a distance
with regard to the lived real and
organizes the web of the unconscious in
everyone.
According to Lacan, the male child is offered the
possibility of taking up the subject position in language
at the price of his sensuous relationship to the real. The
real, the most elusive of Lacan's categories, is the other
of the symbolic, it is that which must lie outside of the
Kaya Silverman The Subject of Semeiotics (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 178.
Anika Lemaire Jaaues Lacan , trans. David Macey
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) p. 55.
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symbolic, but is absolutely ungraspable from within it. As
Kaya Silverman puts it, "...during his entry into the
symbolic order he gains access to those privileges which
constitute the phallus, but forfeits direct access to his
own sexuality."^ By, so to speak, mortgaging his penis
for the symbolic phallus, the male child is given the
right to take up a subject position. The female child, on
the other hand, has nothing to offer up to the symbolic.
Since she has no hope of having the phallus, which the
mother desires, she can never be the desired other of the
mother. Hence, she cannot be a subject. Her use of the
symbolic will always be based on an inauthentic
appropriation of a necessarily masculine standpoint.
Since most interpreters of Irigaray see her work as
appropriating this Lacanian theory of subjectivity, and
the way gender functions in it, they see Irigaray 's own
work as an attempt to theorize the position of exteriority
to language which is taken to be women's lot. Since all
symbols refer back to the One which institutes desire, the
phallus, any use of language is a perpetuation of the law
of the father, or the privileges of men. In Speculum and
This Sex Which is Not One, Irigaray argues that the system
set up by this patriarchal law values one truth, and must
reduce all plurality to the law of the same. Woman is then
constituted as that which is different, and therefore as
Silverman p. 185.
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that which is Other, in the radical sense of being un-
symbolizable except as that which is lacking, which is the
other of language.
Lacan makes much of the alterity of feminine libido in
his theory of feminine sexuality. In his "God and the
jouissance of the Woman", he argues that since woman's
libido is not mortgaged for entry into the system of
desire played out in the symbolic, she remains closer to
the real, and in a peculiar way, closer to 'god. He
argues that woman does not exist as a universal, that
there is no describable essence which women can be said to
be instances of (hence the line through the 'the 'in the
title). This is because "[t]here is woman only as excluded
by the nature of things which is the nature of words...
Her essence is to be non-essence and to be outside of
symbolization. Since she is excluded from the 'phallic
function', she has a closer relation to ' jouissance, '
a
kind of non-teleological sexual pleasure, than man has.
"There is a jouissance proper to her, to this 'her' which
does not exist and which signifies nothing. There is a
jouissance proper to her and of which she herself may know
Jacques Lacan "God and the Jouissance of The
Woman" in Feminine Sexuality trans. Jacqueline Rose, ed.
Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 1985) Jacques Lacan in Feminine Sexuality pp.
138-148
.
Ibid. p. 144.
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nothing, except that she experiences it."^^ For Lacan,
this supplement to the symbolic, that which is on the
border line of experiencability
,
just beyond
expressabil ity
,
is precisely what has up to now been
called God.
Might not this jouissance which one
experiences and knows nothing of, be that
which puts us on the path of ex-istence?
And why not interpret one face of the
Other, the God face, as supported by
feminine jouissance?^®
For Lacan, then, being a woman has its advantages. Sex
and love are just charades, since in the economy of
desire, satisfaction is deferred infinitely through the
symbolic system. Men exercise power and control, they have
the illusion that they can say what they mean; women, on
the other hand are able to experience pleasure.
Those who see Irigaray as accepting this theory of the
position of women in culture have trouble coming to terms
with what it is that her work accomplishes. If we see the
task of her work as theorizing this untheorizable other,
we have left her with an obviously contradictory task.
This has lead several commentators to criticize Irigaray
for falling into the inevitable traps of this position,
yet they offer no insight into how one could avoid them
without discarding the entire framework, a move which some
Ibid. P- 145
Ibid. P- 147
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of them do not want to make. Thus, Rachel Bowlby argues
that for Irigaray women are absolutely excluded from
subjectivity. She claims that Irigaray accepts the
description of woman as a dark continent, and attempts to
reverse the system of values which ascribes this status as
negative. This strategy cannot be effective, she argues,
since it retains a patriarchal frame of reference, namely
woman as the other of language, which must be subverted.
In a similar vein, Shoshona Felman reads Irigaray as
valorizing the madness which is said to be woman's lot.
Felman argues that one must go beyond this and invent a
language which does not incorporate a masculine reason.^’
Andrea Nye argues that Irigaray accepts Lacan's schema of
sexual difference and attempts to articulate the real of
the female in it.
...she attempts to answer Freud's and
Lacan's unanswered question (What do women
want?)
,
and to make articulate that
feminine "jouissance" which escapes
masculine logic. She supplies Lacan's
"Woman", the pas-toute (not all there) with
a specific presence. Women's sexuality
will no longer be the simple negative, or
lack of masculine phallic presence; nor
will it be the ineffable ecstacy-beyond-
words of Lacan's appropriation of
Bernini's Saint Therese. Instead, it will
be an alternative kind of pleasure-
describable, recoverable and connected
Bowlby, p. 63.
Ibid. p. 65.
Shoshana Felman "Woman and Madness: the Critical
Phallacy" in Diacritics (Winter 1975) pp. 2-10.
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with a women's different "self-touching"
sexual economy.
Each of these authors acknowledges that what Irigaray
has to say is different from what Lacan says. Lacan's
attempt to describe the specifically feminine stops at his
pointing to Bernini's Saint Therese,
. . .you only have to go and look at
Bernini's statue in Rome to understand
immediately that she's coming, there's no
doubt about it. And what is her
jouissance, her coming from? It is clear
that the essential testimony of the
mystics is that they are experiencing it
but know nothing about it.^^
Irigaray, on the other hand, rather than merely
pointing to an inexpressible experience, (as she mockingly
says " "In Rome? So far away? At a statue? Of a saint?
Sculpted by a man?"^^) attempts to give this experience a
voice ("For where the pleasure of the Saint Theresa in
question is concerned, her own writings are perhaps more
telling"^^) . Much of her work, especially the essays
included in This Sex Which is not One , attempts to
remythologize the feminine. She counterposes a mythology
of feminine desire to the dominant masculine one in order
Andrea Nye "The Hidden Host: Irigaray and Diotima
at Plato's Symposium" in Hypatia #3. vol. 3 (Winter 1989)
pp. 45-61.
33 Lacan, P* 147.
Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One p. 91.
35 Ibid.
125
to motivate the possibility of feminine difference,
excluded by masculine discourses. Thus in This Sex Which
Is Not One she writes,
How can I speak to you? You remain in
never congealing or solidifying.
What will make that current flow into
words? It is multiple, devoid of causes,
meanings, simple qualities.
Hsre she does not claim that female desire is essentially
fluid and multiple, rather, she wants to begin the process
the representation of this desire in language by giving
it a description, for which she makes no metaphysical
claims. In the section entitled, "When our Lips Speak
Together" she posits that there is a feminine pleasure
which does not require the intervention of subject/object
relations, as male pleasure does. "There is no need for an
outside; the other already affects you. It is inseparable
from you."^^ She claims that through the self touching of
the vaginal lips, women are always already in a sensual
relationship, which does not require mediation or
intervention.
But doesn't it follow from the Lacanian theory of
language that this new mythology must also be
phallocentric the moment it is brought into the symbolic,
i.e. the moment it is described? If we were to accept the
view that Irigaray attempts to thematize the Lacanian
Ibid. p. 215.
Ibid. p. 211.
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other, then her remythologizing must necessarily share the
problems of the old mythologies. Even if Irigaray avoids
sssentialist truth claims by seeing her work as
mythmaking, she still uses language to communicate the
myth. If language is essentially alienating, then wouldn't
extending its reach further into female experience be an
invitation to a deeper colonization of the female body?
Wouldn't it be a call to give up the one advantage women
have, namely a direct relationship to jouissance? Wouldn't
any saying be co-optation? And wouldn't therefore, any
ci^itique which uses language be necessarily an exercise in
masculine hegemony? If she uncritically accepts the
Lacanian paradigm, then there is no way for Irigaray to
avoid having her writing fall into these traps.
What is necessary for a feminist appropriation of Lacan
which wants to avoid the impossible position implied by
these questions, and what Irigaray does, is to part ways
with Lacan over the claim that the symbolic is necessarily
a phallic and dominating function. To the extent that
Irigaray leaves open the possibility of feminine desire
being expressed in language, she is not trapped by the
implications of these questions.
Nowhere does Irigaray state that she agrees with Lacan
that the symbolic order is a necessarily masculine one.
Rather, she speaks of the problems of conceptualizing
female needs within the current system of representation.
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thus implying that another system of conceptualization
which did allow its expression might be possible. In an
interview in Ideology and Consciousness
, she claims that
Lacan's appropriation of structuralism was too uncritical,
Lacan erred in not questioning the claims to universality
of the model of language that he uses. Thus, she argues,
"The unconscious is structured like a
language" he claims repeatedly. Obviously,
but which? And if language is unique, and
always the same- for men and women- Lacan
can only lead back to a traditional
position concerning the feminine.^®
In order to have a different position concerning the
feminine, the possibility of women's articulating their
desires in language must be opened up. While Irigaray both
uses and rejects many of his concepts, she never engages
in a sustained critique of the master. This is at least
part of the reason why there is little clarity in the
literature on how her views differ from Lacan's. Since
Irigaray does not share Lacan's view that language is
necessarily masculine, in looking for where they part
ways, it is perhaps best to focus on why he does think
that it is.
In attempting to explain this aspect of Lacan's work,
Kaja Silverman argues that this notion comes from a
confusion in Lacan's work about the relationship between
the phallus and the penis. Lacan argues that the phallus
Luce Irigaray "Woman's Exile" trans. Couze Venn,
in Ideology and Consciousness #1 (1977) p. 69.
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is a purely symbolic function, that it is not motivated by
anatomical reality. If there were no relationship between
the penis and the phallus however, Lacan could not use
this scheme to explain the different access that men and
women have to the symbolic order. Silverman argues that
Lacan's position that the mother is seen by the child as
abandoning it for the phallus assumes that the mother is
in a primordial position of lack. Silverman argues that
this structure of lack should be seen as the result of a
particular social form, rather than as a human universal.
If we are to benefit from Lacan's
discovery that the phallus is not the
penis but a signifier we must remember the
conditions under which it can function as
such. Like any other signifier it can be
activated only within discourse, and like
any other signifier it is defined by those
terms with which it is paradigmatically
connected, whether through similarity or
opposition. The discourse of the family
serves constantly to activate the paternal
signifier, and one of the most important
ways it does so is through the evocation
of its binary complement "lack." In short,
the paternal signifier finds its support
in what might be called the "maternal"
signifier. It is only through the mother's
desire that the cultural primacy of the
phallus can be established and maintained,
and that the discourse of the patriarchal
family can be perpetuated.^^
If this is correct, then Lacan's argument for why it is
that language is masculine would have to be relativized to
a specific social form. From this it would follow that
39 Silverman, P- 189 .
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language has a tendency toward having a patriarchal
structure within a patriarchal society, but that this
patriarchal element cannot be taken as an invariant
characteristic of all languages. If we accept this view,
then we can accept the Lacanian analysis of the depth of
P^^^i^^chal structures in language without accepting the
view that to be authentically female, one must renounce
language as a corrupt realm.
Section 3
If Irigaray is seen as holding this sort of critical
acceptance of Lacanian doctrine, then we have taken the
first step toward investigating just how it is that she
thinks feminine desire can be brought into language.
Section 1 examined how it is that the dominant discourses
of rationality are built upon an exclusion of female
desire. Section 2 showed how even though Irigaray operates
with a Lacanian theory of subjectivity, she is not forced
to accept the pessimism about a feminine appropriation of
language that a straight Lacanian would have to. If we
reject the idea that the exclusion of feminine desire from
language is a necessary characteristic of the symbolic,
then in order to combat it, we need to look at how this
exclusion functions.
Irigaray 's notion of how masculine discourse excludes
the feminine and of how that could be changed is most
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clearly seen in her theory of the imaginary. According to
most readings of him, for Lacan, the imaginary order is
entered into before the symbolic, and therefore, before
the onset of the ideology of gender divisions. Thus, in
her book Jaccrues Lacan and the Philosophy nf
Psychoanalysis, Ellie Ragland-Sullivan argues that sexual
identity occurs after the advent of the mirror stage. Only
when the child takes up a position in the symbolic is it
forced into one side or the other of the gender divide.
In the imaginary, both male and female children posit an
ego ideal of the self as a unified and independent whole.
As Silverman argues in her criticism of this view, from
the fact that in the imaginary an ideal image of the self
is produced, it follows that cultural ideals are already
operating in it.
Careful scrutiny of the account given to
us of the mirror stage reveals undeniable
traces of cultural intervention, most
notably in the term ' ideal ' by means of
which Lacan qualifies the pronoun 'I.'
' Ideal ' is a term which has meaning only
within a system of values.^’
If we accept this criticism of Lacan, then it does not
make sense to claim that the imaginary is free from the
ideological structures of valuation and the question of
Ellie Ragland-Sullivan Jaques Lacan and the
Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1986) p. 276.
Silverman, p. 160, see also Silverman, p. 273.
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gender ideology having a presence in the imaginary is
raised. Margaret Whitford claims that for Irigaray the
imaginary is gendered.
The imaginary is sexed; it is
either a male imaginary bearing
the morphological marks of the
male body whose cultural
products are characterized by
unity, teleology, linearity
self-identity etc., or it is a
female imaginary marked by the
morphology of the female body,
and characterized by plurality,
non-linearity, fluid identity
etc.^^
This way of reading Irigaray does not necessarily imply a
biological reductionism, as many of Irigaray 's critics
would claim. Although the male sex is, as Irigaray
points out, characterized in our society as unitary, there
is no necessary reason that the male body must be thus
symbolized. The point is that because in the oedipal
relation the boy is forced to renounce his relation to the
mother, his ego ideal is founded upon a vision of the self
as unitary. The girl is not forced to give up this
relationship, and thus retains an identification to the
mother which allows for a more fluid ego. According to
Margaret Whitford "Luce Irigaray and the Female
Imaginary: Speaking as a Woman" in Radical Philosophy
vol.43, (1986) p. 4.
See especially Plaza, Ibid, and Janet Sayers
Sexual Contradictions (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986) p. 42.
Nye, p. 66.
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this view, gender differences are internal to the
structure of the imaginary. This contrasts with the view
that the imaginary is entered into before the onset of the
symbolic since it would imply that gender based ideology
is already functioning at the level of the imaginary, that
the imaginary contains retroactive effects of the
symbolic
.
In her book Jaccmes Lacan
. Anika Lemaire argues that
the symbolic and the imaginary should not be seen as
temporal stages, but as interpenetrating poles of
consciousness
.
...the process of symbolization, in the
sense of engendering, unfolds between two
poles, the first of which- the minimum
threshold of opening- is the imaginary,
and the second of which- the threshold of
accomplishment- is the social relation
recognized in discourse [or the
symbolic]
The imaginary is the register of those things brought to
the edge of consciousness but not yet into language. And
yet, she argues, the imaginary is always in a sense
present in the symbolic.
The imaginary is the psychoanalytic
register par excellence , but
psychoanalysis has taught us to find
traces of it in language, where words
overlap with symbols multiplied a
hundredfold, and where organization
ultimately depends upon such a slender
thread that it is not aberrant to wonder
whether language really is the agent of
interhuman dialogue. At the same time, the
45 Lemaire, p . 56
.
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imaginary is pertinently reflected in
socio-cultural symbolism, as much by the
multiplicity of thoughts it implies as by
the number of thoughts it neglects/^
While Lemaire does not believe that the imaginary is
gendered, her view that the imaginary and the symbolic are
polss of consciousness, rather than temporal stages, opens
the way to seeing a reciprocal effect between the two. So,
while Lemaire raises the idea that the imaginary is
already in a sense present in the symbolic, she does not
touch on the question of whether or not the female
imaginary is also present there. Given her reading of the
slips which necessarily allow imaginary material to slip
into the symbolic, it seems consistent with her view, if
she were to accept the notion of a gendered imaginary, to
argue that the female imaginary already does come into
language, but that it is continually censored from being
thematized in our concepts of the functioning of language
and reason. The exclusion of feminine desire from language
thus operates at the level of thematization rather than at
the level of expression.
In a discussion of Freud in "Any theory of the
subject..." Irigaray argues that because of his own
psychic needs to repress his desire for his own mother,
Freud was forced to ignore the effects of the feminine in
language.
Lemaire, p. 61.
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[Freud] might have been able to interpret
what the overdetermination of language
(its effects of deferred action, its
subterranean dreams and fantasies, its
convulsive quakes, its paradoxes and
contradictions) owed to the repression
(which may yet return) of maternal
power. ... we shall in fact receive only
confirmation of the discourse of the
same. . .
According to Irigaray, it is necessary for the specific
rationality functioning in our society that the
relationship to the mother/body be repressed. Since the
female imaginary is constituted socially, as based on this
connection, its thematization would be disruptive of our
entire system of representation. The perpetuation of this
system of representation requires that the female
imaginary be seen as not able to be brought into language,
that its effects be repressed before they are thematized
in our conceptual systems. And yet, the psychoanalytic
theory of the relationship between language and the
unconscious would seem to imply that it already reaches
language through slips, associations, jokes etc..
Though the feminine imaginary reaches language in a
repressed form, its presence remains unacknowledged.
Anglo-American theories of language, which see language as
reducible to the truth claims implicit in a given
utterance encourage us to look at language in a way that
misses the presence of things not thematizable according
Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman p. 141.
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to the dominant cultural categories of meaning and sense.
While Lacan's structuralism allows him to include in his
understanding of language those things only reachable
through chains of associations, his belief that these
chains are limited by the law of the father, that other
imaginary contents are completely censored from being
present in language, leads him also to see language as
only able to presence those things which accord with the
dominant system of representation. Philosophy participates
in this by reinforcing the laws of legitimate discourse,
which is why Irigaray focuses so much attention on the
critique of philosophical writings. "[I]t is
philosophical discourse that we have to challenge, and
disrupt . inasmuch as this discourse sets forth the law for
all others, inasmuch as it constitutes the discourse on
/ Q
discourses .
"
Irigaray shows how the dominant system of
representation keeps the content of feminine imaginaries
from being thematized, but does not argue that this
content is completely unable find expression. The
censorship occurs even more at the meta-level, at the
level of thematization- in our concepts of language and of
reason- than at the level of language itself. This would
imply that the mechanism of exclusion does not just
operate on an individual psychological level, but also on
Irigaray, This Sex Which is not One p. 74.
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a social level. The rules for comprehensibility which are
fought out in a variety of types of interaction, from
interpersonal dialogue to the level of philosophical
discourse, reinforce the hegemonic structures which
prevent the comprehension of the desires of women.
One cause of confusion in answering the guestion
whether or not Irigaray believes that the female imaginary
can be brought into language, is that on her
^characterization
,
the female imaginary is characterized by
fluidity. This might lead us to then see it as
constitutionally incapable of finding expression in
language which requires reification, or the reduction of
the multiplicity of experience to words which reduce
experience to generic concepts. In Speculum
. Irigaray
makes it clear, however, that the difference between the
male and the female imaginary is not one of reification
versus total fluidity. Any expression requires some
reification, the point is how this reification is carried
forth. While the female imaginary is constructed as fluid,
it also requires form, or reification, in its
representation. The difference is that the form which
operates in the feminine imaginary has no pretensions to
absolute, Platonic stability.
This self-touching gives woman a form that
is in (de) finitely transformed without
closing over her appropriation.
Metamorphoses occur in which there is no
complete set, where no set theory of the
One is established. Transmutations occur.
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always unexpectedly, since they do not
conspire to accomplish any telos. That .
after all, would rest on the assumption
that one figure takes up- sublates- the
previous one and dictates the next one,
that there is one specified form, that
becomes another
. But this happens only in
the imaginary of the (male) subject, who
projects onto all others the reason for
the capture of his desire: his language,
which claims to designate him perfectly.^’
While the male imaginary operates through generating myths
of stability and requires notions of form which have some
sort of ultimate sensibility, the female imaginary is able
to accept its formal reifications as temporary, shifting
and perhaps even arbitrary. What women need to do to have
their desires articulated in language is not to completely
break the reification which language requires, but to
break through the specific hegemonic structures which have
become reified in the concepts which are taken as
meaningful
.
What needs to be done instead, of course,
if she is to begin to speak and be
understood, and understand and express
herself, is to suspend and melt down all
systems of credit. In every sense. The
credit, the credibility, that sustains all
the current forms of credibility, that
sustains all the current forms of
monopoly, needs to be questioned.
Otherwise, why speak about 'her, ' since
she has no currency, and only supports the
currency in her/with silence.
Ibid. p. 233 .
Ibid. p. 234 (translation modified. French p.
290) .
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Section 4
According to Irigaray, for both men and women there is
an experience of connectedness, of fluid relations to the
body, to the mother and to others which is a primary
target of repression in the dominant system of
representation. In women this connectedness structures the
imaginary, but is repressed in language. In men it is more
deeply repressed and not allowed as the structuring
principle of the imaginary. The dominant ways of
conceptualizing language and reason operating in our
society are grounded in this repression.^’
According to most theories of language, the meaning of
language can be reduced to a set of truth claims implicit
in any statement. This ignores the contents of language
which are excluded by systems of hegemony. Although all
speaking requires the intervention of a mediating
principle into experience, and therefore a sort of
It is not clear from her texts if Irigaray thinks
that men and women each have a different gendered
imaginary, or if she believes that every person has access
to both types of imaginary structure. The second of these
possibilities, even if it is not Irigaray's view, leads to
some interesting implications. It might be helpful to see
the very real option that women have of being successful
at using the dominant discursive systems as an exercise of
their male imaginaries. In his discussion of Kierkegaard
in "God and the Jouissance of The Woman", Lacan claims
that through his relationship to Regine, Kierkegaard was
able to reach the mystical realm which usually excludes
men. This seems to imply that men are at least
theoretically capable of having access to a female
imaginary. [Lacan p. 148]
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of experience, we do not need to completely
reject all forms of reification as problematic. What
shows in her work is that the way meaning is
in our current system creates a hegemony which
does not allow feminine desire to be thematized and that
the narrowness of current conceptions of rationality acts
as an ideological filter on what can be received as
meaningful. This means that we need to look at what
perspectives get encoded in speech and how the
hegemonizing functions. What is needed then, is for the
desires of women to be able to be expressed and thematized
in language. We do not need to attempt the impossible task
of making language non-reifying.
Irigaray shows that dominant concepts of rationality
are based on masculine psychic needs to repress the
relationship to the body and to materiality. By showing
there to be an internal connection between a concept of
reason and a particular set of psychic needs, Irigaray
undermines the notion that reason is an autonomous
faculty. What we call rational is nothing but the most
accepted discourse of legitimation in our conceptual
system. And the politics of what is to be accepted and
where questioning is appropriate is related to the desires
of those able to impose their rationality on others.
Rationality is always a sedimentation of desire and of
power.
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Once Irigaray has succeeded in showing that rationality
cannot be found through pure reflection and that it is an
operation of desire and power, it no longer makes sense to
look at rationality as a metaphysical principle that can
be accepted or rejected. We can reject what has gained
acceptance as the content of reason in dominant Western
philosophical discourses. But, if we believe that language
always requires conceptual reifications and with them
discourses of legitimation, then we cannot escape the
space of the rational. If we accept the view that
rationality is nothing but a discourse of legitimation,
then we cannot reject rationality as long as we use
language
.
Irigaray does not directly argue for the need for a new
less patriarchal form of rationality. From some of her
statements one can get the impression that she wants to
reject rationality- and language- as necessarily
patriarchal. If as Lacan claims, all linguistic expression
is reenactment of the law of the father, then the proper
place for feminists is outside of language. I have already
pointed out the paradoxes of a feminist adoption of this
position, and argued that it is not the position that
Irigaray holds. Irigaray shows how linguistic systems work
to elevate certain contents and repress others, and
thereby act to exclude the contents of the imaginaries of
women. Philosophical concepts of Rationality can be seen
141
as the highest articulation of a certain repressive
discourse, and as Irigaray writes, those that become the
law of acceptability governing all discourses. Only when
the exclusionary systems set up by this law are challenged
will the hegemonic control of discourses of the rational
begin to be undermined.
142
CHAPTER 4
and Universal ism:
A Critique of Habermas' Universalist Discourse Ethics
The present hegemony of the West
is assumed, that is, the
outcome is determined, the
'diagnosis' is complete. The task
remains to account for why this
outcome uccurred. In short, the
question is, "Why did the West
rise to hegemony?" Past
historical events are integrated
selectively to answer this
question.
’
Rationality is always an operation of discourses of
desire and power. Discourses of rationality act to set up
exclusionary practices by marking some positions as
legitimate and others as illegitimate. As I have shown in
the previous chapter. Western philosophical notions of
rationality have been especially efficient at excluding
the contents of the imaginaries of women. But if we accept
the view, articulated in Chapter 1 that all uses of
language set up evaluative systems, and hence discourses
of legitimation, then rationality, as the space holder for
our discourses of legitimation cannot be avoided.
Once we have accepted the view that any discourse of
rationality is a temporary reification of the views of
Janet Abu-Lughod, "On the Remaking of History: How
to Reinvent the Past," in Barbara Kruger and Phil Mariani
eds. Remaking History (Seattle: Bay Press, 1989) pp.lll-
130, p. 114.
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what counts as legitimate thinking at a given time, we are
faced with the question of how we should judge the
legitimacy of different views. Theories, statements,
expressions and critiques will still be brought to courts
of appeal, even after we have begun to question the
authority of the judges.
Since we can neither escape from engaging in
legitimating practices nor ground these practices in any
complete way, what we are left with is the view of
rationality as a space holder for what counts as rational
at a given time. Following from this view, discourses that
attempt to legitimize principles or ideas by naming them
as rational need to focus on determinate negations of
existing discourses of rationality as they appear
problematic. The difference between what I am
claiming here and the traditional view of rationality as
being based in processes of argumentation is a subtle one
but central for the current project. We can engage in
argumentative practices to settle questions of dispute,
but we cannot assume that there is a rationality that
governs these practices before we begin to engage in them.
What I am arguing for here is a Negative Dialectic through
which validity claims are raised as views come to seem
problematic. While this bears a strong resemblance to
traditional Enlightenment views, it contains an essential
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difference: I am not starting from the assumption that
there are any a priori limits on what is to be accepted as
rational. This caveat is important for distinguishing
critical from hegemonic epistemological practices.
The moment of openness to exploration and critique is
something we should keep from the Enlightenment tradition.
The content of the notion of rationality which has grown
out of this tradition, however, must be rejected. As Trinh
T. Minh-ha puts it:
By attempting to exclude one (darkness)
for the sake of the other (light)
,
the
modernist project of building universal
knowledge has indulged itself in such self
gratifying oppositions as
civilization/primitivism,
progress/backwardness
,
evolution/stagnation. With the decline of
the colonial idea of advancement in
rationality and liberty, what becomes more
obvious in the necessity to reactivate
that very part of the modernist project at
its nascent stage: the radical calling
into question, in every undertaking, of
everything that one tends to take for
granted- which is a (pre- and post-
modernistj stage that should remain
constant
.
But how are we to characterize the notion of
rationality we want to hold on to if we are to keep from
giving it any content? It has become common in
contemporary philosophical circles to reject the view of
reason as embodying a certain content or being a specific
^ Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman. Native. Other: Writing
Postcolonialitv and Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1989) p. 40.
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sort of rule to apply ready made to the world.
Contemporary rationalists tend to be much more modest in
their claims than the likes of Kant, Locke or Descartes.
What we are more likely to encounter now is the view that
what is rational is what follows from good argumentation.
Thus, someone is said to be rational to the extent that
they are willing to defend their views through arguments
and respond to the force of the arguments of the partner
iri argumentation. From this it would follow that we could
engage in arguments to settle disputes, and could use this
method to undermine the abuses we have uncovered in
current discourses of rationality, while still engaging in
legitimizing practices.
This view of argumentation as the basis for rationality
is at the heart of Habermas' consensus theory of truth. In
The Theory of Communicative Action
. Habermas claims that a
rational discourse is one in which the result is based on
the uncoerced consensus of the participants in the
discussion. Habermas' project is useful for our discussion
since it bears a certain surface level resemblance to what
is being claimed here, and yet the differences are very
telling. Habermas claims to derive the universal component
of his theory of rationality from the notion of the force
of the better argument and from a theory of human
evolution- in which we develop as we come increasingly to
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accept argumentation as the court of appeals for all
judgments.
Our goal in this chapter will be to show the impossibility
of grounding the notion of the 'force of the better
argument' and through this to reveal both the hegemonic
operations of Habermas' universalism and the necessary
openness of any non-hegemonic operation of reason.
Section 1
Habermas
' approach to epistemology has been described
as an attempt to move beyond the dualism of objectivism
and relativism.^ Habermas is critical of objectivist or
transcendental approaches to epistemology, arguing that
they ignore the inherent linguisiticality of truth
relations. In spite of his skepticism about the
possibilities of a priori grounding for truth claims, he
wants to preserve some form of universalism in order to
preserve the possibility of making critical judgments. As
a way out of the dilemma of universalism and relativism he
proposes grounding judgments in the universal requirements
of the use of language. The project of 'universal
pragmatics' then is to reveal these universal structures
and the normative implications they carry with them.
^ Alessandro Ferrara, "A Critique of Habermas's
Consensus Theory of Truth," Philosophy and Social
Criticism Nl, V13, pp 39-68, p. 40.
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The problem with Habermas' project lie precisely at the
point at which he attempts to make his theory universal/
Here he engages in exclusionary practices which have
hegemonic implications. In the following I will argue that
despite the helpfulness of looking at rationality as an
empirical practice which is grounded through
intersubjective practices, Habermas still ends up
repeating the most misogynist and Eurocentric mistakes of
the Enlightenment tradition. Habermas' view of what count
as rational rules for discussion presupposes some of the
very standards of rationality which I would like to
challenge
.
Any discussion of Habermas has the difficult task of
reconstructing the logic of his project which exhibits a
structure so baroque as to defy comprehensibility. In this
discussion I will focus only on the thread of
argumentation that goes into forming his theory of
rationality. The problem of rationality is at the basis of
Habermas' whole project, yet it is not until his Theory of
Communicative Action that we get a systematic treatment of
the question of what is to count as rational. Before this,
in the essay "Wahrheitstheorien, " Habermas gives a
critique of traditional approaches to epistemology and
^ For a different approach to the problem of
Habermas' reification of the concept of rationality see:
Rudolph Gasche, "Postmodernism and Rationality" in The
Journal of Philosophy . V85, October, 1988, pp. 528-533.
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offers his consensus theory of truth as an alternative. In
this essay, which is Habermas' clearest enunciation of his
own epistemology, Habermas attempts to ground his theory
of truth in the rules of good argumentation. The
relationships between argumentation and rationality on the
one hand and rationality and progress on the other are
left to be developed in the Theory of Communicative
Action .
In "Wahrheitstheorien, " Habermas claims that sentences
can have different meanings depending on the context in
which they are uttered, he further claims that these
differences of meaning effect the truth content of
sentences. Because of this we need to look at truth claims
as arising out of propositions, or speech acts, rather
than out of sentences. For every assertion there is a
corresponding truth claim. "In the fact that I assert
something, I raise the claim that the assertion is true."^
When we make assertions we raise claims to the validity of
that which is asserted and these validity claims are open
for justification, or what Habermas calls redemption
[einlosen]
.
Habermas argues that validity claims can only be
redeemed discursively, that is, through argumentation. To
ground a truth claim we must resort to argumentation
^ Jurgen Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in Vorstudien
und Erqanzungen zur Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns
(Frankfurt: Surkamp, 1984) p. 129.
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rather than to the evidence of experience. A statement
such as "this ball is red" refers to the experience of
perception of the redness of the ball, and yet its truth
is a matter of the validity of the speech act of the
proposition 'this ball is red.' Habermas argues that
although "experiences appear with claims to objectivity :
but this is not identical with the truth of the relevant
proposition."^ This is because, according to Habermas, the
truth relation we are investigating is not in the
correspondence of the statement with reality, but in the
truth of the proposition. Thomas McCarthy expresses
Habermas' line of argument in this way:
Correspondence theories of truth are not
only unable to supply a criterion of
truth (which statements correspond to
reality?) independent of critical
discussion: they are incapable of giving a
coherent account either of the ' ready-
in-itself to which true statements are
said to correspond or of the relation of
'correspondence' that is said to
obtain. . . .The conclusion to be drawn from
this line of argument is that ultimately
there can be no separation of the criteria
of truth from the criteria for the
argumentative settlement of truth claims.^
In place of a correspondence theory of truth Habermas
argues for a consensus theory of truth. Against the charge
that what he is speaking about here is not truth, but a
^ Ibid. p. 153.
^ Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen
Habermas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982) pp. 302-3.
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method for ascertaining truth, Habermas claims that the
method for redeeming truth claims is not external to the
meaning of truth. Following Dewey, he defines truth as
'warranted assertability .
' The truth of a statements lies
in the warrantedness of what is asserted. Whether or not
an assertion is warranted is not just found through
argumentation, its warrantedness consists in the basis for
its acceptance.®
Since the truth of a proposition is judged through the
settlement of differences through argumentation, the best
basis for saying that a certain proposition is true is
that it was arrived at through good argumentation and that
all those participating in the discussion agree to its
truth. Yet clearly, if consensus is to count as the mark
of a true proposition, there must be some way to
distinguish valid from invalid forms of consensus. If one
participant in the discussion wields a sanction of death
over other participants if they disagree, it would be hard
to imagine why we should accept the agreed upon
proposition as true. A rationally motivated consensus (and
therefore a consensus which yields truth- or 'warranted
assertability') is one in which what determines the
For an interesting criticisms of this view as
confusing the meaning of 'truth' with a criterion for
truth see: Alessandro Ferrara, "A critique of Habermas'
Consensus Theory of Truth," in Philosophy and Social
Criticism
. #1, V13, pp. 39-68; "Critical Theory and its
Discontents: On Wellmer's Critique of Habermas," in Praxis
International , #3, V9, Oct. 1989, pp. 305-320.
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outcome of the argument is nothing but the unforced force
of the better argument (der zwanglosen Zwang des besseren
Arguments)
. In order to be sure that this is that case,
the participants must allow for a stepwise radicalization
in which increasingly deep questions as to the context of
the discussion can be raised.
The first step is the passage from
problematized assertions, which themselves
represent actions, to assertions whose
controversial validity claims will be made
into the object of discourse (the entry
into discourse) . The second step consists
in the theoretical clarification of the
problematized assertions, that is, in the
statement (at least) of an argument within
a chosen speech system (theoretical
discourse) . The third step is the passage
to a modification of the chosen speech
system to a weighing of the
appropriateness of alternative speech
systems (metatheoretical discourse) . The
last step consists in a further
radicalization in the passage to a
reflection on the systematic changes in
the ground language.’
The participants in the discourse must be able to move
back and forth between these levels of thematization until
a consensus is reached. Habermas claims that the ideal
speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a
pure construct: it is an unavoidable presupposition of all
discourse. In "Wahrheitstheorien" Habermas claims that
although all discussions take place in a context of space
and time constraints and are limited by the real
psychological constraints of the participants, its
’ Habermas pp. 174-5.
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It is anfulfillment is not an a priori impossibility
fiction which we must always assume in
discussion.
There is a certain circularity in Habermas' explanation
of why we must accept the ideal speech situation as the
legitimizing ground of any discourse. He claims that we
must be able to distinguish rational discourse from
apparent discourse that is based on coercion. Once we have
given up on transcendental ways of grounding the
rationality of a discourse, what we are left with is the
notion of the force of the better argument. But why should
we accept the view that we can distinguish between truth
bearing and coerced forms of consensus? Habermas claims
that "It belongs to the presuppositions of argumentation
that in performing speech acts we counterfactually act as
if the ideal speech situation were not just fictive, but
real..."^^ In "Wahrheitstheorien" Habermas does not
attempt to ground this assertion. In an earlier work,
Communication and the Evolution of Society , Habermas had
first raised this issue. In the first part of that book
"What is Universal Pragmatics," he defines his task as
developing the thesis that "anyone acting communicatively
must, in performing speech action, raise validity claims
Ibid. P- 179
” Ibid. P- 181
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and suppose that they can be vindicated [or redeemed:
einloesen]
.
Following reconstructive methods of Piaget and Chomsky,
he attempts to blend empirical with formal methods of
analysis
.
The paradigms introduced by Chomsky and
Piaget have led to a type of research
determined by a peculiar connection of
formal and empirical analysis, rather than
their classical separation. The expression
transcendental
. with which we associate a
contrast to empirical science, is thus
unsuited to characterizing, without
misunderstanding, a line of research such
as universal pragmatics.’^
He claims that there is an underlying structure of
language such that in all speaking, the speaker raises
claims to the truth, validity, normative rightness and
veracity of her/his statements.
Just as Chomskian linguistics "starts from the assumption
that every adult speaker possesses an implicit,
reconstructible knowledge, in which is expressed his
linguistic rule competence," in universal pragmatics there
is a "corresponding communicative competence." Habermas
claims that as with linguistic competence, communicative
competence has a universal core.
A general theory of speech actions would
thus describe exactly that fundamental
Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution
of Society trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press,
1979) p. 2.
Ibid. p. 25.
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system of rules that adult subjects master
to the extent that they can fulfill the
condition for the happy employment of
sentences in utterances
. .T^
Habermas does not just claim that this is true by
definition, i.e. that what we mean by instances of
communicative interaction are only those speech act that
raise these validity claims. Rather, he sees these
validity claims as immanent to all interactive uses of
language. "In the interactive use of language, the speaker
proffers a speech-act-immanent obligation to provide
justification."^^ That is, an obligation to provide
backing for the validity claims that are raised.
One objection to this approach to language is that
there are clearly many times when the users of language do
not act according to this obligation. Speakers routinely
lie, attempt to derail the discussion by raising points
they know to be irrelevant, violate their own moral
principles, or show a lack of understanding as to their
own motivations. To answer this objection, Habermas moves
from the formal to the empirical side of his theory. He
grounds the notion of the presupposition of the ideal
speech situation in his evolutionary proposition that as
society develops there is an increasing thematization of
validity claims such that more aspects of the society come
Ibid. p. 26.
Ibid. p. 64.
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to be ruled by the force of the better argument. Thus, his
claim is not that in all speaking we attempt to live up to
these validity claims, but rather, that it is in the
nature of human society that as society develops there is
an increasing tendency to thematize them.
In Communication and the Evolution of Society , although
he states that he will defend the thesis that in all
speaking we raise validity claims under the assumption
that they can be discursively redeemed, he never gets
beyond stating it as an assumption. In various of his
later works, he claims that this tendency is proven in the
advances of scientific culture. This is where Habermas,
following the methodological approaches of Piaget and
Chomsky, moves from an analytic perspective to a quasi-
empirical one. Just as Piaget derives his theory of moral
development from observation of the differences in the
moral judgments of younger and older children, Habermas
derives his theory of the development of universal
pragmatics, or legitimizing language use, from observing
the differences between the uses of language in more and
less scientifically developed cultures. The argument is
that we know there is something like a development of
truth through the raising and redeeming of validity claims
since this is what happens in a scientific culture, and we
16 especially Per Philosophische Diskurs der
Moderne (Frankfurt: Surkamp, 1986)
.
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can see by the advances of science that science implies
progress
.
In the Theory of Communicative Action
. Habermas pursues
two different lines of argumentation to ground his theory
of rationality. In the first part of Chapter 1 of volume
1
,
he argues for why it is that we should accept the force
of the better argument as the foundation for the
rationality of truth claims. In sections 2-4 of the same
chapter he argues that there is a difference in the
rational potential of modern and mythical ways of
understanding the world. He does not make it especially
clear what he sees as the relationship between these two
lines of argument, but following on the method of rational
reconstruction described above we can infer his intention.
In section one we are given the transcendental part of the
equation, in the following sections, the empirical. The
force of the better argument is the ground for the
rationality of a statement and we know this because this
is the principle underlying the social forms we know to be
the most developed. We know that scientific cultures are
the most developed because they exhibit the quality of
decenteredness which we know to be the mark of
development
.
In discussing Habermas' arguments in this text, I would
like to pursue these two lines of argumentation
separately. There is a tendency in the literature to
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understand Habermas' argument to be that rationality is
grounded in the concept of the force of the better
argument, and yet a careful reading of the first section
Theory of Communicative Action shows that Habermas
is aware of the fundamental openness of what can be taken
to be a satisfactory argument. This is why he must resort
ho the second part of the argument, the empirical evidence
of progress.
It is especially important to focus on Habermas'
discussion of the notion of the force of the better
argument since this is commonly taken to be the what
distinguishes rational from irrational discourse. Thus, if
someone is unwilling to submit to the force of a good
argument, or to engage in argumentative practices, they
are said to be irrational, regardless of the beliefs they
hold, and regardless of the skepticism of the person
making the charge to any notion of an a priori reason. One
advantage to looking at Habermas' discussion, then, is
that he shows us why we should not accept this view. In
his discussion of the force of the better argument
Habermas' shows the indeterminacy that is inherent in the
notion of the force of an argument in a way that is
helpful for undermining the notion that rationality can be
grounded a priori.
It is because of this indeterminacy that Habermas must
resort to the second, and much more problematic part of
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the argument, that there is an evolutionary tendency to
human society and that modern Western societies are at the
most advanced state yet achieved. Several commentators
pointed to the Ethnocentrism of this position. Yet
in pointing this out it is also important to notice the
role this argument has in grounding Habermas' system. This
position is not merely an unfortunate prejudice that can
be written out of the system, rather, it is the foundation
of last resort. Once we accept the openness of the concept
of the force of the better argument, all we have left to
ground the concept that there is something like
rationality operating in the world is this evolutionary
part of the argument.^®
Section 2
Habermas begins his discussion of the notion of "the
force of the better argument" in the essay
"Wahrheitstheorien"
. There he argues that what
See: David Rasmussen, "Communicative Action and
Philosophy: Reflections on Habermas' Theorie des
Kommunikativen Handelns ," in Philosophy and Social
Criticism
, #1, V9, pp. 1-28; Thomas McCarthy, "Rationality
and Relativism," in John B. Thompson and David Held eds.
Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982)
,
pp . 57-78
.
This point is very significant for Habermas'
critique of the likes of Adorno and Horkheimer and
Foucault. His critique of them is based on the position
that there is a content to the notion of 'the force of the
better argument. ' He claims that these thinkers fall into
relativism because they fail to recognize this fact.
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a true from a false consensus is that the
former is grounded in nothing but the uncoerced force of
the better argument. In this essay he is mostly
concerned to argue for the superiority of the consensus
theory of truth over coherence approaches. His discussion
of the force of the better argument focuses on the point
that the truth of a proposition consists not in the
correspondence to the evidence of the senses nor in the
logical necessity of its elements, but rather, in the
validity of the argumentative process through which it is
redeemed.
I have already argued that Habermas believes that
correspondence to the evidence of the senses cannot be
what grounds the truth of a speech act, since speech acts
cannot be stripped of their linguisiticality . Habermas
uses the work of Stephen Toulmin to support the view that
it also cannot be grounded in the logic of the
proposition. In Human Understanding and The Uses of
Argument, Toulmin argues that there is an unavoidable gulf
between formal logic and the truth of most propositions.
Logic helps us to sort out the relations between elements
of an argument. But, Toulmin claims, in real argumentation
the relations argued about almost never amount to
relations reducible to logic.
Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien" p. 165.
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In many situations, the propositions we
put forward as known are of one logical
type, but the data and warrant-backing
which we produce in their support are of
other types. We make assertions about the
future, and back them by reference to data
about the present and past; we make
assertions about the remote past and, and
back them by data about the present and
recent past; we make general assertions
about nature, and back them by the results
of particular observations and
experiments We often find ourselves
in the sorts of situation of which these
are samples, and already the central
difficulty should be apparent. For, if we
are going to accept claims to knowledge as
•justifiable' only where data and backing
between them can entail the proposition
claimed as known, it is open to question
whether any of these sample claims to
knowledge are going to prove
•justifiable . '
^
Toulmin uses this to argue that logic can at most be a
help in settling arguments, but that it is a mistake to
suppose that we can ground the validity of arguments
logic. Toulmin 's argument is that arguments consist of a
heterogeneous conglomeration of different elements. His
sketch of the way arguments unfold helps us to see this
heterogeneity and to see the non-logical character of most
of what goes into making an argument that is taken to be
valid.
For Habermas, truth is a quality of speech acts that
cannot be ascertained through direct evidence of the
senses nor through logic. It can only be redeemed through
Stephen Edelson Toulmin, The Uses of Argument
(Cambridge: University Press, 1969) p. 219.
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the rules of good argumentation. For Habermas rationality
is intimately related to argumentation.
Rationality is understood to be a
disposition of speaking and acting
subjects that is expressed in modes of
behavior for which there are good reasons
or grounds. This means that rational
expressions admit of objective evaluation.
This is true of all symbolic expressions
that are, at least implicitly, connected
with validity claims (or with claims that
stand in internal relation to a
criticizable validity claim) . Any explicit
examination of controversial validity
claims requires an exacting form of
communication satisfying the conditions of
argumentation
.
Habermas follows Toulmin in separating the rules for good
argumentation from the rules of formal logic. Thus he
writes
,
To the extent that arguments are
conclusive in the sense of logical
inference, they do not bring anything new
to light; and to the extent that they have
any substantive content at all, they rest
on insights and needs that can be
variously interpreted in terms of changing
frameworks or 'languages,' and that,
therefore, do not provide any ultimate
foundations
.
What is needed then to ground judgments is a way to access
the validity of arguments. As an alternative to the over
reliance on logic, Toulmin offers a schematic of the
elements of argumentation. An argument consists of four
Jurgen Habermas The Theory of Communicative
Action. Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of
Society trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press,
1984) p. 22.
Ibid. p. 24.
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elements: Data (D)
,
Conclusion (C)
,
Warrant (W) and
Backing (B)
As an example
D > So C
Since W
On Account of B
Harry was born - > sq; Harry is a
in Bermuda British subject
Since
:
A man born in Bermuda
will be a British subject
Because
:
The following legal statutes
and other legal provisions
One of Toulmin's goals in schematizing the structure of
argumentation is to show the relations between terms and
to point out where it is open to different sources of
validity. He thus shows us where in the course of a
typical argument what sorts of questions tend to be asked.
One important thing to notice for our discussion of
Habermas is that there can be an infinite chain of
backings to any warrant. A backing only counts as
sufficient when it has reached a point where the person
being argued with has been convinced. There is no
logically necessary endpoint. In fact, Toulmin shows that
Toulmin p. 94 ff.
Ibid. p. 95.
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while logic can help us in sorting ut these relations in
argument, it has nothing to do with the satisfactoriness
of a backing. This is because of the heterogeneous nature
of the terms involved.
Habermas uses Toulmin's work to show the particular
structure of validity claims raised in speech acts.
Toulmin had attempted in his work to caution against a
misleading conflation of the validity of an argument with
the rules of formal logic. Toulmin does not see his
position as implying relativism. He argues that in
different practical domains, or what Habermas refers to as
institutional frameworks, there are different standards of
rationality which operate. In The Uses of Argument Toulmin
writes
:
We must study the ways of arguing which
have established themselves in any sphere,
accepting them as historical facts;
knowing that they may be superseded, but
only as the revolutionary advance in our
methods of thought. In some cases these
methods will not be further justifiable-
at any rate by argument: the fact that
they have established themselves in
practice may have to be enough for us.
Toulmin is content to accept the seeming advances of
science, the seeming legitimacy of law and the seeming
sensibleness of historical accounts as the basis of our
accepting them as legitimate. He can be content with this
level of acceptance of the given since he does not set out
Ibid. p. 257.
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to be a critical theorist, but merely to encourage us to
look at argument in a new way.
For Habermas, Toulmin's answers to the questions of the
validity of arguments is unsatisfactory. He claims that
Toulmin's position relies on our acceptance of
"preexisting notions of rationality."^^ It cannot give us
the basis for distinguishing valid from invalid
consensually achieved decisions. For this, Habermas
claims, we must be able to distinguish conventional,
context dependent claims from universal validity claims.
Habermas claims that while universal validity claims
raised in a statement are only recognized with reference
to the context in which they are raised, their validity is
not constituted by their context. All statements contain
universal, context independent validity claims.
Habermas cuts off his discussion before explaining
wherein the universality of validity claims consists, but
we know from "Wahrheitstheorien" that he sees it as
growing out of the ideal speech situation. When all
participants in the discussion are able to raise questions
at all of the various entry points in Toulmin's schematic
of argumentation, then we can be assured that the
conclusion reached is warranted, or true. When Habermas
26 Habermas P- 34 .
27 Habermas P- 36.
28 Habermas P- 38 .
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claims that in the ideal speech situation the force of the
better argument is what determines the outcome of the
discussion, he means that all extraneous constraints have
been removed.
In accessing Habermas' claim it is important to note
here that he has not explicitly told us what it is that
gives an argument 'force.' We know that it cannot be
formal logic, since any argument contains a manifold of
relations and claims that cannot be reduced to formal
logic. Toulmin is content with categorizing the different
types of claims that go into making up a good argument to
give us clarity as to what we do in arguing. The operative
concept of force for Toulmin is that which we have left
after people stop raising questions, that is, when the
participants find the warrants, backing, data, etc. to be
acceptable. On this view, the force of an argument is a
discursive space, free of power relations and occupied by
what it is that the discoursing subjects find themselves
to be comfortable with.
The problem with conceiving the force of an argument
this way, for Habermas, is that he needs the concept to do
more than this. I will argue in the next chapter that
there is something appealing about the notion of the ideal
speech situation which can be used counter!actually to
criticize power laden structures of discourse, but
Habermas wants to do much more than this with it. He uses
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the possibility of arguments being redeemed through the
force of the better argument as the ground for his claim
that the Enlightenment brought with it a form of progress
embodied in its rationality.
He can not derive this progressivist doctrine from the
speech situation alone. If we rest content with the
view that rationality is nothing but a discourse taken to
be legitimate on the basis of our ability to say what it
is that we want to say, there is nothing left to
distinguish the rationalities of different cultures or
social groups. The problem with using the ideal speech
situation alone as the ground of our concept of
rationality is that according to it, no consensus is
valid. The ideal speech situation functions only as a
negative critical tool. We can use it to continually raise
objections to statements being made, but it gives no
positive basis for claiming the validity of assertions.
The members of two different cultural groups could find
satisfaction in two completely different conclusions, on
the basis of differences in their existential needs,
cultural beliefs and values. On the basis of the ideal
speech situation there is no reason to believe that
different social groups would accept the same outcomes as
warranted. Yet Habermas is clear that truly rational
decisions would have universal validity. He uses his
theory of the ideal speech situation and the force of the
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better argument to ground the view that there is something
special about modern Western rationality. in his
discussion of the work of Wolfgang Klein, Habermas argues
that we must be able to distinguish power from validity.
"The logic of argumentation requires a conceptual
framework that permits us to take into account the
phenomenon of the peculiarly constraint-free force of the
better argument."^’ This is required so that we can
distinguish a priori valid from invalid forms of
consensus. In criticizing Klein's view that we cannot make
this distinction a priori, Habermas writes, "There is
lacking [in Klein's work] a concept of rationality that
would make it possible to establish internal relations
between what is valid 'for them' and what is valid 'for
us.'"^° This is a repetition of the argument found
throughout The Philosophical Discourse of the Modern .
Adorno and Horkheimer, Foucault, Nietzsche and many others
fail because they are not able to recognize the
"peculiarly constraint free force of the better argument."
Habermas insists that the Ideal Speech Situation is
more than a counterfactual- it is an unavoidable
presupposition of all communicative speech. In using
language we assume that the truth of our statements will
Habermas p. 28.
Habermas p. 30.
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be redeemed through the force of the better argument. We
roust assume that there is a truth giving property that
exists outside of the power relations that de facto often
determine the outcomes of arguments. But what is this
property if it is not logic?
Since Habermas wants the force of the better argument
to be more than the empty space opened up by the lack of
power relations in discourse, he must find a source for
its content. Rather than offering us this, Habermas
changes the subject. There must be such a thing as the
force of arguments since we know that we are able to
distinguish good from bad arguments. We know that we have
this ability because we can see that while holding this
belief, our scientific culture has been able to make
advances. If we weren't,able to tell rationality from
irrationality, then how could we explain the advances of
science? Since science is grounded in the rational and we
have science, then we must have access to the rational.
Section 3
It is here that Habermas shifts from the transcendental
to the empirical side of his argument. He seems to be at
least partially aware of the problem of giving meaning to
the concept of the force of an argument. While he often
refers to the need to believe in such a thing, he never
gives an edequate explanation of the source of this
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mystical force. The fact that he uses Toulmin, and
criticizes his relativist conclusions, shows that he is
aware of the depth of the problem, since Toulmin gives an
excellent critique of the conventional understanding that
the force of an argument rests in its logical validity. It
is his inability to satisfactorily account for the source
of the force of arguments that leads him to switch to the
next- line of attack in his argument. The progress of
science shows that something like the force of the better
argument must be operating.
In switching from the transcendental to the empirical
side of his argument, Habermas must now switch from saying
wherein consists the rationality of a specific discussion
to wherein consists the rationality of a culture. Habermas
acknowledges that something more than the force of the
better argument is needed to ground his theory of
rationality, thus, he writes;
Even when we are judging the rationality
of individual persons, it is not
sufficient to resort to this or that
expression. The question is rather,
whether A or B or a group of individuals
behaves rationally in general ; whether one
may systematically expect that they have
good reasons for their expressions....
When there appears a systematic effect in
these respects, across various domains of
interaction and over long periods (perhaps
even over the space of a lifetime) , we
also speak of the rationality of a
lifeworld shared not only by individuals
but by collectives as well. ^
Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action p. 43.
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into making rational action orientations of individuals
possible. He pursues the answer to this question through
an engagement with the various essays collected in the
volume Rationality .^^ These essays, written mainly by
Anthropologists and Sociologists, deal with the question
of whether or not it is possible to talk about rationality
cross-cultural ly.
In this section, Habermas attempts to make clear what
it is that distinguishes the modern from mythical world
views. For him, mythical world views are characterized by
their totalizing power. "The deeper one penetrates into
the network of a mythical interpretation of the world, the
more strongly the totalizing power of the savage mind
stands out."^^ All information is processed through a
single interpretive framework. One consequence of this is
that people with mythical worldviews are not able to make
the distinctions we moderns take to be fundamental. In
particular, they do not permit a clear differentiation
between nature and culture. "We can understand this
phenomenon to begin with as a mixing of two object
Bryan R. Wilson ed. Rationality (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1970).
Habermas p. 45. It is interesting to note that
McCarthy adds scare quotes around "wilden Denkens" that
are not in the original.
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domains, physical nature and sociocultural environment." 34
One of the problems with a mythical worldview according
to Habermas is that from within its parameters judgments
can only be dogmatically asserted. This he argues is
because
,
. . .mythical worldviews prevent us from
categorically uncoupling nature and culture, not
only through conceptually mixing the objective and
social worlds but also through reifying the
linguistic worldview. As a result the concept of
the world is dogmatically invested with a specific
content that is withdrawn from rational discussion
and thus from criticism.
This dogmatic conflation of the subjective and objective
worlds protects the culture from being able to raise
validity claims that require the ability to step back from
the culture and view it externally. Thus, Habermas argues
that what distinguishes mythical from modern world views
is their differing degrees of openness. A closed world
view is characterized by an "insufficient differentiation
among fundamental attitudes to the objective, social, and
subjective worlds; and the lack of reflexivity in
worldviews that cannot be identified as worldviews, as
cultural traditions
.
34 Ibid. P- 48
.
35 Ibid. P- 51.
36 Ibid. P- 52 .
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At the end of this section, Habermas makes clear that
with this distinction between closed and open world views
he still has not grounded the rationality of open world
views
.
Of course this does not yet prove that the
supposed rationality expressed in our
understanding of the world is more than a
reflection of the particular features of a
culture stamped by science, that it may
rightfully raise a claim to universality.^^
This necessitates the next step to the argument, an answer
to the question as to why we should take the 'openness' of
a worldview as indication of its rationality.
Central for this part of Habermas' argument is his
engagement with the work of Peter Winch. Basing his
approach to epistemology in the work of the late
Wittgenstein, Winch argues that there is no perspective
from which we could ground the universality or superiority
of our own world view. Winch claims that since each
language has its own notions of reality and truth, there
is no neutral perspective from which we could say that
science registers them correctly.^® Winch is critical of
anthropological approaches that claim the peoples they
study are irrational because of the logical contradictions
that could be found in the statements they make. This
claim is based on a category mistake, the beliefs of
Ibid. P- 53 .
Ibid. P- 57
.
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members of the studied culture are not scientific theories
at all, and thus should not be seen as bad scientific
theories. Where we might see logical contradictions, we
may be missing something like shifts in level of meaning.
After raising these issues from Winch, Habermas answers
by using Robin Horton's Popperian idea that open
worldviews promote learning and hence promote species
development. He uses this as a defense against Winch's
relativism. According to Habermas and Horton, Winch may be
right that we cannot judge the rationality of a worldview
on the basis of its sharing with us views we take to be
scientifically grounded, nor on the basis of our being
able to find what look to us like logical contradictions
in their utterances about the world. According to
Habermas, Horton,
accepts Winch's view that the structures
of worldviews are expressed in forms of
life, but insists on the possibility of
evaluating worldviews, if not be their
degree of cognitive adequacy, then by the
degree to which they hinder or promote
cognitive learning processes.^’
Habermas quotes from Horton's essay:
In other words, absence of any awareness
of alternatives makes for an absolute
acceptance of the established theoretical
tenets, and removes any possibility of
questioning them. In these circumstances,
the established tenets invest the believer
with a compelling force.
Ibid. P- 61 .
Ibid. P- 61 .
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Habermas claims that the distinction closed versus open
provides a context independent standard for judging the
rationality of worldviews
Habermas raises the point that in a scientific culture
there are many beliefs held as sacred, that is, as not
open to criticism. But, he argues that this means that our
culture is not as completely open as it could be. One such
position is our hypostatization of cognitive-instrumental
rationality as the only legitimate form of rationality.
Habermas attempts to slip his own conclusions into the
discussion in his usual deceptive style. Why this counts
as an example of the closedness of our worldview and a
position such as that there is such a thing as a universal
rationality does not, is never explained.
Habermas believes that an open worldview must 'be able
to' distinguish between the different types of rational
action spheres: cognitive, moral and expressive. In order
to be able to do this, they must 'be able to' make a clear
distinction between nature and culture. The reason that
this is required is that Habermas argues that it is only
when we have made these distinctions that we are able to
see how the various validity claims that are inevitably
raised in language use can be redeemed.
The problem with Habermas' view here, is that it seems
as though the elements of our own world view which we must
Ibid. p. 62.
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hold as sacred are precisely those required for Habermas'
own conclusions. An open worldview must distinguish
between nature and culture because otherwise how could we
ground our theory of communicative action? And we need
some way to ground the rationality of at least some
aspects of our modern worldview because without this we
fall into relativism, which is (take your pick) 1- a self-
undermining position or 2- does not account for the
we know to be exhibited by modern Western
culture
.
Section 4
In his attempts to give positive content to his theory
of rationality Habermas runs into problems finding the
sources for his grounding. It is also here that the
hegemonic side of his position comes into play. In his
casual discussion of what we should take in actual
discussions as the force of the better argument, we can
see that he appeals to dominant conceptions of common
sense. In his discussions of what counts as an open
worldview we can see his valorization of categories which
are functional for Eurocentric and patriarchal worldviews.
While a sympathetic reader of Habermas could argue that
these are accidental slips in his work that should be
criticized and eliminated, they are also foundational for
grounding the notion that there is such a thing as
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rationality that can be found in the discursive practices
of the modern West.
When Habermas wants us to understand what he means by
the force of the better argument, he uses Toulmin's schema
of argumentation to show the different points at which
further argumentation can be asked for. He then claims
that when we are able to raise all of the claims we want
to at these various points, nothing but the force of the
better argument will coerce our agreement. But when he
characterizes the rational person, it is clear that, in
the absence of the realization of the ideal speech
situation, the rational person is the one who agrees with
the expectations grounded in existing value systems.
In contexts of communicative action, we
call someone rational not only if he [sic]
is able to put forward an assertion and,
when criticized, to provide grounds for it
by pointing to appropriate evidence, but
also if he is following an established
norm and is able, when criticized, to
justify his action by explicating the
given situation in light of legitimate
expectations. We even call someone
rational if he makes known a desire or an
intention, expresses a feeling or a mood,
shares a secret, confesses a deed, etc.,
and is then able to reassure critics in
regard to the revealed experience by
drawing practical consequences from it and
behaving consistently thereafter.
But what should the person do if the evidence she gave
were not considered 'appropriate,' the expectations
referred to not accepted as 'legitimate' or the critics so
Habermas p. 15.
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threatened by the proposition as to not be able to be
'reassured'? While on the most open reading of the ideal
speech situation, we could criticize the dogmatism of the
who do not accept a proposition because they are
by it, it is not clear how we could ever know
when this is the case and when it is the case that the
person making the threatening proposition was simply being
hysterical. The notion of the force of the better argument
must always rely on the interpretive framework out of
which a person is operating and there is no way to bridge
the gap separating different positions using nothing but
argumentation
.
In discussing the rationality of preferences, Habermas
claims that some idiosyncratic preferences are rational,
in that they can be justified "in such a way that other
members of their lifeworlds can recognize in these
descriptions their own reactions to similar situations."
But, he goes on, if the others cannot so recognize
themselves, the preference is to be deemed irrational.
Some idiosyncratic preferences are innovative in an
aesthetic sense, most however,
follow rigid patterns; their semantic
content is not set free by the power of
poetic speech or creative construction and
thus has a merely privatistic character.
The spectrum ranges from harmless whims,
such as a special liking for the smell of
rotten apples, to clinically noteworthy
symptoms, such as a horrified reaction to
open spaces. Someone who explains his
libidinous reaction to rotten apples by
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referring to the 'infatuating,'
'unfathomable,' 'vertiginous' smell, or
who explains his panicked reaction to open
spaces by their 'crippling,' 'leaden,'
'sucking' emptiness, will scarcely meet
with understanding in the everyday
^o^texts of most cultures.
. . . Anyone who
is so privatistic in his attitudes and
evaluations that they cannot be rendered
plausible by appeal to standards of
evaluation is not behaving rationally
Given his understanding that the ideal speech situation is
a counter-factual
,
it is hard to see why Habermas believes
that we should judge someone irrational whose views are
incomprehensible to others. In real life, those who win
arguments are most likely to be those whose views accord
with dominant preconceptions. This is because such a view
can be supported with a minimum of validity claims raised.
It can rely on a whole range of background assumptions not
available to a more unusual position. Thus, part of the
power of the force of an argument comes from the inertia
of preconceived ideas.
A defender of Habermas might want to argue here that
any argument that relies on the weight of preconcieved
ideas is not a valid one. The point I am making here,
however, is that given the fact that arguments tend to
work this way, Habermas has given us no principle by which
to distinguish valid real empirical arguments from invalid
ones. If he gives up on this and limits the ideal speech
situation to a counterfactual
,
then he cannot use it to
Ibid. p. 17.
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judge anyone to be irrational, including those who refuse
to engage in arguments because they see the discursive
terrain as weighted against them.
In Habermas' argument about the differences between
open and closed worldviews we run into another set of
problems. On the methodological level there is a problem
with how we could ever judge a worldview as embodying
progress, since notions of progress are always already
embedded in worldviews. Habermas attempts to get out of
this paradox through a metaphorical use of Piaget. Leaving
aside the enormous problems with hidden assumptions in
Piaget's work, it is questionable if this paradigm can be
appropriately used, as Habermas does, to judge entire
world views. Piaget used what he took to be empirical
facts about how children change as they grow older to be
the foundation for a theory of progress in moral
development. His theory has some plausibility when limited
to the moral development of those children he watched
develop. The ideal type Piaget develops is grounded in the
evidence of his experiments.
This cannot be the case for Habermas' use of the method
of empirical reconstruction. He begins with Piaget's view
For a discussion of cultural bias in Piaget see:
Susan Buck-Morss, "Socio-Economic Bias in Piaget ' s Theory
and its Implications for Cross-cultural Studies," in Hum^
Development , #18, 1970, pp. 40-1; Carol Gilligan, In a
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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that as children develop they tend increasingly to
separate their subjective worlds from the objective world.
Habermas extrapolates from this to argue that a
decentering of the ego is the sign of a developed
worldview. But, given that fact that Piaget worked with
middle class Swiss boys, isn't it possible that what he
observed was their progressive taking on of the conceptual
framework needed to function in their own society?^^ It is
not clear why we should interpret the fact that people in
the so called modern world have more of a tendency to
separate themselves off from the world than members of
some other cultures as a sign of progress, rather than as
a sign of how our own culture organizes experience.
As with the ideal speech situation, the moment that
Habermas moves from positing an abstract concept to
filling it out, the truly problematic aspects of his
theory come to view. At the end of section 1.4, in which
he explains the difference between modern and mythical
worldviews, Habermas tells us what some of the necessary
characteristics of a decentered worldview are. In order
for a culture to permit rational action orientations it
must exhibit the following characteristics:
For a discussion of some problems in Habermas' use
of Piaget see: Thomas McCarthy, "Rationality and
Relativism," in John B. Thompson and David Held eds.
Habermas Critical Debates (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982)
,
pp. 57-78.
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a) The cultural tradition must make
available formal concepts for the
objective, social, and subjective
worlds.... b) The cultural tradition must
permit a reflexive relation to itself; it
must be so far stripped of its dogmatism
as to permit in principle that
interpretations stored in tradition be
placed in question and subjected to
critical revision.... c) In its cognitive,
moral, and evaluative components the
cultural tradition must permit a feedback
connection with specialized forms of
argumentation to such an extent that the
corresponding learning processes can be
socially institutionalized. ... d) Finally,
the cultural tradition must interpret the
lifeworld in such a way that action
oriented to success can be freed from the
imperatives of an understanding that is to
be communicatively renewed over and over
again and can be at least partially
uncoupled from action oriented to reaching
understanding
.
Note here that these elements do not grow out of
decentering itself, rather they are characteristics of a
worldview that is taken to be decentered. Habermas does
not explain why it is that a worldview must have these
characteristics.^^ The way that our society separates
nature from culture is a precondition for the entire
edifice, and yet feminists and theorists of racism have
pointed out in a number of different ways just how this
Habermas pp. 71-72.
Fred Dallmayr argues that Habermas cannot make the
distinction he does between modern and mythical worldviews
on the basis of the concepts of rationality he valorizes.
See: "Habermas and Rationality" in Political Theory , Vol.
16, #4, November, 1988 pp. 553-579.
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distinction has been used hegemonically If this
separation is something that must be accepted for a
rational world orientation, then we have violated
precondition b) by holding a principle as above question
and we have biased our conception of rationality in favor
of those who share the dominant conceptions.
Section 5
Having rejected transcendental, correspondence and
coherence notions of rationality and truth, Habermas wants
to still defend some notion of universal truth. Habermas
believes that we must hold on to some notion of universal
truth if we are to engage in linguistic practices, since
in speaking we always implicitly assert the truth of what
is asserted. But does all speaking imply the specific
politics of truth that Habermas has in mind? I argued
earlier that in all speaking there is an unavoidable
discourse of legitimacy, that critical judgments are
always present in language. But from this does it follow
See: Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman ,
trans. Gillian Gill (Ithica: Cornell University Press,
1985)
,
Sandra Harding; The Science Question in Feminism
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1986) ; Franz Fanon, The
Wretched of the Earth , trans. Constance Farrington (New
York: Grove Press, 1964) ; Franz Fanon, Black Skin, White
Masks . trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press,
1967) ; Patrick Brantlinger, "Victorians and Africans: The
Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent," in Henry
Louis Gates, Jr. ed. "Race," Writing and Difference
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) , pp. 185-
222 .
183
that there is an unavoidable reference to truth as a
universal? It is in making the transition from asserting
that language implies legitimating practices to the claim
that these legitimating practices have universal
implications that Habermas' position runs into problems.
Habermas' universalism is never satisfactorily grounded in
his system and it is through the assumptions of
universalism that Habermas' most politically questionable
claims get raised.
We can accept the view that truth is immanent to
linguistic practices and the claim that all linguistic
practices imply a politics of truth, without making the
further claim that there is a single most appropriate
politics of truth.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion: Reason, Hegemony and Desire
On the one hand, each society has
its own politics of truth; on the
other hand, being truthful means
being in the in-between of all
regimes of truth
J
The process of dominance keeps
spewing undigested scraps of
sub j ugated nature .
^
According to Habermas, a universalistic politics of
truth is necessary if we are to avoid the relativism that
leads to the inability to make critical judgments. As a
son of the Enlightenment, he argues that if we reject
universal discourses of rationality we will undermine our
ability to ground any critical judgments. He uses the
notion of the force of the better argument to point to the
space where the judgments we know to be correct come from.
But if the notion of force of the better argument remains
ungrounded, as I argued in the previous chapter, then do
we have any option but to give up on all of the critical
discourses which have seemed so helpful in motivating,
orienting and organizing liberation movements? If we give
^ Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman, Native. Other: Writing
Postcolonialitv and Feminism
.
(Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1989) p. 121.
^ Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics , trans. E.B.
Ashton, (New York: Continuum, 1983) p. 347.
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up on the universalism that a stable concept of
rationality seems to offer us, then how can we speak about
social issues across different discourses- from the points
of view of different oppression dynamics, from radically
different epistemological perspectives, cross culturally?
The belief that we are operating from within a
universally valid epistemological perspective has of
course given those using it a sense of security in making
their judgments. But the arrogance that goes along with
this belief has also caused enormous problems. And these
problems are not just related to abuses of power or
extreme cases. Whenever a certain group sets the agenda
for liberation, there will be a tendency for the notion of
liberation that it comes up with to reflect the particular
social positions of the members of that group- no matter
how good their intentions may be. As I tried to show in
the case of Habermas, in spite of his intentions that the
ideal speech situation be a principle of liberation that
works to express the interests of all people, his
particular universal principles get him caught up in
privileging the interests of the already powerful.
Section 1:
Habermas' fear of the neo-conservatism of all possible
critics of the Enlightenment can be read as a defensive
reaction to fear of having his own privileges undermined.
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Habermas is right that many followers of post-modernism
use their undermining of ethical universalism to justify a
status-quo politics, but a valorization of the status quo
does not necessarily follow from a critique of the
Enlightenment. The conclusion from a critique of
universalism to an acceptance of the status quo only
follows if we have an impoverished concept of action and
responsibility. The skeptic who sits in her room writing
pessimistic philosophy is acting and judging as much as
the political activist sure of the justice of his
position. The decision to go along with the status quo
requires as much justification as the decision to rebel.
It only makes sense to say that rejection of universalism
leads to acquiescence if we assume that acquiescence is
not itself a form of action, no less in need of
justification than any other form of action.^
In rejecting the universal validity of Western
discourses of liberation, we are not arguing that they do
not often play a positive role. The problem lies not in
the content of these principles, but in their supposed
status. Discourses of liberation are ways that critical
issues have been organized through a complex of forces.
They are not universal measures found through a perfect
form of reflection known as universal reason. They are
^ This does not mean that acquiescence is a priori
unjustifiable, merely that it requires justification.
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determinant negations of particular things found
problematic by real people in one context, that have often
found resonance in other cultural contexts. The claim to
equality of all people, for example, does not derive its
validity from universal reason, rather, it is a principle
that has worked to organize the demands of many people in
many different circumstances.^
The conclusion from the view that these concepts of
liberation are culturally specific to the conclusion that
they must be rejected rests on a false dichotomy. As I
argued in Chapter 1, this dichotomy is reflected in
Habermas' argument for universal values and Lyotard's
equally absolutist argument for dissensus. I argued in
Chapter 4 that Habermas is wrong in claiming that these
sorts of concepts are universally destined to play
themselves out in history. But Lyotard is also wrong to
claim that their achieving a universal status would
necessarily be problematic. Dissensus, or the agreement to
^ Similarly, the notion of human rights works as an
organizing tool for articulating demands for human
dignity. The demand does not need to have metaphysical
validity to be politically effective. For John Locke, our
natural rights derive from the fact that we are all the
property of God, and since God's property rights should be
respected, as God's property, we each have natural rights
to life, liberty and property. We all can know this fact
through our use of reason. The effectiveness of human
rights talk as a political tool has nothing to dcp with the
validity of Locke's argument. Human rights functions as a
political call for people who do not believe in God,
natural rights or reason as well as for people who do.
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disagree, may be positive when people really do disagree.
But Lyotard never explains why disagreement should be
universal
.
Lyotard reaches his position of valorizing dissensus
through ontologizing language games. He seems to believe
that society contains a plurality of language games that
are ontologically distinct from one another. Each language
game has its own rules and is immune from having its rules
questioned from the perspective of those of another. Only
when metanarratives are introduced do language games speak
to one another. And when this occurs, Lyotard claims,
differences are obliterated. The problem with this view is
that it supposes that language games are and should remain
distinct from one another.
This sort of ontology of dissensus can turn into what
Trinh T. Minh-ha calls the apartheid of cultural
difference.^ Difference becomes an apartheid principle
when it is used to prevent a dialogue from taking place
between people. If we assume that the differences between
ourselves and someone we speak with are necessarily
unbridgeable, then we are protected from changing through
the interaction. We allow difference to act as a wall
between us.
In situations of cross-cultural contact, or of multi-
culturalism, acceptance of difference as unbridgeable can
^ Trinh T. Minh-ha, p. 80.
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lead to a liberal sort of toleration that protects the
dominant from being effected by the subaltern.^ What needs
to be looked at in these situations is how power dynamics
operate to structure the interaction and how dynamics of
hegemony enter in and make one group overly vulnerable to
change by the other.
The problem with Habermas' valorization of consensus is
not that agreement is impossible, but that by his assuming
that it is necessary, he forces agreement on the terms of
the most powerful. In the absence of agreement we need to
respect difference. The other crucial point is that in the
absence of interaction it is most likely that different
groups will come to different conclusions about truth.
Truth is not a universal waiting to be found. It is
created through processes of real people answering
questions that arise for them.
This complex of issues around the status of discourses
of liberation from the West gets us to the heart of the
epistemological puzzle we have been circling around this
^ Bell Hooks talks about how the feminist call to
find our own voices has little relevance for those who are
not listened to. Specifically she criticizes white
feminists who urge African-American women to find their
own ethnic voices but then exoticize them, thereby
protecting themselves from what African-American women
have to say. "In celebrating our coming to voice. Third
World women, African-American women must work against
speaking as 'other,' speaking to difference as it is
constructed in the white supremacist imagination." [Bell
Hooks, Talking Back (Boston: South End Press, 1989) p.
16
. ]
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entire thesis. The puzzle is philosophicall
y
unsolvable.
We cannot reject ethical universalism and replace it with
a new universal principle. But I have also been claiming
that relativism is existentially impossible. The position
that I am arguing for then is an acknowledgment of the
fact of our always already making judgments in the world
and an openness to the fact that in making these judgments
our positions are always limited and with respect to the
perspectives of other people, and in a certain sense
always wrong.
I introduced Chapter 4 by asking how we can
distinguish hegemonic from counter-hegemonic discourses in
the absence of there being a universal content to reason,
or a universally valid discourse of legitimation. I argued
that Habermas' attempt to do this by appealing to the
universal concept of the force of the better argument
failed. I also argued that once we reject this
universalism, we can make no stronger claim for
rationality than that it is what we have left when
participants in a discussion stop wanting to raise
objections to whatever is on the floor. ^ If we are to
^ On a casual reading, this may sound like Habermas'
position. But the critical difference is in his insistence
that there are universal answers to questions- that the
'peculiarly constraint free constraint of the better
argument' underlies all discursive interaction. Habermas
clearly and vigorously rejects the openendedness and
pluralism that the view stated here implies.
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stick with this formulation we are left with a daunting
problem: what are the feelings of satisfaction that mean
that a discussion is really over? Presumably we have not
arrived at this point when the discussants are so tired
out by dealing with an intransigent discussant that they
finally give up and say they have had enough. When we say
that a conclusion is satisfying we want to say more than
that the participants don't want to argue any more. Yet is
it possible to come up with a criterion of what counts as
satisfaction with a discussion?
Section 2:
In Chapter 3 I argued that reason is a discourse of
desire and that reason operates hegemonically when people
are not able to articulate what they want to articulate in
discourses that are accepted as legitimate. To make this
claim is to appeal implicitly to the view that legitimate
discourses of legitimation come from the articulation of
suppressed interests. The problem of course is that if we
do not accept any sort of universal discourse of reason,
then it is difficult to give any universal content to the
idea of interest or of suppressed interest. This problem
has a rich and complicated history going back at least as
far as Hegel.
^
^ Actually the idea goes back even further- at least
to Rousseau. Though he did not articulate this program as
clearly as Hegel, Rousseau at his most socialist can be
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For Hegel, reason is the universalization of desire.
The goal of human history is the harmonization of these
two principles. What makes his work so interesting, and
the debates that follow him so rich, is that neither
reason nor desire is taken to be unproblematically or pre-
dialectically given. Followers of Hegel have often
undermined this tension by ontologizing either reason or
desire.® Thus, thinkers such as the right Hegelians tended
to see reason as a given absolute, and took the goal of
human development to be to bring desire into conformity
with reason.
Hegelian Marxists, on the other hand, have been more
suspicious of any given notion of reason. But by siding
with desire they have often ended up ontologizing it. In
Eros and Civilization
. Marcuse argues that social
domination functions through a repression of human
instincts. He claims that any society needs to suppress
some instincts in order to maintain a modicum of order. He
seen as arguing that reason develops out of human
interaction and that the best reason is one that
integrates the desires of all people in a society. In
other places, however, he argues that desire needs to be
socially controlled by a reason that is external to
it. [Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract , trans.
Maurice Cranston, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968].
® One way to conceive of the split between the left
and right Hegelians is on their ontologizing opposite
sides of this divide. Though the history of Hegelianism is
not a linear one: on this question orthodox Marxism has
more in common with the right Hegelians than with Hegelian
Marxists
.
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defines oppression as the suppression of instincts beyond
the level needed for social functioning.
Although Marcuse claims that instincts are drives
subject to historical modification, the range of
modification is not particularly great.’ Marcuse follows
the more dualistic side of Freud in seeing the human
organism as having inborn desire which is at most socially
organized in its orientation. The sheer mechanical energy
of the instincts is a given. This fluid dynamic model
works as the foundation for conceptualizing the liberation
of desire. A society that is able to maintain social
interaction with a minimum of repression against this
fluid energy could be seen as the least oppressive. But
what if this energy were not an ontological given?
In The History of Sexuality
.
Foucault has persuasively
argued that this notion of a pre-given sexual energy has
operated as a mechanism of social control by creating a
'true discourse' about the self. According to Foucault,
social control does not just operate through the
suppression of biologically given desire, but also through
the construction of the notion of a true self. As the
individual human being works to discover this true self,
of true desire, she works to create herself according to
its model.
’ Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization , (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1974) p. 8.
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Whether or not we want to accept Foucault's notion that
all desire should be seen as socially constituted, we
should at least take as problematic any view of desire
that bases itself on a separation of nature and culture or
mind and body. While the world in which we find ourselves
in both found and made, both physical and mental, any
articulation of this matrix brings us into an impossible
knot of problems since the physical world as we experience
it is always already socially mediated and the world of
social creation has always already partaken of physical
being. By ontologizing desire, Marcuse comes up with a
critical principle at the expense of reifying the body.
While the body is not pre-socially given in its desires
or interests, neither is it purely a social construct. It
has become fashionable to argue that desire is a
discursive construction, as if the body were nothing but a
substrate for social construction. Jacques Lacan, the
presiding master of this view, looks at desire as a lack,
an empty space that prompts us to language which operates
as an impossible attempt to fill this gap. In this story,
desire functions to structure discourse, and its dynamics
grow out of the needs and interests of discursive
construction. Physical need is experienced by the child,
but the inability for it to find satisfaction leads the
child into the symbolic network. Once the child enters
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into this network, need is replaced by desire, and desire
is a purely discursive construction. The body disappears.
When all impulses from outside of the discursive system
are eliminated from discussion, it becomes very difficult
to speak about resistance.
If we do not accept a strict mind/body dualism, then we
cannot use desire as a simple yardstick for oppression.
But neither can we simply ignore it. If we take a
phenomenological view and look at desire as growing out of
our being in the world, which is always a thinking
physicality, then perhaps we can avoid the question of the
source of legitimate desire all together. We find
ourselves in the world with desires. The self we find
ourselves being is the result of physical reality-
biological processes, chemical precesses etc.. It is also
the result of social articulation and construction. We
can say that the being I call myself has all of these
elements and it finds itself having desires without
needing to make any ontological claims about the source of
my desires or the division between the sources.
Starting from this perspective we can see desire as the
complex articulation of a variety of social and biological
My using these categories is clearly the result
of the way our culture cuts up the world, rather than any
necessary division. To make a claim that nature and
culture structure desire is to accept a nature/culture
dualism. What I am claiming here is that as long as we are
speaking from within a structure that accepts these
categories, we need to prioritize neither of them.
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forces. Having said this we can then go on to look at
desire as the expression of negation. We can then build
critical discourses on the foundation of the negations
expressed by unfulfilled desires. This is possible even if
we acknowledge that desire is often constructed positively
through social discourses. In Sexual Subversions Elizabeth
Grosz claims that we have two very different concepts of
desire each growing out of a different intellectual
tradition and each with a different relation to negation.
In the first tradition, within which Plato, Hegel
and Lacan can be located, desire is conceived as a
fundamental lack in being, an incompletion or
absence within the subject which the subject
experiences as a disquieting loss, and which
prompts it into the activity of seeking an
appropriate object to fill the lack and thus to
satisfy itself. . . . This first tradition sees
desire as negative. In a second tradition within
which Spinoza, Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze are
placed, desire is not a lack but a positive force
of production. It is no longer identified with a
purely psychical and signifying relation, but is a
force or energy which creates links between
objects, which makes things, forges alliances,
produces connections.^^
Grosz's distinction between positive and negative
conceptualizations of desire follows the distinction made
by the contemporary thinkers identified as having a
positive conception of desire: Foucault and Deleuze.
Foucault sees desire as both constructive and constructed.
It operates much like Nietzsche's concept of the will,
where there is a positive force that articulates the world
Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions (Sidney: Allen
and Unwin, 1989) p. xv.
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according to its needs. But what constitutes a need for
the will or for positive desire? Lurking under this
'positive' notion of desire is a negative moment. Desire
directs itself to that which it finds as in its way.
Desire 'creates links' and 'forges alliances' but it does
this where they appear to be missing. Thus the existence
of a positive notion of desire does not undermine our
ability to use desire as a sign of negation.
Both of the ways of looking at desire thematized by
Grosz require negative and positive moments. On both
schemes, desire ends up constructing the self. On both
models, desire drives the activities of the individual and
through the history of these activities a subject is
created. And on both, the world as it is found is
challenged by an energy created in and transformative of
the world. The difference between these schemas is more
one of emphasis than of radical opposition. Where the
Hegelian tradition emphasizes the negative moment of
desire, by focusing on the gaps that lead the subject on
its path, the Nietzschean tradition focuses on the
positive moment of the creation of the subject through
this trajectory of negation.
Foucault's stressing of the positive side of desire
grows at least in part out of a challenge to the Freudian
tradition that sees power only as repressive. Much of the
freshness of Foucault's work grows out of his pointing to
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the constructive side of discourses of desire. Subjects
are not just repressed in their given desire by discourses
of power, they are constructed, inscribed with desire and
repressed. This idea of course is not new in Foucault. The
work on the culture industry by members of the Frankfurt
school also makes this point. Following on the Marxist
notion that needs are social creations and that
individuals and social groups can be manipulated through
the construction of needs and desires, they showed how in
a capitalist society, subjects with infinite desires for
consumption are created.
In Discipline and Punish Foucault describes how through
such institutions as school and the military, individual
bodies are trained in the routinization required for
capitalism. Similarly, in One Dimensional Man Marcuse
shows how capitalist society creates subjects whose most
prevalent desires are for the kind of consumption that
advanced capitalism requires. For both Foucault and
Marcuse, the individual becomes an agent of capitalism by
having interests that are consonant with it. An important
difference between Foucault and the members of the
Frankfurt school is that the latter were more likely to
thematize the notion of negation than Foucault. Even with
the post-holocaust pessimism of Marcuse, Horkheimer and
Adorno, some attention is paid to the negative moment of
the trajectory of desire.
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We can see Adorno's thematization of negation in his
critique of Hegel in Negative Dialectics
. Adorno argues
that while Hegel posits as an ideal the perfect mediation
of freedom and necessity, which is achieved through the
movement of negation, Hegel ultimately subordinates
negation to the logic of the system. Adorno points out
that in his work, Hegel distinguishes the subject from the
individual in such a way as to invalidate the interests of
the real empirical individual. Adorno argues that the
following passage from Hegel's Reason and History shows
Hegel's lack of concern for the real individual. "As the
state, the fatherland, makes out a community of existence,
as man's subjective volition submits to the laws, the
antithesis of freedom and necessity disappears
. Adorno
draws our attention to the word 'submission' and points
out that there cannot be a perfect union of freedom and
necessity here. The signs of resistance are present here
in the moment of reconciliation.
Adorno acknowledges that we cannot point to the desires
or interests of the real empirical individual as always
legitimate. This possibility is foreclosed by the
realization that the individual finds itself with socially
created interests and desires manipulated by such forces
as the culture industry. But he insists that we cannot
dismiss the negativity that comes from the individual. We
Adorno, Negative Dialectics , p. 350.
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cannot suppose that we have a union of fireedoin and
necessity when the supposedly legitimate side of the
individual submits to authority, while some other part
resists. As long as there is resistance, there is a reason
for critique.
This same notion of critique as resting in the
negations posited by the real empirical individual can be
found in the work of Foucault. But this moment is
suppressed. It shows up in the tone of moral indignation
one finds throughout his work. If there were no resistance
or negativity, why would it matter to us that power
constructs its agent into infinitely complex networks?
The moral force of Foucault's work relies on the
negativity of the individual who is not completely self-
identical with the discursive constructions s/he finds
his/her self in.
The work of Foucault and the members of the Frankfurt
school show us that we cannot point unproblematically to
the expressed desires of the individual as the source of a
critical locus. We cannot authorize our judgments by
simply pointing to unfulfilled desires whether they be
desires to say something, to judge something as right or
to call something irrational. But these thinkers also show
that the real empirical individual cannot be ignored.
Critical discourses always rely on the expressions of
socially articulated individuals. These discourses are
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always caught up in webs of power and hegemony. And yet,
we have nowhere to go to find the interests of resistance
than the expressions of people.
And if, as I have been arguing in this thesis, there is
a strong tendency for the interests of the subaltern to
appear on the ideological scene as illegitimate, then
there are good reason for those concerned with liberation
to listen with an especially open ear to the claims of
members of suppressed groups, even when according to
dominant conceptual schemes- even dominant conceptual
schemes of liberation- these claims often do not at first
make sense. In the absence of a universal standard of
reason, an openness to the articulations of the desires of
agents and groups opens up the possibility of a less
dominating rational discourse.
Section 3;
A practical implication of this approach to
epistemology can be seen in the discussion of feminism
cross culturally. In feminist discussions there is often a
fear that if we give up on the universal status of our
discourses of liberation, we will no longer have any way
to advocate for the interests of women in other cultures.
Isn't the call for women's liberation the answer to a
peculiarly Western, or white or middle class set of needs?
The fear is that if we reject all universal views we will
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be unable to take up a critical attitude toward anything.
We will fall into a cultural relativism in which the
practices of any society will have to be accepted as
simply that society's way of organizing itself.
The problem with this view is that it supposes that
societies or cultures are homogeneous. If an
anthropologist goes to study a culture with a relativist
P®^sp®ctive and attempts to make judgments on the basis of
the rules of the society being studied, she will need to
make choices about which rules and interpretations to
accept. The picture that an anthropologist puts together
of a culture is always a composite of material from a
variety of sources and much of the work of interpretation
is in the mediation of the differences in sources. This
problem has been especially clear with feminist
anthropologists who have shown how dissimilar different
gendered experiences of the 'same culture' can be.
A predominant feature of society in highland New Guinea
is the phenomenon of ritual pollution. At certain times,
members of these societies are extremely careful not to
come into contact with contaminating substances. In the
anthropological literature these substances were
identified as menstrual blood and blood lost in
childbirth. What Elizabeth Faithorn found in her study of
these same societies was that semen was also among the
contaminating substances. Faithorn writes.
204
I was quite surprised when I stumbled on thebelief that men can pollute, for it had not
occurred to me to ask that question directly.
Based on everything I read and heard about
Highlands cultures, I had assumed that
pollution was only associated with female
sexuality and was expressed among the Kafe,
as elsewhere, in terms of women threatening
the health and vitality of men.’^
The problem was that the previous studies done by men, had
relied on predominantly male informants. Since Faithorn
was able to spend time with the women of the society, she
was able to get a women's perspective on the matter and to
move beyond the anti-woman bias of previous studies.
Anthropologists writing from the male side of the very
gender divided Arab world have characterized Arab women as
passive, submissive and subservient. Female
Anthropologists have pointed out that this behavior is
only one part of the reality of these women's lives.
Often, the public appearance covers a more complex
reality. Soheir Morsy writes, "...I recalled that while
adult women of my family projected a public image of
submission to the 'world of the man of the house, ' they
were in fact the real power behind the scene.
Elizabeth Faithorn, "Gender Bias and Sex Bias:
Removing our Cultural Blinders in the Field," in Tony
Larry Whitehead and Mary Ellen Conway eds. Self, Sex, and
Gender in Cross-Cultural Fieldwork (Urbana and Champaign:
University of Illinois Press, 1986.) p. 286.
Soheir Morsy, "Toward the Demise of Anthropology's
Distinctive-Other Hegemonic Tradition," in Soraya Altorki
and Camilla Fawzi El-Solh eds. Arab Women in the Field:
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If we do not accept the view that cultures are
homogeneous, then we cannot suppose that a consistent
relativist can ever simply accept the judgments of the
society under study. The open minded anthropologist does
not need to accept the misogyny of a different culture,
especially if she finds that there is a spirit of
resistance in that culture among women. Cultural
relativists have often made the mistake of subordinating
their own judgments to the dominant judgments of the
culture under study.
Just as it does not follow from the idea that our
discourses of liberation are not universal that we can
reject all critical positions, neither does it follow that
all of the grand concepts of liberation that we have
relied on in the West need to be rejected. The discourses
of liberation that have been exported from the West seem
to have had a mixed history. If we look at the history of
Marxism in Africa, Feminism in the Middle East and
Christianity in Latin America, for example, we can see
Studying Your Own Society (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1988) p. 74.
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that Western discourses of liberation have had complex
histories of effecting liberation movements in a wide
variety of very complex waysJ^
There is always a danger in using our grand concepts of
liberation in speaking cross-culturally that we will
reinforce the notion that everything that has to do with
positive social change has come from the West. The story
often told about women's liberation is that it grew out of
the ethical universalism of the Enlightenment. It somehow
seems to follow from the call to fraternity, equality and
liberty that all human beings, including women, should
have these rights. Along with the evils of Western
imperialism came the radical force of the Enlightenment.
As peoples were oppressed they were also educated into the
universal values required for human liberation. In
Feminist discourses there is a surprising tendency among
even the most anti-imperialist writers to suppose that
Feminism is something that grew out of Western ethical
See: Nawal Sadawi, The Hidden Face of Eve . (London:
Zed Press, 1980) ; Roger N. Lancaster, Thanks to God and
the Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press,
1988) ; Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru na
Uiamaa (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968)
;
Thomas Kono Ranuga Marxism and Black Nationalism in
Southern Africa (Azania) (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms
International, 1983). Of course if we do not begin from
the position of accepting the concept of liberation
embodied in any one of these discourses, it is hard to
even judge whether they have been useful for 'liberation'
or not. One of the reasons this question is so complicated
is that none of the terms remains stable, including
' liberation.
'
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universalism and has been brought to liberate the
colonized.’^
While the feminism that has grown out of the Western
tradition has been helpful in many ways to women in other
parts of the world, it is clearly not the case that this
is the sole source of women's resistance. Domination has
engendered resistance throughout history, without the need
for the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Ofelia Schutte
points to sources of resistance to patriarchy in Latin
America, long before the influence of the Western women's
movements. She writes about Sor Juana Inez de la Cruz, a
Mexican nun born in 1651 who challenged the patriarchal
system she lived under. Similarly, Azizah al-Hibri
writes of women in ancient Arab societies who fought in
tribal wars alongside the men of their tribes. She also
claims that there is a long tradition of stories of women
resisting their exclusion from the battle field in the
pre-islamic Arab world. When we look at the history of
women's resistance to male domination throughout the non-
See Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism
in the Third World
.
(London: Zed Books, 1986)
.
Ofelia Schutte, "Philosophy and Feminism in Latin
America: Perspectives on Gender Identity and Culture," in
Philosophical Forum . Vol. XX, No 1-2, Fall-Winter, 1988-
89, pp. 62-84.
Azizah al-Hibri, "A study of Islamic herstory: or
how did we ever get into this mess?," in Women in Islam ,
ed. Azizah al-Hibri (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982) , pp.
207-220.
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Western world we can see that Western feminism has often
been helpful for articulating an oppositional critique.
But it has at times also brought with it elements of the
dominant ideologies of the West and opened Women's
movements up to the charge of advocating a foreign
ideology.
The view that women's liberation is a product of
Western ideology puts us in a very awkward epistemological
position. This view implies that universal reason and
universalistic ethical values of the West have some sort
of real superiority. In the history of feminism this sort
of view has contributed to the hegemony of the feminist
agenda set by women in the core countries of the dominant
world system. If we start from the view that women have
universal interests as members of the same group, we will
have a tendency to take up those issues that express what
we take these universal needs to be.
If instead we understand that when women in other
societies have taken up the banner of Feminism as
articulated by Western feminists it is because they have
found some resonances, then we should not be surprised
when the agenda is changed as resonance turns to
dissonance, or if there are women in some social groups
who do not find any resonance in the entire project. Given
the fact that all over the world women experience reality
very differently. Feminists from dominant groups need to
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be cautious in supposing that they can ever find universal
interests as women.’’
This issue is complicated by the fact that often
Western feminists find themselves as having thought a
problem through in ways that are found useful by members
of other societies. Their discourses of liberation are
often experienced as enlightening by other women. Many
Western ideas have been used fruitfully by people in other
cultures to organize political demands. This however
should not be seen as the taking up of a universal
principle of liberation, but rather as a healthy mixing of
cultural information. This positive travelling of ideas
can at any moment turn into its opposite. Ideas can travel
in the opposite direction, from dominated to dominant
cultures (though operations of hegemony make this sort of
travelling more difficult). The women's health movement of
the early seventies provides some examples of Western
feminists learning from their Third World sisters. Non-
western holistic approaches to medicine were adopted and
the medical model of child-birth as a disease were
” Given the powerful forces of hegemony, it seems to
me that the dangers inherent in positing false universals
is far greater than what is gained in solidarity by taking
a universalist position.
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women in the Thirdchallenged using cultural resources of
world.
For various historical reasons women in the West have
been able to articulate their interests in fruitful ways
not available in some other societies. This may have
something to do with the extreme individualism of
societies that has allowed the social positions
of men and women to be brought up for question. Upon
contact with the West, women of in the Westernized
bourgeoisies of many colonized countries were put in some
situations similar to those of Western bourgeois women.
They were then able to take up some of the cultural
possibilities opened up by Western feminism. One of the
effects of this has been that in many colonized countries,
feminism has been associated with the interests of
bourgeois women rather than the interests of women as a
whole. As Western feminists we often find ourselves in
paradoxical situations of supporting the positions of
relatively privileged women. This is partially because we
have been more able to understand the interests of these
women and to see our own concepts of liberation reflected
in their struggles, and they have been more able to find
resonances in the work of Western feminists.
For a discussion of the concept of ideas
•travelling' see Edward. W. Said, The World, the Text and
the Critic
.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983)
.
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The problem with this phenomenon is that it has often
led to a conditional support of women in other cultures.
We only support them as long as what they are doing is
seen as women's liberation on our terms. The strategy of
supporting the liberation struggles of other peoples when
their interests do not resonate with our own puts us on
shaky and uncomfortable grounds. But in order to support
the liberation of women from other societies and social
groups, women from dominant social groups need to listen
to the self-articulation of the agendas of those they see
themselves as supporting, even when this self articulation
incorporates ideas or interests that we do not understand
as part of our agendas for liberation
.
Section 4:
If we understand critical discourses to grow out of
situated concerns of people in particular concrete
situations, then we can continue to engage in critique
long after we have given up on a universal epistemology.
An interesting example of this was recently
experienced by a friend of mine who visited her in-laws in
China. While middle class, white feminists have often seen
the ability of women to breast feed their children as part
of a feminist agenda, my friend's Chinese sister-in-law
saw her ability to use infant formula as liberating
because it freed her to go to work and leave her husband
at home with the baby. While we need to be critical of
Nestle for pushing infant formula on women in
underdeveloped countries who would be better off breast
feeding, we cannot suppose that breast feeding is
necessarily a feminist practice in developing countries.
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Critical discourses that grow out of one situation are
often taken up in others and experienced as enlightening.
This 'travelling' of ideas does not imply the
epistemological superiority of the system that first
generated them. There are a variety of reasons for why a
particular discourse grows up in a particular context.
Given what has been said thus far in this thesis about
the way that discourses of legitimation have of
universalizing themselves and importing a hegemonic power,
I am taking the position that the best we can do is
tentatively hold on to our own critical ideas, while
always understanding that they are ours and that they may
work very differently in other contexts and to listen with
an open ear to the critical judgments of others. We need
to understand the power of hegemony in prejudicing our
concepts of liberation, and of forcing others to define
their interests in our terms.
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